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The importance of staple agriculture in the development of the modern world can hardly
be overstated. The connotations surrounding the word “bread” and the phrase “staff of life” bear
witness to the close association between the availability of grain and the overall well-being of
western societies. It is not a coincidence that bread is both an important religious symbol and a
causal force in the maintenance or collapse of entire societies.
This dissertation aspires to provide a clearer understanding of the leading place of
overseas trade in the American economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by
showing how European war restored colonial trade relationships and reintegrated the US into
trans-Atlantic and international economic exchanges led by grain exports. By challenging the
assumption that the rupture of the American Revolution led naturally to economic separation,
this project argues that material forces and long-standing cultural ties were more powerful than
politics in shaping the contours of the British Atlantic world in the nineteenth century. Assessing
the political economy of the grain trade deepens our understanding of the late colonial and early
republican US.

Grain was also vital to the British Atlantic and British North American economy of this
era. The inherent difficulties of overcoming national, imperial, and war-divided historiographies
conceals grain from our easy gaze. Mistaken ideas of periodization and politically inspired
limitations to historical assessments ultimately hide connections that were fundamental at the
time. The availability of surplus grain, particularly from the mid-Atlantic colonies in what
would become the United States, were essential to the viability of societies around the British
Atlantic. Simply stated, without food society ceases to function. Ideology falls to the wayside,
plantations cease production, populations collapse, and long-distance warfare becomes
impossible. Examining the availability of food products, the laws enabling or limiting trade, and
the extraordinary (and sometimes illegal) steps taken to ensure that the staff of life was available
to fuel social development was crucial to the rise of Anglo-American power in a tumultuous Age
of Atlantic Revolutions whose political drama should not completely eclipse its economic
foundations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The importance of staple agriculture in the development of the modern world can hardly
be overstated. The rise of the west and the expansion of Europe relied upon various grain
products, among which corn, wheat, and rice relatively quickly became the staples that fed the
majority of the world’s population. The connotations surrounding the word “bread” and the
phrase “staff of life” bear witness to the close association between the availability of grain and
the overall well-being of western societies. It is not a coincidence that bread is both an important
religious symbol and a causal force in the maintenance or collapse of entire societies. Unlike
other commodities, there is no substitute for grain. If adequate supplies are not or cannot be
grown locally, surpluses from another region must be imported. Control of grain carries political
consequences of the highest order. Despite the importance of subsistence as the foundation for
all economic and political relationships, this is a relatively neglected subject of study. Few
historians think of bread or grain as significant until there is a supply or distribution crisis that
causes chaos. Understanding the trans-Atlantic and circum-Atlantic grain trade is vital to
understanding how the early modern Atlantic world functioned. 1

1

Three quite different studies make plain the crucial place of subsistence agriculture for the rise of the west. See the
condemnation of the origins of sedentary agriculture and early state formation in James C. Scott, Against the Grain:
A Deep History of the Earliest States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); the classic view of environmental
historian Alfred W. Crosby’s Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2004); and the outcome of North American colonization as foreordained by the
disparities in the timing of the Neolithic Revolution in Camilla Townsend, Pocahontas and the Powhatan
Dilemma (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004).

1

This dissertation examines the production and export of grain and related food
commodities from the mainland British North American colonies (and subsequently the United
States) throughout the Atlantic world in a period of sustained warfare from 1765 to 1815. It
bridges the long-standing political periodization that separates the late colonial and early
republican periods of US history as well as the American-Canadian divide to argue for the
persistence and even expansion of late-colonial Anglo-American economic integration into the
nineteenth century.
Three related investigations shape this project. First, it explores trade patterns before and
after the American Revolution by analyzing merchant documents and government trade records
about grain, a staple foodstuff. The contours of colonial trade for 1768-1772 are particularly well
known due to the rich American Board of Customs records, however, a systemic examination of
how the Revolutionary political transformation changed the grain trade remains elusive. This is
particularly true of the key role that “American” grain played in supporting the northernmost
British colonies that remained within the empire and later became Canada. 2
Second, the dissertation examines the slow growth of grain production in and exports
from British North America in the post-Revolutionary period, and the implications this had for
US commerce. British North America possessed limited agricultural potential, primarily due to
ecological factors, made dire when its population boomed due to the loyalist migration that
outstripped the existing capacity of subsistence farming. Ironically, US independence linked
British North America more firmly to the American economy than prior to the Revolution, a
bond that persisted through the War of 1812 and beyond. Grain production shortages in British
North America led British authorities to encourage economic reconciliation with the US to

2

See John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy of British North America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

2

access essential grain, which caused a divergence between British political objectives and
foreign policy, on the one hand, and the pragmatic needs and economic interests of British
officials, the military, and settlers in North America, on the other. This key tension also shaped
the emergent US political economy as Federalist and Democratic-Republican administrations
struggled to navigate reintegration into the British Atlantic economy, which especially exposes
how the Jeffersonian goal of political neutrality in its foreign policy was undermined by a
desperate need for external markets to restart the war-ravaged economy. This critical tension
informed key developments from the Peace Treaty of 1783, to the Embargo of 1807, the War of
1812, and its aftermath.
The third major theme examined here is the role played by US grain exports to Iberia to
sustain the allied British forces in the Peninsular War from 1809 to 1813. While a North
American continental focus helps to shift our understanding away from a strictly national view,
this trans-Atlantic trade further highlights the profound integration of US grain producers and
merchants, British capital, and the exigencies of provisioning the army and civilians in a period
of large-scale military mobilization. The Iberian Peninsula had been an important destination for
colonial period grain exports, and British military records indicate that US grain supplies were
vital for the British army commissariat through the 1813 campaign.
This dissertation aspires to provide a clearer understanding of the leading place of
overseas trade in the American economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by
showing how European war restored colonial trade relationships and reintegrated the US into
trans-Atlantic and international economic exchanges led by the expansion of grain exports. By
challenging the assumption that the martial and political ruptures of the American Revolution led
naturally to economic separation, this project argues that material forces and long-standing

3

cultural ties were more powerful than politics in shaping the contours of the British Atlantic
world in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the power of Britain’s “informal empire,” based on trade
rather than direct political control, was first operative in its former American settlement colonies
over the many years of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
Economic historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher’s influential examination of
the intersection between imperialism and free trade in the British Empire usefully informs the
analysis of the post-independence persistence of trade in the Anglo-American world. Their
article “The Imperialism of Free Trade” considers the mid- and late-Victorian era, however, their
conceptualization applies to earlier imperial developments, indeed, the US may have served as a
model for later trade relations with the non-British world. According to Robinson and
Gallagher’s theory, the official governing bonds of empire could be supplemented or replaced by
informal bonds of commerce provided that the paramount position of British economic interest
was not imperiled. 3 Commercial ties could often be more effective, less risky, and certainly less
costly to the British than formal annexation. After the Revolution, returning the former colonies
to the empire was not a realistic possibility. Rather, trade networks between Britain—and by
extension the British Empire—and independent countries like the US encouraged the growing
power of local elites who depended on foreign trade for prosperity. 4
Robinson and Gallagher focus on the interests of mercantile elites. The unique nature of
grain, however, expands the interest in international trade much more broadly to other social and
economic groups. Markets for surplus grain was not just an elite concern. Economically, the
“revolution of 1800” in the US with Jefferson’s presidential election changed nothing.

3

John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review, Vol. 6,
No. 1 (1953), 1-15, 4.
4
Ibid, 10.

4

Jefferson’s beloved yeoman farmers depended on the West Indies and Iberia as a vent for their
surplus production. Thus, they shared pro-trade commitments with the more Federalist-leaning
merchant class. The financial interest in reopening and sustaining trade cut across other social
and political boundaries as well. Efforts to disengage from trade with Britain provoked a
visceral response from a wide swath of American society. This outrage caused the failure of
Jefferson’s embargo and subsequent trade restriction schemes under Madison, even those called
for during wartime.
This dissertation contributes to new scholarly knowledge about the economic and
political structures of an imperfectly divided first British Empire. The durability of transnational business relationships based on mutual self-interest—despite wars, international
tensions, and domestic political rancor—is the essential terrain to be mapped by this project. This
dissertation also challenges the politically-dominated chronology of late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century US history, but risks being an historiographical orphan as it tries to break
from that traditional periodization. Nonetheless, by doing so a richer understanding of transnational trade can be achieved with valuable implications for better understanding contemporary
globalization and its dynamic flow of capital and goods.
The chronological divide between late colonial and early republican American history is
a recognized problem among specialists. The October 2017 joint editions of the William and
Mary Quarterly and the Journal of the Early Republic sought to illustrate integrative connections
across the Revolutionary rupture. Chronologically, the issues attempted to explore
if we have miscast the American Revolution by treating it either as the
culmination of colonial history or as the foundation for the early republic. Does
focusing on the coming revolution distort the colonial past to serve a teleology?
Or do we a priori assume that the revolution was a watershed between a rather
5

somnolent colonial society and a modernizing republican order? What happens to
our histories if instead we plant the revolution in the middle of a longer flow of
change: does it appear more or less transformative? 5
This valuably questions the teleology of the Revolution and draws attention to the difficulties
national histories impose on historians. Despite the stated goal, however, none of the articles in
either journal provided a substantive response to this call for a more inclusive perspective.
Rather, they tacitly delineate the connections and boundaries between the two journals. This
dissertation, however, embraces the challenge set forward by Eliga Gould in Among the Powers
of the Earth: what would happen if the Revolution were in the midst of the story rather than its
organizing structure? 6 By adopting an economic frame of reference centered on a particular set
of commodities that transcend the Revolutionary divide, this dissertation provides an answer.
While the wheat trade became more complex due to post-war US independence, AngloAmerican grain trading patterns continued and intensified even during the War of 1812.
Any study of international economy encounters multiple national perspectives,
frameworks, and chronologies. The US was only one part of the early modern Atlantic grain
exchange system. Unfortunately, pre-Confederation Canadian historiography often hinges on
two events that dominate its chronology and conceptualization of British North America. The
fall of New France in 1760 with the subsequent introduction of British rule and the arrival of
loyalist refugees in 1783, which serves a parallel function to the American Revolution in US
scholarship. Again, political events, actors, and perspectives are at the forefront of scholarship.
While this dissertation post-dates the conquest of New France, 1783 is not an apt starting point

5

Alan Taylor, “Introduction: Expand or Die: The Revolution’s New Empire,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
Series (hereafter WMQ), Vol. 74, No. 4 (October 2017), 619.
6
Eliga Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

6

for anglophone British North America’s relationship with the wheat economy. The date is
significant, however, as the increasing population’s need for US provisions led to closer
economic integration.
British Imperial history also provides limited insights. As the British historian Peter
Marshall noted long ago, the loss of the thirteen colonies “seems so clearly to bring to an end one
imperial system, and to be followed so slowly and reluctantly by the gradual accumulation of a
second empire, that the importance of American independence as a line of demarcation has never
been in doubt.” Yet Marshall questions this truism by seeing the Revolution as part of a
continuity: “the first and second empires were divided by a war, but they were linked by long
term and perhaps more fundamental trends than those which have been believed to divide
them.” 7 Marshall astutely questions the chronological divide but does so with a different
rationale than is pursued here.
The core periodization of this study from 1765 to 1815 follows Marshall and focusses
intensively on the commercial tenet of empire highlighted by David Armitage’s Ideological
Origins of the British Empire, which proposes that the first empire was defined by its’
“Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free” nature. 8 Imperial ideology did not automatically
cease or transform in 1783 nor did Americans totally reject British values and norms. They, too,
saw themselves as Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free, independence mostly meant that
the colonies rejected and transcended their inferior position within the British Empire. The
political context changed, but patterns of trade and its sweeping cultural and social implications

7

Peter Marshall, “The First and Second British Empires: A Question of Demarcation,” History, Vol. 49, No. 165
(1964), 13, 23. Marshall extends this commitment to a common empire in his recent, more global, work The Making
and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
8
David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
8.

7

were not fundamentally altered in either theory or practice. In the context of the wheat trade, the
first empire persisted for both British and US actors. The wheat trade offers a revealing case
study of a continuous development from the first empire to the second with hard work and
intensive negotiations to reintegrate the US back into an important place as an agricultural
exporter in the British-dominated Atlantic economy.
Despite the importance of grain for early modern political economy, the topic has been
neglected with just a small handful of exceptions. These reflect a twentieth-century interest in
American trade with Europe in the wake of World War I and World War II. Studies of US grain
exports to Europe bloomed briefly in the 1920s, led by W. Freeman Galpin’s The Grain Supply
of England During the Napoleonic Era and a couple of subsidiary articles. 9 The 1960s also saw
several publications on the political economy of the American grain trade to Europe. Mancur
Olson’s The Economics of the Wartime Shortage stressed the continuity between the Napoleonic
era, World War I, and World War II through an examination of trade barriers to US grain exports
due to European wartime struggles. 10 Galpin and Olson both focus on trade directly with Great
Britain, which was actually one of the smaller markets for American grain in the period.
Nevertheless, both persuasively demonstrated the significance of European warfare on neutral
US trade.

9

W. Freeman Galpin, The Grain Supply of England During the Napoleonic Period (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1925); Galpin’s other works include “The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 18101814,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 28, no. 1 (1922): 24-44; “The Grain Trade of Alexandria, Virginia,
1801-1815,” The North Carolina Historical Review, Vol. 4, no. 4 (1927): 404-27; “The Grain Trade of New
Orleans, 1804-1814,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (March 1928), 496-507. See also
Anna C. Clauder, “American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 17931812” (unpublished Ph.d. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1932).
10
Mancur Olson, The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic
War and in World Wars I and II (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963).

8

Emphasizing continuity rather than disjunction presents several theoretical challenges.
Eschewing nationalistic narratives requires a different type of framework without an obvious
alternative. Grain compounds that challenge. Unlike other agricultural staples, grain does not
require a particular form of labor or social structure for production. The ubiquity of grain has
dissuaded historians from serious inquiries into its trade as it does not fit into familiar categories
of historical analysis. Grain farming occurred in feudal, semi-feudal, free, and slave-based labor
systems. As a result, social historians examining the intersections of race, class, and gender have
ignored grain as a category of analysis in favor of other staples such as sugar, cotton, tobacco, or
fur that clearly demonstrate a link between forms of labor, the goods produced, and local social
and economic development. 11
Cathy Matson’s essay “Thoughts on the Field of Economic History” provides a broad
state of the field assessment and notes that economic history has had “an uneasy co-existence”
with both history and economics because of modern disciplinary distinctions. 12 A separation
among economics, history, and politics, however, would not be recognizable in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. In that era leading commentators such as Adam Smith, Thomas
Malthus, David Ricardo fully fused these and other fields that would be sundered by later
professional specialization.
The intersection of grain, economics, and politics is extensively examined in Adam
Smith’s pioneering study of political economy The Wealth of Nations (1776). According to

11

See Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries: History of an International Economy, 2nd edition. (Toronto: Toronto
University Press, 1954); Stephen Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Space of Power in Early Modern
British America. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2005); Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The
Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1972); Phillip Morgan, slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).
12
Cathy Matson, “A House of Many Mansions: Some Thoughts on the Field of Economic History” in Cathy
Matson, ed. The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 1.

9

Smith, a scarcity occasionally arose due to war or natural causes, however, “a famine has never
arisen from any other cause but the violence of government attempting, by improper means, to
remedy the inconveniences of a dearth.” 13 Essentially, for Smith, government intervention into
the marketplace causes greater distress in markets and for people. In his view, government
interference, even to protect domestic peace by controlling grain prices, only made catastrophe
more likely. 14 In conclusion, governmental restrictions on the grain trade
may every where be compared to the laws concerning religion. The people feel
themselves so much interested in what relates either to the subsistence in this life,
or their happiness in a life to come, that government must yield to their
prejudices, and, in order to preserve the public tranquility, establish a system
which they approve of. 15
Smith’s analysis of the volatile links among the people, the government, and subsistence was
correct. In the most famous case of the eighteenth century, the women’s march on Versailles in
1789 started as a bread riot in Paris.
Smith’s primary focus was on internal British trade laws and domestic production. The
multiple and conflicting interests of the crown, landowners, the public, and merchants combined
to restrict the practical application of an unfettered supply and demand grain economy.
Eliminating internal trade barriers drove Smith’s narrative with a main focus on Great Britain as
a country rather than as an empire. Beyond Britain itself, a system of freer trade in grain already
existed.
In his recent analysis of the early modern mercantile system historian Steve Pincus notes
that there was a “profound and highly politicized debate between those who thought trade was in
fact a zero-sum game based on landed wealth and those who felt substantial worldwide economic

13

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. II (London: W. Strathan and
T. Cadell, 1776), 109.
14
Ibid, 117-120.
15
Ibid, 126.
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growth created by human labor was possible and desirable.” 16 Clearly, a mercantile system of
controlled and regulated trade was not universally accepted or defined even among Britain
officials. Thus, the more active trade management reforms of the post-Seven Years War period
marked more than the end of a period of supposedly salutary neglect. For Pincus, it heralded the
ascendance of a new policy with a significant coalition of British support. 17
The mercantile roundtable in which Pincus’ article appeared provoked several strong
responses. Cathy Matson argued that his ideological argument stressing partisan polarization
was over simplified. Mercantilism was “neither a static nor a coherent system of interests and
policies but rather an ever-changing approach to the economic development of the British
Empire and always politically charged.” 18 Susan Amussen’s critique acknowledged the
unsatisfactory capaciousness of the term mercantilism, but defended it as a useful description for
an “overall framework within which changing economic policies functioned, as both theory and
practice were debated in coffeehouses and the pamphlet literature….[but] rather than assuming
that debates about economic ideas mean that some particular thing is happening, we need to ask
whether and how they affected policy.” 19
The grain trade fits awkwardly within these structural debates. Other commodities, sugar
above all, were certainly politically charged. Organized groups such as the West Indies planters
utilized mercantilistic arguments to exploit the political system to protect their economic
interests. There was no organized grain advocacy group or agitation on behalf of grain producers
outside of England itself. It rarely appears in any of the debates over imperial trade regulation.
16

Steve Pincus, “Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 3-34, 15.
17
Ibid, 31-34.
18
Cathy Matson, “Imperial Political Economy: An Ideological Debate and Shifting Practices,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1
(January 2012), 35-40, 35-37.
19
Susan Amussen, “Political Economy and Imperial Practice,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 47-50, 50.
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Colonial grain was the ideal trade commodity to support the mercantile system of the British
empire precisely because it was allowed to be exported beyond the empire. The inherent
imbalance between food production and food consumption in the Caribbean plantation complex
could only be reconciled through trade with Great Britain or its mainland colonies. Thus, a key
element of the extreme overcommitment to slave staple production in the Caribbean by all
European empires were payments to Great Britain in exchange for food.
The definitive feature of mercantilism is not as a system to control trade; rather, it is a
system of import controls on external products entering the empire. As efforts to enforce
stronger central oversight of the British Atlantic economy in the 1760s demonstrates, it was not
grain exports that created conflict between colonial traders and imperial officials. Rather, it was
the content of the return cargos that provoked dispute. The colonial grain trade was the key
commodity in the Atlantic World that made mercantilist theory viable in the real world of
market-based trade driven by practical self-interest. Allowing free grain exports, in the end,
served mercantile needs effectively even as it operated outside of imperial regulation and
taxation.
Political economy is a key concept for this dissertation, and its definition by historian
Drew McCoy in The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America offers a
useful starting point. McCoy defined political economy in the era as
the necessary existence of a close relationship between government, or the polity,
and the social and economic order. Thus to the revolutionaries in America, the
notion of “political economy” reinforced the characteristically republican idea of
a dynamic interdependence among polity, economy, and society. 20

20
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Political economy, of course, is not exclusively characteristic of a republic nor the sole claim of
Jeffersonians. Every government in the early modern Atlantic World was keenly aware of the
political dimensions of trade. McCoy’s definition also does not highlight the importance of
provision agriculture in the era’s political economy, a widespread shortcoming, as noted earlier.
As the writings of Smith and Malthus persuasively demonstrate, political economy was
understood in explicitly agricultural terms in the early modern world. Commerce based in
agricultural products—especially grain products that form the basis for subsistence—were
fundamental to political economy and to viable societies throughout the Atlantic world. Our
understanding needs to be more fully grounded in this context.
Marxist interpretations of the early modern economy examine the effects of trading
networks on labor, however, the focus is on the European working classes more than the system
itself. Scholars such as Immanuel Wallenstein seek to explain the industrialization of a
European core as the result of structural exploitation by European capital of the periphery. 21
Class relations are significant, of course, but to only consider the connection between grain
shortages and revolution fails to offer a holistic understanding of the central place of the
economics of grain as the emergent Atlantic world was created and provided a foundation for
later globalization. The intersection of the politics of grain and the economics of grain lie at the
center of this dissertation.
The combination of politics and economy have yielded landmark studies of colonial
societies. Harold Innis developed the staples thesis to explain the development of the Canadian
economy, and the theory’s emphasis on the importance of the export economy is applicable to
other societies in the early modern period. Underlying the theory is the assumption that the
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export sector “is the leading sector of the economy and set the pace for economic growth.” 22 In
his 1936 article “Some Aspects of a Pioneer Economy,” W.A. Mackintosh stipulated that it was
only through the production and export of staples that a pioneer economy could gain the capital
necessary for further economic development. Exports link immature frontier economies to
developed economies, thereby encouraging further capital investments, settlement, and the
development of subsidiary economic activities around staples production that allow for further
development. 23 While Mackintosh focused his research on the development of the Canadian
west and the production of wheat for export markets in the late nineteenth century, the theoretical
model that he followed also applies to earlier forms of staples production. In most ways, the US
economy in the period under study remained a colonial-frontier economy.
According to historian Marc Egnal, the staples theory approach to colonial economic
growth suffers from many limitations. The breadth of staples theory does not lend itself to
quantifiable analysis, does not adequately account for non-staples driven growth, nor for cultural
characteristics that influence social development, and it rests on a static conception of rates of
economic growth. A critical shortcoming of staples theory in the case of grain is that there is not
a discernable social or labor structure associated with grain. At its heart, the staples thesis is a
theoretical explanation of how a single resource economy developed to support the production
and sale of that commodity to distant markets. Wheat fits this model poorly, for, unlike the
classic examples such as sugar or fur, there is no inherently necessary backwards or final demand
linkages associated with its production or consumption. For grain, 75-80% of production was
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consumed on the farm rather than for trade. 24 Staples theory works well as a frame of analysis
for luxury goods that yielded enormous profits via an overwhelming orientation toward exports,
yet it does not permit an evaluation of the importance of grain.
Generally, this is a work of Atlantic history that uses the trans-Atlantic political and
economic implications of the grain trade to emphasize persistent and durable trade connections
despite political change. 25 According to historian Alison Games, the Atlantic World concept
centers on an effort by scholars to examine “the four continents that surround the Atlantic Ocean
and the people contained therein.” This complex undertaking has been influentially organized
into three core approaches by historian David Armitage: circum-Atlantic (focus on the Atlantic
experience as a whole), trans-Atlantic (focus on a comparative approach), and cis-Atlantic (focus
on a single place within an Atlantic context). 26 An Atlantic World conceptualization valuably
recognizes the complexities of a multi-century, multi-layered history within an interactive
geographic space.
The trans-national quality of the Atlantic World concept is especially helpful to assess
issues such as smuggling and illegal trade that fall outside the boundaries of nationalistic or
empire-centric narratives. The British Atlantic economy depended on trans-Atlantic connections
to provide Africans as slave camp laborers, North American lumber and provisions fueled slave
subsistence, and European capital investments and markets were essential for colonial
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development. This complicates the traditional view of the “triangle trade” which connected the
Americas to Europe and Africa. According to historian Bernard Bailyn, the triangle trade was, in
fact, “an unstable, flexible, multilateral geometry of trade that shifted in unpredictable ways.” Its
pan-oceanic trade networks were “interwoven, complex, and multitudinous- so complex, so
numerous, that they can only be illustrated, not catalogued, enumerated, or fully summarized.” 27
Under this theory, the regions within the Atlantic system are important in and of themselves,
however, the most valuable insights concern interconnections among them. The flexibility of the
Atlantic World model encourages the examination of trading patterns that pursue the actual
movement of commodities rather than the assertions and claims about trade by politicians.
Atlantic history continues to be a dynamic and productive approach to assess the early
modern world. Writing in 2009 on the expanding literature in the field, Bailyn wrote “the main
stimulus to the proliferation of studies in and references to Atlantic history has been the
explanatory power and suggestive implications created by the vison of the Atlantic region as a
coherent whole.” 28 Trade has been an important beneficiary of this focus. By transcending an
overly simplistic narrative of centralized control of economic development and trade.
The field of Atlantic history now threatens to become nearly as large as the Atlantic itself
with many large multi-essay guides to the subject. A leading example by Oxford University
Press posits that “over the course of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, several
Atlantic worlds, each with distinctive features but sharing much in common, were fashioned,”
yet it was not until the eighteenth century that these were absorbed “into a larger unit of
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interdependency” so that “a single functioning Atlantic World….flourished through much of the
eighteenth century.” However, the volume “emphatically rejects” viewing this history as “an
extension of European history and teleological delineations of transitions from ‘colony to
nation,’” thus distancing their conception of Atlantic history from an older and less inclusive
tradition of imperial history. 29 Despite these grandiose goals, and perhaps, in part, because of
them, vital agricultural commodities are ignored entirely in this state of the field assessment that
aspires to be comprehensive. Wheat, grain, food, and agriculture do not even appear in the index
of this 37-chapter tome.
Historian David Hancock’s contribution on commodities and trade to the volume
exemplifies the ways in which provision agriculture has been overlooked. His essay in this
compilation reflects several similar themes to the Bailyn volume. Clarification on his points
about networks and self-organization centered on the importance of the family firms and private
partnerships in commerce. The role allotted to agriculture outside of the plantation complex by
Hancock is limited. He suggests that management of agricultural trade by imperial structures
was looser due to the labor intensive (rather than capital intensive) nature of the commodities. 30
Hancock’s contributions to this dissertation are important, as family-based merchant
firms, such as the Hollingsworths of Philadelphia, were crucial actors in the grain trade.
American independence did not sever the self-organized and decentralized trading networks that
linked the US and Great Britain. Temporary political conflict could not abolish the important
ties of family, mutual economic interests, and shared culture created over decades of exchange.
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As historians David Armitage and Michael Braddick wrote, “the British Atlantic might be an
imprecise geographical expression, but it was a real social phenomenon. Over time, identifiable
networks of trust, trade, and kinship grew up between British people moving in this larger
Atlantic world.” 31 The persistence of commerce after US political independence illustrates the
ongoing power of these connections to maintain an English-speaking Atlantic World.
Informal and illegal trade is important as well, particularly in the context of the
Caribbean. The food commodities trade between the mainland colonies and foreign colonial
empires was long established by the 1770s. Focusing on illicit trade, however, is not the main
part of the story. Grain does not fit neatly into the licit/illicit dichotomy associated with sugar
and other better-studied products. Legal commerce across imperial boundaries was common in
the grain trade. Spain and Portugal both relied on British colonial surpluses that were legally
exchanged under the laws of both kingdoms as well as Great Britain. After US independence,
need compelled British officials in the Caribbean and British North America to legalize trade that
under the strict mandate of the mercantile system would have been illegal. It is a telling
commentary that there were only three brief moments when the grain trade was outlawed after
the American Revolution and all were unusual: the US embargos from 1807-1809, again by the
US in early 1814, and by the British government in 1814 as part of its wartime blockade of the
US
The Atlantic World was a coherent whole by the mid-eighteenth century and the place of
trade in wheat and subsistence crops was a key element of this integrated world that needs
further study. Scholarship on the economy of the Atlantic World has been novel and exciting,
but it remains incomplete. An analysis of US exports prior to 1820 illustrates this shortcoming.
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According to Robert Lipsey’s research, vegetable foods (including grain products) represented a
plurality of US exports during the early republic. The expansion of cotton production and
exports starting in the 1820s shifted this trade pattern to the more famous leading role of the
slave-produced commodity. 32 The grain trade played a crucial role in a volatile political era of
change from the 1760s to the 1810s and helped to stabilize the Anglo-American Atlantic via
dynamic and persistence commercial exchanges and relationships.
Persistent commercial ties stemmed from a lack of viable alternatives for both producers
and consumers. Despite the lack of attention to the grain trade by historians, early modern
observers were keenly aware of wheat as an essential product and trade commodity. The direct
connection between social stability, grain prices, and the availability of bread was central to
wide-ranging and frequent political debates. In Great Britain, the landowning class depended on
agricultural profits and rents to sustain their economic and social status. Thus, an uneasy balance
between profit and access shaped the grain trade. These social and political forces, however, did
not exist for the rest of the empire. After the American Revolution the British would have
preferred to prohibit American trade with the empire but efforts to find a non-US granary
remained elusive for the next four decades. The consequences of this failure are significant as it
created a dichotomy between political policy and economic necessity.
This dissertation has six substantive chapters. Each approaches the continued
connections between the US and the British Empire through the grain trade over time. Chapter 2
explores the late colonial and early republic era trade patterns, especially in regard to two
essential primary source collections. The Colonial Office 16 records (hereafter, CO 16) for
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1768-1772 provide the most important quantitative assessment of colonial era trade. Second,
Timothy Pitkin’s A Statistical Analysis of American Trade (1816) provides an important
corroborating source. Unenumerated grain and grain products were not constrained by law to
trade within the empire and could be exchanged directly with Iberian, Caribbean, and
Mediterranean markets in both the late colonial and early republican periods. This legal
difference from famed products like tobacco and sugar contributes to the obscurity of grain in the
secondary literature. There are no grain-based counterparts to the Sugar Act or the Boston Tea
Party that illustrate ruptures in trade to attract historians. Rather, grain underwrote quotidian
continuity, rendering it a less emotive—but still vital—subject of inquiry.
John McCusker and Russell Menard’s groundbreaking study The Economy of British
North America dedicates only thirteen pages to early American provision agriculture. 33 Within
this brief section, the connection of food production to external markets are not mentioned. The
research in grain production is relatively strong as part of the “transition to capitalism” debates. 34
Paul Clemens’ From Tobacco to Grain illustrates the transition to grain production for external
markets on Maryland’s eastern shore. By the mid-1760s, the expansion of grain farming in
Maryland and Virginia due to multiple factors was clear. Clemens argues that a growing demand
for grain fused with the complementary nature of grain and tobacco agriculture encouraged a
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significant shift in regional production, but how this happened, why, and exactly when these
strands combined remains unclear. 35
The trade patterns outlined by these two landmark studies note a significant change in
colonial grain exports by the 1730s as “Europe in general became less and less able to feed
itself.” 36 Integration with European markets, especially those of southern Europe, is an
important continuity connecting the colonial and early republican eras. James Lydon’s Fish and
Flour for Gold persuasively argues that the colonial grain trade with Iberia reached significant
levels by the 1730s that persisted despite the temporary disruption of the American Revolution.
However, “Iberia’s need for foodstuffs and lumber products worked to America’s
advantage…and the European wars after 1790 saw this valuable trade firmly and profitably
regenerated.” 37
The American Revolution changed the political geography of the previously united
empire. Andrew O’Shaughnessy offers a political interpretation of its impact on the British West
Indies in An Empire Divided. The separation of the West Indies from their traditional sources of
provisions caused starvation for thousands of enslaved people and poor whites on the islands of
Nevis, St. Kitts, Montserrat, and Antigua during the war. 38 Further research on the post-war US
grain economy by Brooke Hunter confirms the importance of the Caribbean as an export market.
Hunter argues that the 1780s were a profitable time for American grain exports despite the shortterm disruption of the war. In theory, US trade was excluded from British Caribbean markets.
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However, “to declare a law and to enforce it were two different things.” 39 According to Gordon
Bjork’s work, although the volume of legal trade in the 1780s declined, the actual value of trade
remained constant since the price of grain increased. As Europe slid into disorder and then into
war in the 1790s, the price for grain rose even more dramatically. 40 Hunter’s 2001 dissertation
“Rage for Grain: Flour Milling in the Mid-Atlantic, 1750-1815” advances our understating of the
flour production industry in the mid-Atlantic region. Hunter’s chronology is significant,
however, her research focuses on technological evolution, environmental factors such as the
Hessian fly, and labor requirements of production more than trade. 41 Despite the call for more
research on the grain trade, this has not occurred, as David Hancock noted in his 2006 article
“Rethinking the Economy of British North America.” 42 A thorough quantitative analysis of this
trade, however, is impossible as a fire in the London Customs House in 1814 destroyed most of
the Ledgers of Imports and Exports for 1780 and after. 43
Chapter 3 examines post-US independence grain farming in the British North American
colonies as a potential alternative to traditional American sources that were now outside the
empire. To establish a reliable grain surplus would require the British to accomplish a level of
agricultural development in Quebec that the French had not achieved in 150 years and to do so
for a suddenly enlarged population due to the loyalist migration. This chapter has two
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subsections: Quebec (Lower Canada post-1791) and the Maritime Provinces (New Brunswick,
Cape Breton, and Nova Scotia). Politically the regions were linked by British rule, but a variety
of factors create distinct historiographies for each in relationship to agricultural development.
Despite important differences, in the face of conflict with the US, British North America
functioned as a coherent unit. This is particularly true in the nineteenth century when economic
regulations (and the defiance thereof) were increasingly cast in nationalist and imperialist terms
rather than cross-border regionalist ones.
The grain economy was central to a post-Revolutionary debate about how (or if) the new
United States would be reintegrated into the British Atlantic economy. A series of trans-Atlantic
treatises on the political economy of trade ensued. Writing in 1783, Lord Sheffield’s tract
Observations on the Commerce of the United States presented a traditional outline of mercantile
theory combined with the hopeful assertion that British North America would soon replace the
US as an imperial granary supporting the West Indies and export markets in Iberia. This
provoked many responses on both sides of the Atlantic. 44
The practical problems of replacing US production were clear almost immediately,
especially with local production in the Maritimes. As Neil MacKinnon’s This Unfriendly Soil
persuasively demonstrates, loyalist refugees in Nova Scotia faced a formidable environment, a
lack of infrastructure, and near famine conditions. 45 In response, the provincial government of
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Nova Scotia permitted food imports from the US on a “temporary” basis until establishing an
adequate agricultural base to feed itself. This plan, if practicable as an abstract policy, did not
account for how markets function. Graeme Wynn’s research on agriculture in the Bay of Fundy
suggests that hopes for provincial self-sufficiency on foodstuffs did not make economic sense. 46
By the early years of the nineteenth century, the temporary expedient of US grain imports into
the Maritime Provinces was effectively permanent. Dreams of the Maritimes as an alternative
granary to supply massive demand in the West Indies proved illusory.
Quebec (Lower Canada, after 1791) represented the most developed and heavily settled
colony in British North America, and, thus, the most likely source of grain exports from British
North America. Lydon’s Fish and Flour for Gold and the CO 16 ledgers record exports from
Quebec to Iberia prior to the American Revolution. Assessing agriculture production, however,
is difficult due to the lack of quantitative data. According to Robert Armstrong’s Structure and
Change: An Economic History of Quebec, no agricultural census was made prior to 1827. 47
Historical assessments of Lower Canadian agricultural development has produced a
significant and emotive, yet somewhat misdirected, series of inquires between two contending
schools of interpretation. In short, the conflict between Fernand Ouellet and the Laval School
and their opponents in the Montreal School are based on clashing assessments of export data.
Lacking any broad agricultural census data, both interpretations rely on export records and hotly
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dispute whether or not it can be used as a proxy for production. The inability of Quebec grain
production to serve as a replacement for US imports is agreed upon. 48 Whether this was due to
increasing domestic demand (as proposed by the Montreal School, thus indicating a productive
but not export oriented agricultural economy) or as a sign of declining production (as proposed
by the Laval School, thus indicating an agricultural society in crisis) need not be resolved for this
dissertation. Agricultural exports in this long-standing historiographic dispute became a proxy
argument for the overall state of French-Canadian society. What is central to this dissertation,
however, is that both sides agree that there was a decline in grain exports from Quebec after
1802.
Beyond the contending schools of interpretation lies a material reality. When compared
to the mid-Atlantic colonies, all of British North America faced difficulties in transportation,
infrastructure, and the environmental conditions required to sustain a large-scale grain export
economy. Time is another important factor. The colonial grain economy was built over the
course of decades; recreating that economy overnight was simply not possible. In the case of
Lower Canada, the potential development of other crops, such as peas and potatoes, diminished
the overall importance of wheat to the local economy, and thus detracted from the ability to
expand grain exports. 49
Chapter 4 examines the connections between the US and the Atlantic grain economy
during the French Revolution through the end of Jefferson’s administration in 1809. With
British North America unable to produce necessary grain surpluses to meet demand, British
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policy makers turned to the US Political changes throughout the Atlantic World brought change
to the US economy as well. Jay’s Treaty in 1794 reopened official connections between the US
and the British Empire and legalized the pattern of exchange that already existed informally.
Wartime conditions, familiarity, and neutral trade offered great potential for mutually beneficial
exchanges.
The focus on exports and re-exports for the European markets as the vehicle for
American prosperity has been dubbed the “Taylor-North” thesis. This explicitly explores the
power dynamic between the United States and European powers (especially France and Great
Britain), and its impact on the US export-based economy. The European war placed most transAtlantic trade into the hands of neutral powers and was particularly beneficial for the United
States as a fragile new nation. According to historian Douglass North, the 1793-1808 time
period brought “years of unparalleled prosperity” for the US led by the rapid expansion of
exports in the overall economy, advantageous import prices, and the growth of domestic
manufactures driven by export-sector profits. 50
War in Europe meant opportunity for neutrals, as the US, in theory, could legally trade
with any belligerent power. However, this became increasingly dangerous as the European war
changed. According to historian Reginald Horsman, neutrality and the European conflict
provided the United States both the opportunity to secure western expansion as well as the
danger that those great powers might interfere with US shipping. 51 One major beneficiary of
these wartime conditions were grain farmers. In her analysis of the early republican political
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economy, historian Joyce Appleby wrote that “the new European demand for American
grains…. created an unusually favorable opportunity for ordinary men to produce for the Atlantic
trade world.” 52
The 1790s exposed stark cleavages among US political leaders. Divisions over how the
US should respond to the French Revolution, taxation and economic policies, the power of the
federal government in relation to the states, and other issues sharply polarized politics. The
Federalist and Democratic-Republicans (or Jeffersonian Republicans) disagreed on many issues,
but the need for external markets to sell surplus US agricultural products was an important point
of agreement. The continuity of trade policy from Federalist regimes under Washington and
Adams through Jefferson’s first term reflects this consensus.
Thomas Jefferson’s presidency after 1800 brought a new examination of the young
republic’s political economy and its relationship with the rest of the Atlantic world. Studies of
Jeffersonian political economy, such as Drew McCoy’s The Elusive Republic and Doron BenAtar’s The Origins of Jeffersonian Commercial Policy and Diplomacy, draw attention to the
philosophical debate among Jeffersonians over the appropriate relationship between the
economy, foreign trade, and the republic. 53 According to McCoy, the political economy of
Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman republic depended on three factors: “a national government free
from any taint of corruption, an unobstructed access to an ample supply of open land, and a
relatively liberal international commercial order that would offer adequate foreign markets for
America’s flourishing agricultural surplus.” 54 For the grain trade, the “revolution of 1800” did
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not lead to a new era of commercial liberalization. It was already liberated. Massive
commercial changes were attempted between 1805 and 1807 as the new trade policies of Britain
and France ensnared US commerce in the widening reach of European economic warfare. 55
The famed Leopard-Chesapeake incident in summer 1807 sparked the most draconian
trade regulation of the time—the Embargo Act of the United States. Beyond the economic
consequences of the embargo, law enforcement posed an unanticipated difficulty for the
Jefferson administration. Even the introduction of extraordinary measures, including the use of
military force, had little effect. 56
The total embargo transformed an international political dispute about neutral trade
regulations into a de facto referendum on Thomas Jefferson’s scheme of political economy and
the strength of the federal government. Gautham Rao’s National Duties persuasively argues that
seaborne commerce was aided by a malleable customs enforcement structure that favored
merchant interests rather than national policies restricting trade. 57 Historian Joshua Smith’s
work illustrates the link between flour and grain smuggling between US ports on
Passamaquoddy Bay into adjacent New Brunswick that effectively evaded the embargo. 58
Moreover, H.N. Mueller and Alan Taylor persuasively argue that cross-border exchange by land
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in the northern interior was virtually unchecked by the embargo. 59 Efforts to compel obedience
to the policy sparked derision from the local population, rendering future efforts to eliminate
trade by edict ineffective. According to historian Reginald Horsman, the Embargo Act
“shattered American trade and finances, created bitter internal opposition, and left no possibility
of stepping up the pressure on Great Britain by further escalation of the economic measures.” 60
Chapter 5 outlines the continued development of Canadian agriculture in the wake of
Jay’s Treaty. The arrival of the “late loyalists” and the growing settlements in Upper Canada led
to a new variable in British North American agricultural development. The environment of
Upper Canada was more favorable for wheat production due to soil and climate. The late
loyalist immigrations of the 1780s and 1790s provided some labor for clearing farms and
creating infrastructure. However, this proved inadequate to replace the US as a major imperial
granary until at least the mid-nineteenth century. The labor and infrastructure for this
development would only come with the large waves of immigration from Britain after 1815. A
trio of major monographs approach grain production from slightly different frameworks but
agree on the limited nature of early grain agriculture in the Canadas and Ontario. 61 Subsistence
farming with only minor export surpluses characterized Upper Canadian agriculture through the
1830s. Grain surpluses in Lower Canada were variable but declining, while the Maritime
Provinces continued to be dependent on external sources of grain.
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Of course, the international situation remained volatile during the embargo years, and
Chapter 6 traces Napoleon’s efforts to expand the reach of his Continental System and the
ongoing influence British naval mastery in the Atlantic. A growing dissatisfaction with
Napoleonic rule in Iberia sparked the Peninsular War in 1808. On its surface this theater of war
had nothing to do with the United States as a neutral power. It was not a belligerent power nor
was there any realistic possibility of American intervention on either side of the contest. The
historiography of the Peninsular War mistakenly reflects this perceived isolation. Only two
articles focus directly on the United States and the Peninsular War. 62 Histories of the period are
generally divided between a domestically oriented examination of Jeffersonian policies or on the
growing conflict with Great Britain that would culminate in the War of 1812. Conversely,
studies on the Peninsular War generally treat it as a European event with little direct connection
to American affairs other than as a stimulant to Latin American independence movements. 63
Ignorance of the US role in the Peninsular War is a considerable oversight. Grain
connected the US to the conflict in a vital way and provides a powerful example of the continuity
of the grain trade. Importantly, these connections are consistent with pre-war and indeed preAmerican Revolution patterns of exchange. The outbreak of the Peninsular War deepened two
long-standing elements of the traditional triangular trade. First, the connection between the mid62
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Atlantic and Iberia, where the latter provided access to salt, wine, and bills of exchange drawn on
British merchant houses. The war changed the nature of this trade. Production of wine and salt
was severely curtailed by wartime destruction. Thus, bills of exchange, notes drawn on the
British Treasury, and specie became the primary products of exchange. Even as the political
animosity between the US and Great Britain descended into war, the Iberian trade continued.
Chapter 7 outlines the persistent trade between the US and British North America from
the end of Jefferson’s embargo through the War of 1812. The rationale behind the American
declaration of war remains a matter of scholarly dispute. A sampling of theories range from
“desperation” and the desire to avoid disgrace, to more substantive US considerations of British
interference with American overseas trade, US opposition to British alliances with the First
Nations that restricted westward expansion, and American fury at impressment. 64 More
helpfully, historian J.C.A. Stagg offers a persuasive economic rationale for US goals in its
invasion of Canada as an effort to “affect Britain’s capacity to exercise its commercial and naval
powers against Americans in harmful ways that they could not otherwise control.” 65 The war
was a reactionary measure by the US to indirectly combat British trade regulations by improving
the US bargaining position through the use of Canada as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions
on neutral trading rights. 66
Other elements of the historiography reflect the ambiguous nature of the conflict for
many in both British North America and New England. John Boileau’s Half-Hearted Enemies
on the wartime relations between Nova Scotia and New England reflects the general
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ambivalence toward the war in both regions. Although privateers on both sides damaged the
calm on occasion, commerce co-existed with the conflict. 67 Faye Kert’s Prize and Prejudice
puts the point succinctly: the war “seems to have been declared by the unprepared and fought by
the unwilling for reasons that remain unexplained.” 68
Much like the connection between the US and the Peninsular War, the wartime economy
remains relatively ignored. Historian Donald Hickey, a sort of Dean of War of 1812 studies, has
repeatedly bemoaned that we lack a thorough treatment of the economic and financial history of
the War of 1812 as well as attention to the role of trade with the enemy. 69 Hickey’s earlier
article, “American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812,” argues that the British blockade
and trade restrictions were not designed to stop US trade with Canada nor could American laws
designed to end trade with the enemy be enforced. 70 Part of Hickey’s critique was answered by
Brian Arthur’s How Britain Won the War of 1812. Arthur’s focus is on the British blockade of
US ports and the economic dislocation it caused. The work persuasively links the overall health
of the US economy to external markets. Awareness of the link between customs revenues levied
on exports and the stability of US government finance is a significant contribution to
scholarship. 71
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The Treaty of Ghent that ended the War of 1812 was signed on Christmas Eve 1814. The
end of the war provided one last test for the persistent connection between US grain producers
and imperial consumers. The dawn of 1815 saw the resumption of the regular grain trade,
rendering the disruption of the North American blockade year of 1814 a rare aberration in the
long-established trade pattern. Without the interference of war, commerce in subsistence goods
again pursued their accustomed channels.
The grain trade deepens our understanding of the late colonial and early republican US It
was just as vital to the British Atlantic and British North American economy of this era. The
inherent difficulties of overcoming national, imperial, and war-divided historiographies conceals
grain from our easy gaze. Mistaken ideas of periodization and politically inspired limitations to
historical assessments ultimately hide connections that were fundamental at the time and should
be better understood. The availability of surplus grain, particularly from the mid-Atlantic
colonies in what would become the United States, were essential to the viability of societies
around the British Atlantic. Simply stated, without food society ceases to function. Ideology
falls to the wayside, plantations cease production, populations collapse, and long-distance
warfare becomes impossible. Examining the availability of food products, the laws enabling or
limiting access via trade, and the extraordinary (and sometimes illegal) steps taken to ensure that
the staff of life was available to fuel social development was crucial to the rise of AngloAmerican power in a tumultuous Age of Atlantic Revolutions whose political drama should not
completely eclipse its economic foundations and the vital lens of political economy.
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CHAPTER 2
THE GRAIN TRADE IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1768-1793: THE STAFF OF
LIFE AND THE PERSISTANCE OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND

New World settlement created a dynamic new economic structure for the increasingly
interconnected Atlantic World. Colonial development expanded production of familiar European
crops (as well as exotic newer ones) and created powerful market ties among previously isolated
locations. One foundation of this new economic framework was the emergence of the middle
colonies of the North American mainland as the granary of the Atlantic World. Exports of
colonial wheat and corn proved essential to sustain societies in other corners of the Atlantic. The
sugar plantations of the Caribbean, the settled fisheries of Newfoundland, and increasingly
portions of Europe itself all depended on surplus colonial grain by the mid-eighteenth century,
creating a complex and interlocking system of exchange. Complexity led to continuity in the
case of the wheat trade. Although the dramatic political rupture of the American Revolution
should (in theory) have caused a significant and lasting rupture in trade, this was not the case.
The contours of exchange in the grain trade remained remarkably consistent from the late
colonial era to the early republic. Rather than a decisive break, the War for American
Independence marked only a temporary aberration in the existing pattern. Reconciling political
change with economic continuity challenged political leaders and merchants throughout the
1780s and early 1790s as the dichotomy between the dictates of mercantilism (and nationalism)
and the quotidian demands for profit and food strained against one another until the outbreak of
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War created a new geo-political context that spurred a
return to traditional patterns in the grain trade with the Mid-Atlantic US exporting to much of the
multi-national Atlantic.
34

Grain as an export commodity is a surprisingly expansive category that was also rarely
documented by government sources in a systematic manner. Grain and grain products were
unenumerated commodities not subject to customs duties under British law. For tax and
regulatory purposes, there was little need to fully define the category. Depending on who was
doing the counting and how they organized their ledgers, different grain products were itemized
and combined in varied ways. For example, the Halifax Naval Office Records for the 1750s and
early 1760s do not provide set columns for commodities. Cargo manifests were written into the
ledgers on a ship-by-ship basis. By October 1811, columns for flour, corn, and bread had
appeared. 1 The essential CO 16 records for the period 1768 to 1772 itemize Indian corn, barley,
rice, and wheat under the label of “grain”. Bread and flour, however, were combined as one
item, categorized separately as “provisions.” 2 US Congressman Timothy Pitkin’s A Statistical
View of the Commerce of the United States itemizes wheat, flour, Indian corn, corn meal, and
rice under the general label of “Agriculture.” 3
The clearest definition of grain in this era appears in the Corn Laws passed by
Parliament. The May 1814 bill identified corn, grain, meal, malt, and flour as regulated
commodities under the Corn Laws. 4 In the Parliamentary debates in early 1815, the label “Corn”
was used to describe the itemized list of wheat, rye/pease/and bean, barley/beer/bigg, and oats.
Included in this was any meal or flour made of these products. 5 By the debates of 1814-1815,
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bread and rice had disappeared from the legal definition of “corn” although bread was implied by
the context. This dissertation focuses on wheat, and its direct products of flour and bread.
“Indian corn” (or maize) is also a significant cereal crop that can be important as a
complementary or substitute commodity based on shifting market circumstances. There is a
differentiated market for these two major cereal crops. Wheat was the preferred export product
to British North America (i.e., Canada) and Europe. Indian corn was more significant for the
West Indies market and could supplement imported wheat in other markets in case of need.
Quantifying the grain trade prior to start of the CO 16 records in 1768 is impossible.
However, the increasing trade volume and importance of colonial grain is clear at least as early
as the 1730s. As the leading economic historians of the era John McCusker and Russell Menard
have observed, by that decade colonial grain exports played an increasingly important role in the
Atlantic economy as “Europe in general became less and less able to feed itself.” 6 James
Lydon’s Fish and Flour for Gold persuasively argues that colonial grain exports to Iberia
reached significant levels by the 1730s. This trade was actively encouraged by British officials
as a crucial means to gain specie from Iberia. The direct beneficiaries of this inter-imperial trade
were colonial grain merchants and farmers in the large grain-growing region of the middle
colonies that stretched from Connecticut to northern Maryland. 7
To what degree colonial farmers planted grain explicitly for the export market is
disputed. Historical geographer James Lemon’s study of the major grain-producing region of
Pennsylvania and Delaware stresses its environmental advantages. Fertile soils allowed for
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farmers to plant a variety of grains, garden crops, and forage crops required for an effective
mixed-farming economy. Although surpluses would be sold, monocrop specialization was not
the norm in this era. Yields per acre could vary widely from 20-40 bushels per acre on new
lands to an average of 5-12 bushels on older farmlands. Corn was even more productive,
averaging a yield of 20-30 bushels per acre. However, most corn was used as fodder rather than
traded or consumed. 8 Overall, Lemon noted that farmers existed in both a local subsistence
economy and a market economy linking them to external consumers. He estimated that by the
1740s farmers of “middling status” sold between one third to one half of their total production
during peace time. 9
Geographic factors assisted the development of the grain trade in the Delaware Valley
and the adjacent Chesapeake and Susquehanna watershed, where grain exports were also notable.
The deep and broad Delaware River connected farmers and merchants in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Delaware directly to the Atlantic. Despite being far upriver, Philadelphia was a
major seaport and the largest British colonial city of the latter half of the eighteenth century.
Smaller streams provided energy for water mills, which allowed millers in the region to convert
semi-processed wheat into flour for local consumption and export. 10 The Chesapeake facilitated
a similar export-based economy of bulk products, especially in areas where tobacco did not
dominate or became less profitable over time. It is not possible to precisely quantify early grain
production and export in a systematic manner, but it was without question a robust and consistent
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export surplus from the Delaware Valley and the broader middle colonies to customers
throughout the eighteenth-century Atlantic World.
Colonial grain exports followed three major paths—the first to the Caribbean, the second
to Iberia, while the third pursued coastal trade. Although there were temporary fluctuations, this
order of export destinations remained stable. John McCusker and Russell Menard assessed the
relationship between mainland exports and these markets in their work The Economy of British
North America. McCusker and Menard provide a more nuanced interpretation of the export
driven economy theory and the impact that the staples trade had on the development of the North
American colonies. The middle colonies benefited from an increase in cereal prices in Europe
in the mid-eighteenth century. Combined with the pre-existing trade in grain with the West
Indies, the size, geographical expanse, and profitability of the grain trade dramatically increased
after 1750. In turn, the increased demand facilitated expanding production throughout the
region, including the repurposing of some agricultural lands from other staples commodities into
grain production. 11
A useful proxy measurement for the colonial grain trade is the scope and scale of efforts
to curtail its trade during the Seven Years War. Two related studies illuminate the overall
importance of the multi-national Caribbean as a destination for North American grain and the
complications arising from this exchange. According to Thomas Truxes’ Defying the Empire,
trade with the enemy from New York during the Seven Years War was widespread and the result
of a “naked manifestation of a powerful commercial impulse synonymous with the great
metropolis.” Truxes emphasizes how New York merchants engaged in illegal, quasi-legal, and
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morally dubious trade. 12 The outbreak of war in 1755 brought renewed imperial focus to
colonial trade practices. As part of the war effort, it was necessary to eliminate exports of flour
and other provisions to French posts in Cape Breton, New Orleans, and the Caribbean. 13
The Provisions Act of 1757 theoretically made any trade in provisions (grain, flour,
bread, and salted meat) with any trading partner other than Great Britain or other British colonies
illegal, with enforcement provided though bond requirements that amounted to three times the
value of all shipped cargo. This was evaded by first shipping New York products to New
London or other colonial ports with lax customs enforcement and obtaining documents to ship
exports to Monte Christi, a neutral Spanish Caribbean port. 14 The Royal Navy was unable to
interdict this trade. Another method of evading restrictive British trade law was through the flag
of truce. Prisoner exchanges between colonial British America and the French West Indies were
common. According to Truxes approximately 25% of New York’s trade with the enemy was
covered by an official flag of truce. 15 The imperial government attempted to curtail this traffic
through mandating better law enforcement by colonial officials. However, most colonial
governors denied the existence of illegal practices. 16 The first conviction in the New York courts
for provision smuggling was not until April 1763, and the two convicted merchants were
released with a fine. 17
According to Cathy Matson’s Merchants and Empire, trade with the West Indies was
particularly attractive to younger and middling merchants due to the lower capital investments
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required to enter those markets. 18 From 1715 to 1765 one half of all of New York’s trading
vessels and tonnage cleared for destinations in the Caribbean. 19 Overall, in McCusker and
Menard’s assessment, the West Indies
served as a major market for colonial exports, particularly foodstuffs and wood
products; they supplied a variety of goods that the continental colonists imported,
processed and consumed, and re-exported; and they provided an important source
of foreign exchange that helped balance colonial accounts and pay for British
manufactures. 20
A quantitative analysis of the system described by Lydon, Truxes, Matson, and McCusker and
Menard is possible for the years 1768-1772. Customs records for this period were preserved as
the Ledger of Imports and Exports for America, 1768-1772, better known as the CO 16
records. 21 Effective trade regulation and customs enforcement were problematic due to the great
distances between customs houses, the coasting and fishing trades, and the lack of a substantive
enforcement mechanism on the scale found in Britain or Ireland. 22 Despite these inherent
limitations, the ledgers provide an essential overview of the grain trade and provide the
opportunity to examine market differentiations in product and volume over time.
Not surprisingly, the West Indies were the most significant export market for colonial
grain products in volume. The data reveals several elements to the trade and help to explain the
place of grain within the contested mercantile system that aspired to keep trade within the British
Empire. Indeed, the first important argument here is more political than economic. The headings
within the CO 16 records explicitly acknowledged grain exports to the West Indian colonies of
non-British imperial powers. There is no differentiation between exports to the foreign West
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Indies and the British West Indies in the ledgers, thus shedding light on an important question of
peacetime trade when agricultural exports to other empires were lawful as a means to gain
wealth at the expense of a foreign land. This acceptability was contingent upon the form of the
return, however, and whether the profit impinged on the opportunities of other interest groups
within the British Empire.
A closer examination of the Sugar Act (1764) illustrates the contingent nature of the
mercantile system. Developed by George Grenville in response to the costs of the Seven Years
War, the act attempted to raise revenue while asserting some measure of control over the colonial
economy. The methods to accomplish this reflected mercantilist thinking by regulating imports
to Britain rather than exports from its colonies. While certainly politically volatile, this
legislation did not directly affect lawful grain exports to foreign colonies, and they remained
untaxed. Indeed, no grain or grain products are mentioned within the legislation. Only imported
sugar products (especially molasses), Iberian wines, and a handful of other commodities were
subjected to the new duties. 23 Despite this, access to grain underlay the entire scheme.
An analysis of the Sugar Act emphasizes its flexible blend of political interests and
careful economic considerations via a pragmatic application of mercantilist ideas. In Grenville’s
conception, lowering taxes on imported sugar products while providing for a more effective tax
collection bureaucracy would not inconvenience colonials. Rather, the tax would be passed on to
French sugar producers in the form of higher costs for provisions. Since the French islands had
no other potential source for foodstuffs, they would be forced to pay whatever price colonial
merchants charged or face the collapse of the plantation system due to lack of sustenance. As
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historian Fred Anderson notes, “if legitimizing trade between the mainland colonies and the
sugar islands of a foreign empire did not fit comfortably within the mercantilist conceptions that
framed the rest of the [sugar] act’s provisions, it made excellent economic and strategic sense in
the postwar world.” 24
Anderson’s point makes good sense, but one could go further and insist that the Sugar
Act was entirely consistent with mercantile thought. It was not the exportation of agricultural
goods into another imperial system that caused a more stringent regulatory regime. Rather, it
was the competition of the return cargo of foreign sugar products into the British imperial
economy that provoked vociferous complaints from powerful British West Indian interests. The
broader economic framework of the Sugar Act was not analyzed by colonial subjects. Rather, it
was perceived as a political measure introducing new imperial oversight that did not exist before.
Popular outrage nullified the law, but the outrage was based upon a political conception of the
disagreement rather than a coherent economic view of the place of the colonies within the
empire.
Grain lies at the intersection of political machinations and economic interests because
there were no ready substitutes for grain exports from the middle colonies. This was true for the
French and Spanish West Indies, indeed, for the entire sugar plantation economy. Resource
dependency illuminates the profound trade connection between the mainland and the planation
colonies of the Caribbean.
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Table 2.1 outlines the CO 16 records for the West Indies trade and exposes two important
elements.
Table 2.1: Exports to the British and Foreign West Indies , 1768-1772 25

Year

Flour/Bread (Tons)

Indian Corn (Bushels)

Wheat (Bushels)

1768

17,292

638,883

No Line Item

1769

20,319

514,848

No Line Item

1770

23,442

402,958

955

1771

20,652

607,532

1,028

1772

23,575

541,962

154

The sheer scale of exports is significant and further illustrates the difficulty of replacing the
mainland colonies as a source of provisions. Second, the diverse selection of commodities
displays a degree of market segmentation within the grain trade. The lack of wheat suggests a
distinct class element to provision exports. Indian corn was cheaper than wheat, considered a
cruder food item, and could also be used as animal fodder.
The ledgers do not distinguish between flour and bread, thus disaggregating the total into
its constituent parts is impossible. Yet it is notable that raw flour spoiled quickly in a tropical
environment. According to one estimate, after four months of storage most raw flour would be
uneatable and after six months of storage all flour would be rancid. 26 Due to the perishability of
flour and the relative durability of hardtack bread, it is likely that the majority of the non-corn
grain exported to the West Indies was in the form of bread.
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Perhaps the most significant information within this section of the ledgers is not the
commodity data at all. Acknowledging and labeling the foreign West Indies as a major trading
partner for the grain economy is an important illustration of how the mercantile system operated
in practice. The ledgers show how provision exports functioned within mercantilist thought.
The regulatory emphasis and fears of economic competition lie only in certain enumerated
imports to British domains.
The open market connections between the colonies and the non-British Caribbean reveals
the political economy of the grain trade under mercantilism. In theory, trade between Britain’s
North American colonies and the non-British Caribbean was illegal. However, as Truxes and
Matson have demonstrated, this was a polite fiction by the 1750s. The trade was entirely legal
under British law during peace time. It was Spanish law that threatened to curtail the exchange.
The fear of British colonial imports was grounded in fears of competition with Spanish producers
in Mexico. However, according to historian Sherry Johnson’s examination of the 1760s and
1770s, climatic fluctuations undermined these trade restrictions, and legally opened markets for
British colonial farmers. A series of hurricanes, floods, and droughts combined to disrupt local
production and distribution routes that prompted changes in Spanish colonial regulations. Dire
need overrode the fear of imported provisions. By 1766, the Asiento’s monopoly on foreign
flour imports was broken due to urgent demand. In its place, a more flexible system emerged. In
Cuba, for example, the Captain General gained the authority to permit flour and other food
products from outside the Spanish Empire at his discretion. Although this concession was
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supposed to be limited emergencies, in practice British colonial produce became a regular
sight. 27
Efforts to reconcile the monopoly interest of the Asiento and the practical need of
Spanish colonists for British colonial products on a permanent basis resulted in an unusual
solution. Grain products from the colonies would be exported to Cadiz, and then transshipped to
the Caribbean under the auspices of the Asiento. Thus, the monopoly existed in form but not in
function. Even this polite subterfuge was abandoned in time. The fact that most of the flour
imported into the Spanish Caribbean from Cadiz was from the British colonies was an open
secret. The horrific hurricane season of 1772 brought into the open what was already widely
practiced. The devastation resulted in the direct and open importation of British colonial grain
no matter what the law demanded. 28
The demographics and land use patterns of the Caribbean slave plantation system
regardless of empire required cheap provisions at all times. According to Selwyn Carrington, in
the 1770s the British West Indies received most of its corn, pickled fish, and oats from the
mainland colonies. Half of all flour imports and the vast majority of wood imports were also
from the mainland colonies. 29 The trade in low quality and inexpensive provisions to the West
Indies was a key factor in the expansion of the slave-based plantation economy as booming slave
numbers in the eighteenth century required ever more cheap food from the mainland. 30
Southern Europe was the second most important destination for colonial grain exports.
These exchanges provided a different set of supply and demand relationships based on imports of
27
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Madeira wine, salt, and British bills of exchange in return for colonial grain. Salt was a vital
resource for the fisheries, as well as for preserving pork and beef. Madeira wine was enjoyed in
enormous quantities by colonial elites, while bills of exchange helped to limit the colonial trade
deficit with Great Britain. Despite the different context, the European trade also reflected
classically mercantilist characteristics as the unusable colonial grain surplus was exported
outside of the empire in exchange for specie equivalents or for resources, like salt, that were not
readily available within the British Empire.
The correspondence of merchants Thomas Lamar, Henry Hill, and Robert Bisset provide
insight into this trade network. The three brothers-in-law engaged in a triangular trading
relationship between Philadelphia, London, and Madeira. Beginning in 1756 and continuing
through 1798, their letters illustrate the potential and the perils of southern European trade.
Writing to his brother Richard in 1756, Henry Hill spoke highly of the trading prospects for
wheat and corn due to scarcity. A poor local harvest in Madeira combined with an unexpectedly
scanty crop in Lisbon led to opportunity for colonial British merchants. By December, the
situation was so dire that the Portuguese crown was obligated to provide grain to the public at the
crown’s expense. Hill’s firm provided a portion of this bounty and profited handsomely in the
transaction. 31 The letter implies a close connection to the governing authorities of Madeira and
illuminates how grain merchants sustained the public and good order with provisions, while also
making a profit for themselves.
Their surviving correspondence is sparse during the 1760s, however, two letters reflect
the essence of the Hill family’s business transactions for this decade. The first letter in July 1762
laments the lack of wheat and flour, although this is suspected to be temporary. Corn is plentiful,
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but other commodities were scarce. A second letter from June 1769 inquired as to the fate of a
Philadelphia ship in route to Madeira with a cargo of 3,000 barrels of flour. Robert Bisset, the
family’s merchant in residence, was particularly anxious as he had no flour in stock and had
none due for some time. 32 The correspondence illustrates two important features of this trade.
First, the movement of information and goods was slow. Reconciling supply and demand
relationships from across the Atlantic was difficult. Second, a key management strategy relied
on mercantile family networks. Business management at a distance required trust, reliability,
and a shared faith in the judgement of the merchants involved.
Historian David Hancock’s study of the Madeira trade outlines the broad intersecting
interests of American grain merchants, Madeiran wine producers, and their places within the
mercantile system. Like grain, Madeira crossed imperial boundaries with an open disregard for
official regulations. According to Hancock,
Madeira shows how decentralized the early modern Atlantic was, with widely
dispersed agency and frequent transgressions of imperial boundaries….analysis of
the Madeira wine complex show that world as extensively linked by networksfamily, ethnic, religious, business, and social- that participants created and
managed. 33
However, also much like grain, the regulations governing this trade were also more liberal than a
cursory glance suggests. An Anglo-Portuguese treaty in the mid-seventeenth century opened
trade between the English colonies and Madeira. The Navigation Acts restricting trade did not
apply, and no crown duty was imposed on imported Madeira. 34
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Effective trade regulation under mercantilism during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century consisted of three parts: the creation of regulations, the ability to enforce those
regulations, and then the will to enforce them. The creation of laws was relatively easy, but the
capacity of the various empires to enforce trade regulations was rudimentary at best. Smuggling
and corruption were epidemic, and the application of the law as imagined by its authors was an
uncertain proposition. The third premise is, perhaps, most interesting. The Madeira trade did
not operate in defiance or contradiction of mercantile regulations. The trade was an
acknowledged exception to those rules. Thus, there was no will- and no effort- to curtail these
exchanges on mercantilist grounds. Loose networks of independent merchants did not seize the
opportunity from an unwilling or inattentive mother country, rather they took advantage of an
opportunity freely offered.
The same set of circumstances held true for grain. It was not an enumerated commodity,
therefore exports to southern Europe were legal and consistent with Britain’s mercantile policies.
Direct trade between the middle colonies and Europe increased in the last years of the colonial
era. By 1770, more than 30% of all ships clearing from Philadelphia were bound for Europe.
The fastest growing sector of this trade was grain bound for Iberia and Mediterranean Europe.
The expanding foreign market led to new grain production throughout the Chesapeake Bay
region. 35 More systemically, the focus on export markets as a causal force in domestic economic
development reflects a modified form of the staples thesis of development. Although this is
more often associated with single resource economies such as the fisheries, sugar, tobacco, ride,
or the fur trade, it can also be applied to wheat.
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Yet, the expanding volume of trade was not always advantageous for the merchants
involved. Writing in August 1771, Robert Bisset lamented the flood of corn, wheat, and flour
entering into Madeira. Prices were already low, and threatened collapse as more vessels
arrived. 36 As a small island, its markets could be overwhelmed by a handful of cargos. The
economic law of supply and demand remained intact, although the varying fortunes of the Hill
and Bisset correspondence does illuminate an important feature of the grain trade. Surplus and
dearth could fluctuate in a location based on many factors. The arrival of unexpected imports or
an unexpected shortfall caused by a poor harvest could alter the grain market’s dynamic from
month-to-month and year-to-year. The markets of Iberia and Mediterranean Europe were larger,
less volatile, and sustained an increasing volume of exports.
Table 2.2 outlines the CO 16 export statistics from the mainland British colonies to
Southern Europe.
Table 2.2: Exports to Southern Europe , 1768-1772 37

Year

Bread/flour (tons)

Indian Corn (Bushels)

Wheat (Bushels)

1768

351,573

430,530

1769

5,059 tons, 16,336
barrels.
20,852

393,068

862,926

1770

18,501

175,221

588,561

1771

12,312

215,353

371,310

1772

17,945

261,837

415,433

The data offers several important insights about the European grain trade. First, under the
classification established within the ledgers, all of Europe south of Cape Finisterre in
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northwestermost Iberia were grouped together, including the Wine Islands (Madeira). Thus,
trade with Iberia and the rest of the Mediterranean basin cannot be differentiated. However,
given Lydon’s findings the clear majority of these exports landed in Spain or Portugal. The
volume of bread and flour exported there is comparable to that to the West Indies. Although
less, the volume of Indian corn is still consequential. The volume of wheat, however, is
massively higher. Southern Europe drew the clear majority of all wheat exports from the
colonies. Semi-processed wheat is cheaper than flour or bread and is more durable. The milling
capacity of southern Europe could process both local corn and wheat production as well as
colonial imports.
The West Indies and southern Europe represent the two primary external markets for
grain products, but the CO 16 data clarifies the place of two other markets as well. Exports to
Ireland and Great Britain itself were less common but could be important on a year-to-year basis.
Of course, mercantile impediments to trade did not apply within the empire. Table 2.3 outlines
the mainland colonial grain exports to Ireland.
Table 2.3: Exports to Ireland , 1768-1772 38

Year

Bread/flour (Tons)

Indian Corn (Bushels)

Wheat (Bushels)

1768

471

5,095

21,174

1769

2,332

294

116,045

1770

3,583

150

149,985

1771

No Line Item

8,500

129,638

1772

228

No Line Item

19,941

38
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Grain exports from North America to Ireland were volatile from 1768 to 1772, especially the
spike in imported wheat from 1769 to 1771. Bread and flour see a similar increase for 1769 and
1770 but disappear from the ledgers in 1771. These exports reflect substitution for poor Irish
harvests in those years, and the use of colonial grain to supplement failed local production. 39
Long term, the prognosis for Ireland as a stable market for grain was poor. The 1770s represent
a transition point in Irish agricultural history. By the end of the decade, Ireland would be a net
grain exporter, rather than a potential customer for colonial producers and merchants. The
primary export market for Irish grain was Great Britain. 40 This evolution in Irish agriculture
potentially challenged colonial exports to the British market, however, the significant geopolitical events of the 1770s and 1780s obviously disrupted colonial trade with Ireland and Great
Britain profoundly.
Great Britain forms the fourth key market for colonial grain and represents yet another
distinct trade relationship, as seen in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Exports to Great Britain , 1768-1772 41

Year

Bread/flour (Tons)

Indian Corn (Bushels)

Wheat (Bushels)

1768

3,400

105,161

171,211

1769

2,254

100

48,778

1770

263

No Line Item

11,739

1771

214

No Line Item

47,069

1772

4,785 (quarters)

No Line Item

14,108
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Except for 1768, Great Britain itself was not a significant recipient of colonial grain from 1768
through 1772. The cause for this, however, is political rather than economic. Great Britain’s
agricultural economy had two features that the other markets did not. The importance of
agricultural rents to British elites provided an economic rationale to inflate grain prices via
legislative controls on grain imports. Thus, exports to Britain faced regulatory barriers that
sought to balance the economic interests of politically powerful landowners with the need for
social stability that rested upon adequate access to affordable foodstuffs for the general
population. Second, the 1770s were a period of transition in the British agricultural economy.
Prior to this, Britain was self-sufficient in grain production and tended to be a net exporter of
grain. Colonial imports competed with domestic production except in cases of an exceptionally
poor harvest. However, as the British economy started to industrialize, and the population
increased, the need for outside provisions grew. 42
Customs regulations provide one means of tracing attitudes towards grain imports.
Duties payable on imported grain products fluctuated with its market price in Britain. Other
grain products were regulated with a similar sliding duty structure. 43 This represented a
significant limitation on grain imports into Britain. At its highest rates, the customs levy would
add a 50% surcharge on imported wheat, making it impossible for colonial producers to compete
with local ones. There is a certain degree of flexibility as prices rose, but this also created
market uncertainty for colonial producers who operated under weeks, if not months, old market
information.
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A change in regulations in 1774 presented a potential opportunity for colonial producers.
Paul Sharp and Jacob Weisdorf found a significant increase in imports in 1774 and 1775 because
of changes in the Corn Laws. The revised impost regulations resulted in “practically free” trade
in grain, which does not overstate the scope of change. 44 In 1774, the duty on wheat was
reduced to 6d per quarter if the market price was 48s per quarter or higher. Other grain
commodities saw similar impost rate adjustments. 45 These changes represented an enormous
potential opportunity for colonial farmers and grain merchants.
The final branch of trade explored in the CO 16 ledgers is the important and elusive
“coastal trade” between mainland colonial ports whose connections are often difficult to follow.
In James Shepherd and Samuel Williamson’s analysis of the records, “one can’t determine
specifically to which colonies the exports were going. The general directions of trade can be
surmised, of course, but one does not know exactly ‘what when where.’” 46 For the grain trade,
the broad pattern was the export of surpluses from the upper Chesapeake and middle colonies to
New England. In 1816, Connecticut congressman Timothy Pitkin compiled a quantitative
analysis of colonial-era grain exports. According to Pitkin, local growth of wheat in New
England had failed for some years past requiring the region to import grain. 47
The CO 16 ledgers offer the most complete picture of the late-colonial grain trade.
Surplus agricultural production in the middle colonies, Chesapeake region, and (to a lesser
degree) New York was exported to markets in the West Indies and southern Europe in vast
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quantities. Exports to Ireland fluctuated from year-to-year but could be substantive. Trade
directly with Great Britain was not significant from 1768 to 1772. Legal changes in 1774 and
the expanding trade in 1774 and 1775 suggests that this could become a potential growth market
for colonial grain exports.
The Revolutionary crisis of the 1770s eventually overthrew British rule of the thirteen
colonies by the early 1780s. A combination of ideological ferment and material factors
combined to incite a vocal minority of colonists to lead a successful rebellion against the crown
and departure from the British Empire. 48 There were degrees of enthusiasm even among those
who supported the Revolution. Colonial merchants, particularly those with strong economic ties
to the empire, were notably reluctant. Historian Thomas Doerflinger’s A Vigorous Sprit of
Enterprise illustrates the conflicted responses of Philadelphia’s merchant community to the
crisis. Although there was a deep concern about British policies regulating the colonies, these
did not lead to automatic support of the resistance. As a whole, the merchants were apolitical,
divided culturally, and well aware of the commercial benefits that Philadelphia enjoyed as part of
the empire. 49
Philadelphia merchants’ fears of economic disruption as a result of rebellion were
realized early in the war. A mass panic to clear as many vessels for foreign markets prior to the
severing of political ties flooded many markets with excess goods. A June 1775 letter from
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Robert Bisset reflected this problem, and the looming promise of disruption. Lamenting the
“amazing glut of grain and flour that has poured in upon us since the beginning of the month”
and the corresponding decline in prices, it was unlikely that the firm could profit if the present
circumstances continued. Continuity was fleeting however. The same letter closed with the
observation that two ships with grain cargos from New York had not arrived as expected. Bisset
speculated that “it is shrewdly suspected here from their not having appeared, that they must
have been detained by our frigates, who we are told have orders to stop all of your shipping.” 50
Bisset’s letter reflects a significant feature of the Revolutionary war. It was not just
pursued on the battlefield, it had a major economic element as well. British efforts to suppress
the rebellion included efforts to cut the colonial connections to foreign markets in addition to the
direct war effort. The grain producing regions of the Chesapeake faced numerous interlinked
wartime threats. British military intervention and regulatory barriers forced the collapse of
coastal trading routes. This disruption was serious, and it forced reliance on costly land-based
transportation networks that lacked an adequate infrastructure. The lucrative southern European
trade was also interdicted, thus removing an important resource base for the Revolutionary
government. Domestically, inflationary pressures caused by Congressional monetary policy
hamstrung merchants. The physical destruction of war further reduced outputs even as martial
mobilization also increased demand. 51
Provisioning both armies during the war illustrates the difficulties of recreating the
agricultural economy overnight. For actors in the new US, repurposing agricultural surpluses
from a focus on external trade to domestic consumption proved very challenging in the face of
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massive inflation and transportation limitations that could not be resolved by Congress or the
Continental army. E. Wayne Carp’s work To Starve the Army at Pleasure outlines both of these
daunting obstacles. Land routes suitable for transporting bulk commodities were rare and subject
to all sorts of weather and military disruption. There was no administrative infrastructure for
purchasing, storing, transporting, or distributing bulk commodities on the scale required by the
war effort. Compounding these problems was the precarious financial condition of Congress.
By 1780, the expense of the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments alone were estimated
to reach the ruinous sum of $200 million. 52 Although the figure was in part a product of
inflationary pressures, the disastrous state of Congress’s credit deepened the collapse of the
army’s logistical system. Contributions from the states, French loans, and the personal credit of
merchants such as Robert Morris temporarily filled the breach, however, the system remained
unstable. 53
The need to create a functioning national government and the infrastructure to support an
army did not affect the British. Many of the institutions that Congress vainly attempted to
organize already existed for the British. Yet, logistics and supply would be a major problem for
British forces fighting a distant war and no longer able to reply upon local support as during the
Seven Years War. Historian R. Arthur Bowler examines the new logistical framework and the
similarities between the American and British efforts to reconnect suppliers and consumers in the
changed wartime landscape. Denied supplies from the Massachusetts countryside in the wake of
Lexington and Concord, General Gage’s forces imported provisions from Ireland as surplus
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goods from Halifax and Quebec were soon exhausted. 54 The experience of 1775 was repeated
throughout the war as hopes of local supply proved illusory. Provisions from Britain were
available, but only at enormous expense and subject to the vagaries of long-distance
commerce. 55 Building a provisions reserve adequate to support the army, provincial forces, and
loyalist refugees within British lines remained a challenge throughout the war. Although there
was not a British counterpart to the deprivation of Valley Forge or Morristown, the extended
supply line directly influenced British conduct of the war. 56
Three chief lessons for the grain trade emerge from wartime disruption. First, the root of
the problem for both armies was the difficulty in replacing the usual connections among
producers, traders, and consumers that existed during the Seven Years War and colonial
peacetime. American grain surpluses were traditionally exported, and establishing internal
markets- and more importantly, the financial and infrastructure to support this change- could not
be fully accomplished. Likewise, although the strain of supporting the British army with
provisions from across the Atlantic did not have the same institutional challenges that face
Congress, the practice was ruinously expensive and undependable. Second, this unique grain
economy would be impossible to sustain without the demands of the war, an aberration from the
norm that would soon disappear. Third, the inability of Quebec and Nova Scotia to supply the
British army during the war was a telling commentary on the state of agriculture in those
colonies. Although the rebel invasion of Quebec in 1775 might provide a partial explanation for
modest agricultural production that year, the general lack of surplus throughout the war reflects
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the inability of British North America to function as an imperial granary even during a grave
emergency. The implications for post-war grain production and trade were not promising.
The American Revolution changed the boundaries of the previously united empire, but
all was not as it appeared on the political map. US independence changed the geo-politics of
trade but did not alter the interlocked trade networks that underpinned the Atlantic economy.
Whether the British government’s diplomatic relations with the new United States would
emphasize the political or economic aspects of mercantilism remained uncertain. The most
obvious point of conflict was the dependence of the British Caribbean colonies on imports of
provisions from the mainland. This urgent need required Great Britain to more precisely define
the mercantilist framework for the domestic nation, empire, colonies, and foreign entities.
The Treaty of Paris in 1783 completed Anglo-American political separation, but whetherand on what terms- the United States would be allowed to interact with the imperial economy
was unclear. At its heart, mercantilism is a system of political economy. How each observer
balanced the often-conflicting dictates of political and economic interest widely varied. One of
the most ardent defenders of a closed mercantile system was Lord Sheffield. His interpretation
of the political/economic balance decidedly favored the political. The interests of the nation and
empire demanded severing ties with the US for the benefit of Great Britain and the loyal colonies
remaining under the crown. In his formulation, removing the US from the empire was a positive
good: “Both as a friend and as an enemy America has been burthomsome to Great Britain. It
may be some satisfaction to think, that by breaking off rather prematurely, Great Britain may
find herself in a better situation in respect to America, than if they had fallen off when more
ripe.” 57
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Sheffield acknowledged that this new geography would come at some cost to the West
Indies colonies until the agricultural base in Nova Scotia and Canada developed. However, this
small cost to one interest group within the empire was a necessary (if temporary) burden that
could be offset by other changes. Streamlining customs administration, curtailing smuggling,
and encouraging a diversified agricultural economy in the Caribbean would provide the means to
effectively reformulate imperial trade shorn of the US and its past colonial contributions. 58
Sheffield’s Observations strives to balance political and economic relationships within
the empire. For the first time, trade regulations underlying the mercantile system as a theory
were explicitly applied to the grain trade. This is a significant transition that politicized and
attempted to regulate a trading network that had been practically exempt from peacetime
regulations prior to the War for American Independence. The quest to define the new
relationship between the mother country and her estranged child only served to illuminate
unexamined contradictions within the colonial relationship.
Sheffield’s strident assertions were questioned in Britain. West Indian leaders such as
Brian Edwards accepted Sheffield’s application of mercantilist doctrine as a political concept but
questioned whether or not it made economic sense. In direct response to Sheffield in 1784,
Edwards wrote:
Because they [the Americans] well know that Great Britain must in time
concede; for America has the advantage in this contest, that sugar and rum, and
coffee, and molasses, though very wholesome things, are not, however, like
American provisions, absolutely necessary to the preservation of life. Secondly,
because if they are not permitted to purchase those commodities from us, in their
own way, they can get them elsewhere. The commerce of America, therefore, is
beyond all equivalent more necessary to the British West-India Islands, than that
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of the islands to her. The misfortune is, that our devoted planters may be
famished before the contest is settled. 59
Edwards’ critique highlights three issues. First, politics is an inherent element in economic
debates. Trade within the empire is preferable to external connections. However, the nature of
grain as a commodity does not allow for economic policies to strictly follow abstract principles.
Simply stated, the US could survive in the absence of trade with the British West Indies. The
sugar plantations, however, could not survive without foodstuffs from the mainland. Second,
Edwards points to the enduring influence of customary patterns of exchange. There were no
reasonable substitutes for US grain production within the empire, and no available markets to
absorb the surplus production of the Caribbean colonies if the US was excluded from trade. The
long integrated the grain trade of British mainland colonies with the British Caribbean needed to
survive. For the British, the economic infrastructure of empire could not be dismantled as easily
as the political empire that created it. Third, time did not favor radical changes in trade policy.
Implicit within Edwards’ critique of Sheffield is the urgency of reestablishing trade connections
for the preservation of life in the Caribbean. This illustrates another specific quality of
provisions commerce—its urgency. The empire faced a stark and immediate choice: either
allow US provisions into the empire immediately or face the prospect of the Caribbean plantation
complex collapsing almost overnight.
Remaining loyal to the empire had consequences. Separating the British West Indies
from their traditional source of provisions led to starvation for thousands of slaves and poor
whites on the islands of Nevis, St. Kitts, Montserrat, and Antigua. On Antigua, 20% of slaves
died between 1778 and 1781, and the survivors were too weak to harvest the sugar crop. The
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conclusion of hostilities in 1783 did not end the threat of famine. Sugar plantations remained
profitable during the 1780s, but their margins diminished due to trade restrictions prohibiting a
mutually beneficial trade with the United States. 60 The official prohibition on such trade
encouraged smuggling, and the prices paid for rice, meat, and fish imports rose in the West
Indies between 40 and 100 per cent between 1775 and 1784. 61
The increase in prices for staple foods was a product of geo-political changes. In the
place of relatively accessible supplies, West Indian planters were forced to rely on food imports
from Ireland and Britain, lumber from the Baltic, and other provisions from Florida and
Canada. 62 According to historian Herbert Bell, this system of restrictions caused local distress,
but the overall objective of increasing trade between Britain and the Caribbean colonies was
successful and still allowed for a reasonable profit margin. 63 Other historians are less positive
about the success of redrawing the trade networks. The rise in costs, along with the destruction
of local food sources in series of hurricanes from 1784-1786, caused the death of 15,000 slaves
in Jamaica alone due to famine. By 1791, the assembly of Jamaica called for the cultivation of
other crops such as yams, caco, maize, and plantains to decrease dependency on external food
importation. 64 Other Caribbean sugar islands had similar experiences, leading planters to
advocate for the legalization of trade with the United States. These pleas fell upon deaf ears,
leading to the creation of an informal colonial resolution to the crisis.
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British colonial governors could temporarily suspend the Navigation Acts in the case of
urgent need. The interpretation of “need” varied from colony to colony, but the trend of defining
US provisions as an essential commodity was commonplace. The difficulty for US merchants
lay in the return cargoes. While the concessions reconnected American exports to their
traditional consumers in the West Indies, imperial legal restrictions on colonial exports to the US
remained. In particular, cargos of tropical products were limited to British ships, causing distress
for US merchantmen. 65 Bolstering the merchant marine by limiting foreign competition was a
long-standing British practice under mercantilism. It was not just the products at question, it was
also their means of transport. The Caribbean colonies were one side of a three-sided debate over
trade policy conducted by the United States, Great Britain, and the Caribbean planters within the
British Empire. It was in the interests of planters and US merchants to resume open trade
without restrictions immediately after the war. 66 This would officially reestablish two portions
of the triangular trade, however, new political relations did not allow for a seamless
reestablishment of the colonial commercial system. US objectives were to reestablish trade with
the British West Indies, while limiting direct trade with Great Britain in favor of domestic
manufactures. 67 In essence, all three sides recognized the need for trade but could not agree on
how to reconcile political and economic interests.
Under the authority of the colonial governors, with the acquiescence of the imperial
government, and the enthusiastic participation of American merchants, the grain trade continued.
Complete disengagement was not viable except in the extreme posturing of a figure like Lord

65

Michelle Craig McDonald, “The Chance of the Moment: Coffee and the New West Indies Commodities Trade.
WMQ, Vol. 62, No. 3 (July 2005), 441-472, 448-52.
66
P.J. Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic:The United States and the British Empire after American
Independence (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 101.
67
Ibid, 101.

62

Sheffield. John Darwin’s theory of empire that emphasizes the independent agency of actors on
the periphery of empire can usefully be applied to this situation. Although the imperial
government maintained some control over its agents on the periphery, for Darwin the most
striking feature of the British Empire was its limited governmental influence. 68 Colonial
governors in the Caribbean, Canada, and the Maritime Provinces that depended on US grain
consistently permitted trade that favored local need over imperial policies. In time, many of the
local trade arrangements received tacit official acceptance as no practical alternatives presented
themselves.
Scholarship on the post-war US grain economy confirms the continuing importance of the
Caribbean. Brooke Hunter argues that the 1780s were a profitable time for American grain
exports despite the short-term disruption of the war. In theory, American trade was excluded
from most Caribbean markets, yet “to declare a law and to enforce it were two different
things.” 69 According to Gordon Bjork, although the volume of legal trade in the 1780s declined,
its actual value of trade remained constant as the price of grain increased. 70 Doerflinger’s
interpretation is less positive. He agrees with Bjork that trade with the West Indies was not
particularly high but finds that overall price levels declined. Added to his analysis is the ripple
effect that trade stagnation had throughout Philadelphia’s regional economy. For Doerflinger,
economic depression persisted until 1789 or 1790, after which the demand for foodstuffs in the
Indies and Europe buoyed the economy. 71
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A conclusive quantitative study of the economic conditions within the British West Indies
and the connections to the US is almost impossible due to the lack of reliable sources.
According to John McCusker’s article “Growth, Stagnation, or Decline,” records of the West
Indian economy were destroyed due to the conflicts between Britain and France. A fire in the
London Customs House in 1814 also destroyed most of the Ledgers of Imports and Exports for
the 1780 and later time period. 72 Quantitative government records for sugar production also do
not exist. The best estimates of production are derived from export figures from the islands and
import figures for external markets. 73 McCusker hypothesizes that the economic conditions in
the West Indies were strong before and after the American War for Independence based on per
capita imports to and exports from the islands. 74 Circumstantial evidence is persuasive that prewar trends in the grain trade were reestablished soon after the war’s end. Brought together by
custom and need, the US and the British West Indies remained linked by mutually beneficial
commercial connections with grain as their foundation.
The creation of the new Federal Government of the US in 1789 marks a significant
transition from the lax authority of the Confederation Congress to a stronger central government
and the need for coherent national economic policies has long had a contested place in
explaining the change. 75 For US merchants, the need for stability was essential to support the
domestic economy and foreign trade. The new constitutional government held many powers to
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regulate and support commerce, among them to collect taxes, imposts, and excises, to regulate
foreign commerce, and to coin money. 76 How these new federal powers would be exercised
under the administration of George Washington was unclear and provoked divisive controversy
at the time. Traditional accounts of the growing divide between Federalist and Jeffersonian
partisans cite economic policy as a significant point of division; however, on closer examination
there is remarkable consistency between Federalist and Democratic-Republican views about the
value and importance of agricultural exports in the new nation’s economy.
One of the most influential figures in Washington’s cabinet was Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton. His reports to Congress on US economic policy set forward a coherent
doctrine of national economic development. His proposals were often controversial and
intersected with several separate but related questions about how the new nation should develop
and interact with the rest of the world. The first manifestation of this was Hamilton’s Report on
the Public Credit (1790) that stressed how public debt and a strong national currency benefited
every sector of the economy including agriculture and foreign trade. Revenues from the Post
Office and taxes on liquor distillation would be two useful sources of income for the federal
government, but its major source of revenue would be imposts and customs duties. 77
It is significant to note that there was no proposal to tax US exports. Although the
distilled liquor tax was controversial, the early outlines of Hamilton’s economic plan closely
parallel Jeffersonian initiatives in the early-nineteenth century. In historians Stanley Elkins and
Eric McKitrick’s evaluation of the report, it was clear that the dynamic force behind the
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American economy would be merchants. 78 The interests of merchants and farmers were not
necessarily opposed to one another in the pre-industrial context of the overwhelmingly
agricultural economy of the early republic.
Hamilton’s Report on the Subject of Manufactures advocated for federal action to
promote industrial development in the US. Superficially, this appears to conflict with Thomas
Jefferson’s ideal of the yeoman farmer, and thus produced a conflict between two competing
visions for the national economy. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. Hamilton’s plan was not
inimical to agricultural production nor to the value of the agricultural export sector of the
economy. To Hamilton, “foreign demand for the products of agricultural countries, is, in a great
degree, rather casual and occasional, than certain and constant….there appear strong reasons to
regard the foreign demand for that surplus as too uncertain reliance, and to desire a substitute for
it in an extensive domestic market.” 79 In essence, a domestic market would be more sustainable
because the foreign demand for US surpluses was too inconsistent. If Hamilton’s supposition
was correct, his economic program would benefit farmers. The development of an industrial
base would provide a more certain market, especially as it drew labor away from farms. Thus,
manufacturing was not opposed to agriculture but rather became possible due to expanding
agricultural surpluses. Beyond the supply and demand dynamics, a domestically oriented
economy was also less subject to disruption due to foreign political maneuvers and wars. The
domestic political effects of Hamilton’s economic recommendations, nevertheless, exacerbated
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partisan tensions whose political dimensions has been better remembered than its economic
basis. 80
There are other less theoretical criticisms of the Report on Manufactures. Hamilton’s
theory overlooks the long duration of American agricultural exports. By the 1790s, this had been
a substantive part of the economy for at least 70 years. Although there had been fluctuations and
disruptions due to varied causes, the supply and demand relationship was steady. His program
provided a potential solution to a problem that was not yet apparent to many observers. This is
particularly true for figures like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who had close links to
agricultural interests and opposed Hamilton on a number of other grounds. The Report’s fate in
Congress reflects an interesting split. Although direct government investment to support
industry were not approved, the customs tax structure proposed by the Report was established. 81
The practical state of the agricultural export economy by 1790 did not lead to a popular
outcry for reform. Political economist Tench Coxe provided an American critique of Britain’s
formal trade restrictions. He argued in 1791 that efforts to replace the US as a granary for the
West Indies had failed. Nova Scotia and Canada had not been able to produce an adequate
surplus and substituting imports from Europe was impossible as the volume required was
prohibitive. 82 Dependence on the US was not disappearing. Rather, the provisions trade
expanded in value. For Coxe, “the British West India islands are proved to have been indebted
to the United States, in 1790, for more lumber, more grain, and more bread and flour, than they
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imported from these states before the revolution.” 83 The export-based agricultural economy of
the US was so profitable that few people called for structural changes to it nor were there any
feasible alternatives.
Reports from Madeira also reflected optimism for US agricultural products in post-war
Atlantic markets. Henry Hill learned in February 1790 that every article was in great demand.
Prices for flour and wheat were high and even corn, “which is almost too bad to be eaten,” still
commanded a market. The high prices attracted exports from England as well as the US leading
to a decline in prices by August, but the market remained open for American foodstuffs. 84 There
is a degree of variability in the marketplace, and there remained the danger of a glut caused by
over-importation, however, these were familiar and long-standing factors in Atlantic commerce.
The observations of Coxe and Hill reflect a broader trend. The export sector of the US
economy was booming. According to Geoffrey Gilbert’s research, the volume of bread related
products exported by the US had expanded by over 50% between the years of the CO 16 data set
(1768-1772) and a comparable data set from the US Treasury Department for 1790-1792. 85
Coxe recognized this pattern and assumed continuity, others, like Hamilton, were more
suspicious that the expansion of trade in agricultural commodities would falter. The raw data
from Timothy Pitkin’s accounting supports the conclusion that trade expansion was viable as
noted in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: American Grain Exports by Year, 1791-93 86

Fiscal Year

Wheat (bushels)

Flour (barrels)

Corn (bushels)

Meal (bushels)

1791

1,018,339

619,681

1,713,241

351,695

1792

853,790

824,464

1,964,973

263,405

1793

1,450,575

1,074,639

1,233,768

189,715

Compared to the CO 16 records, there are several structural changes to the ledgers. The category
of “bread” has been removed from the tabulations, the unit of measure for flour changed from
tons to barrels, and corn meal was added as a new the category. Despite these changes, the
overall increase in grain product exports from the US is clear. Pitkin’s statistics give an
aggregated total for all exported grain products and also provides the regional destinations for
these exports that reflects a pattern familiar from the CO 16 ledgers.
Table 2.6: American Exports by Destination, 1790-1793

87

Year

Exported to/Amount
Wheat (bushels)

Flour (barrels)

Corn (bushels)

Meal (bushels)

1790

Spain: 390,585
Britain: 292,042
Portugal: 269,502
France: 136,908

FWI: 173,290
BWI: 139,286
Britain: 104,880
Spain: 97,288
France: 61,049

Spain: 747,840
BWI: 516,794
Portugal: 370,122
FWI: 120,968
Britain: 98,407
Portuguese
Islands: 98,416

BWI: 39,860
Danish WI:
22,716
FWI: 13,529
Spain: 4,103
Britain: 1,401
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Table 2.6: American
Exports by
Destination, 17901793, continued

1791

England:360,139
Scotland: 177,705
Portugal: 156,119
Fayal, Azores:
142,530
Spain: 116,149

FWI: 177,578
BWI: 134,599
Spain: 98,640
England: 46,879
Dutch WI: 45,720

Portugal: 731,121
BWI: 269,387
FWI: 181,852
Spain: 133,555
Fayal, Azores:
110,723

BWI: 43,503
Danish WI: 7,996
FWI: 5,392
Dutch WI: 3,536
Spain: 2,936

1792

Portugal: 397,683
Spain: 257,148
Scotland: 121,702
England: 37,643

FWI: 220,099
BWI: 187,357
Spain: 164,367
Dutch WI: 67,563
England: 62,116

BWI: 604,871
Portugal: 391,683
Spain: 381,555
FWI: 217,203
Dutch WI: 74,177

BWI: 19,776
Danish WI:
17,316
Dutch WI: 7,479
FWI: 5,597

The US Treasury and the CO 16 records vary slightly but organize wheat export data in
comparable ways. The West Indies and Southern Europe remain primary export destinations,
and locations have been disaggregated allowing a clearer geographic understanding of US
foreign commerce in grain products.
The statistics illustrate the continuity between the CO 16 record series for the latecolonial era and US trade after the war. The same strong market differentiation remains with
semi-processed wheat a predominantly European import, while flour, corn, and corn meal were
exported throughout the Atlantic. Overall, the chief customers for US grain products remain the
Caribbean sugar colonies and Iberia. Superficially, the dramatic increase of exports to Great
Britain may seem to be a notable change; however, this can be accounted for by changes in the
British tariff structure in 1774, as noted earlier. Taking that into account, the wheat export
pattern endured without notable alterations.
The data demonstrate persistence, but not why the persistence matters. There are a
number of practical reasons for continuity. There were no competing producers that could
70

provide an exportable surplus with the consistency and volume required. Reformulating the
material basis for a significant branch of the Atlantic economy could not be accomplished in the
short term. The constant need for new supplies of grain due to its perishable nature is important.
Grain could not be stockpiled in large reserves over time. In southern Europe, the lack of
American provisions could provoke social disorder. By contrast, in the Caribbean, the collapse
of the lucrative plantation complex loomed if US grain was excluded from this major market.
The need for a regular resupply of essential American food provisions simply did not allow for
the colonial trading pattern to be reconfigured, even if viable alternatives could be found, which
seems unlikely.
The striking continuity in Anglo-American grain exports provides a fresh view of the
late-eighteenth century political economy of mercantilism. British authorities had long
recognized that colonial grain was traded outside of the empire. Grain exports had not been
limited to British imperial destinations, as the CO 16 ledgers demonstrate. It was entirely
possible to have a mercantile framework co-exist alongside close to free trade in colonial grain
products if we understand mercantilism as an import control scheme. After the Revolutionary
War, it was not necessary to rebuild the trade to adjust to the new political reality because the
grain trade had never been subject to formal colonial regulatory structures in times of peace. The
1780s and early 1790s are not a story of integrating a restructured US economy back into the
Atlantic economy. Rather, it is the story of a politically freed nation utilizing the same
agricultural export-based economy that had existed under the colonial regime. Lack of
systematic evidence between the end of the CO 16 records in 1772 and the start of US
government records in 1790 do not allow for a general quantitative argument. However, there is
little question that the grain trade continued and even flourished in the 1780s. Quantitative US
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government records starting in 1790 conclusively demonstrate the post-war persistence of grain
exports consistent with colonial patterns.
Focusing exclusively on the thirteen colonies during this time is attractive as the
traditional historiography emphasizes the development of the nation state. It is only one part of
the equation however. Geo-political changes in the Maritime Provinces and Canada during the
mid- and late-eighteenth century presents another layer of complexity to assess the political
economy of wheat in North America. These eighteenth-century additions to the British Empire
attracted grain exports from the mid-Atlantic colonies. After the War for American
Independence, whether the Canadian or Maritime Provinces could replace the US as a grain
exporter was a matter of intense interest throughout the British Atlantic. Inability to supplant the
US as a grain exporter, does not suggest a lack of effort to do so. Analyzing the development of
agriculture in Britain’s northernmost North American mainland colonies is necessary to
understand how grain functioned in an interconnected British Atlantic world.
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CHAPTER THREE
BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN AGRICULTURE, THE GRAIN TRADE, AND THE
NEW EMPIRE TO 1794
This chapter examines grain farming in British North America as a potential alternative
to American colonial and post-independence producers. The viability of this alternative remained
doubtful. According to political economist Harold Innis, the conflict within the staples producing
parts of the French and British empires prior to 1763 was fundamentally economic and
geographic in nature. A geographic imbalance in both empires connected a large and productive
temperate zone agricultural economy to a relatively small tropical one in the British Empire, with
the inverse relationship for the French Empire. After the American Revolution, the British faced
similar colonial agricultural limitations as the French. To establish productive grain exports
from post-war British North America would require the British to swiftly accomplish a level of
agricultural development that the French had not achieved in 150 years. This chapter has two
geographic sections: Quebec (Lower Canada post 1791) and Nova Scotia. Politically, British
North America was linked together under British imperial rule. However, settlement patterns,
economic development, and chronology present distinct historiographies regarding agricultural
development in this era that are best examined separately. Despite these deep differences, in the
face of conflict with the US, British North America did function as a coherent common unit.
This became particularly true as the nineteenth century unfolded and when economic regulations
(and the defiance thereof) were cast in imperial and national terms rather than regional ones.
Nova Scotia, 1749-1768
The concession by France of territory to be called Nova Scotia to Great Britain in the
Treaty of Utrecht (1713) did not have an immediate impact on the province’s agricultural
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economy. Acadian farming was productive and generated a surplus. Usually this was traded to
New England merchants in exchange for alcohol, textiles, metal goods, and specie from Cape
Breton. 1 Outside of a brief period from 1745 to 1748, Cape Breton remained under the control
of France. The French fortress city of Louisburg provided another market for Acadian farmers in
addition to the New England coastal trade. Historical geographer Cole Harris’s research on
Acadian farming reveals a mixed farming economy focusing on subsistence. Garden vegetables,
livestock husbandry, and orchard crops combined with peas and wheat to form the basis of
Acadian agriculture. A sophisticated system of dykes and sluice gates allowed the Acadians to
utilize the fertile marshland soils. 2
The establishment of Halifax in 1749 and subsequent developments in the Halifax area
and Lunenburg represent a significant change in the agricultural economy by providing new
markets for external producers. Surplus Acadian production could not be easily transported to
these new markets due to a lack of infrastructure. According to historian John Bartlett Brebner,
“Nova Scotian roads across the wooded, watered uplands were totally impassible for the wheeled
traffic by which bulky farm commodities, except for cattle or sheep or swine on the hoof, could
be transported. It was true that the waterway to New England was much easier and more
expeditious than to Halifax.” 3 Conceived as a naval port city rather than as an agricultural
settlement, Halifax itself produced little despite a system of bounties designed to increase local
production of hay, roots, and grain. 4
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The settlement of Lunenburg by German Protestants in 1754 also provided little
immediate relief for the Halifax provisions problem. This was in part due to the difficulties of
establishing a new settlement, but government action also intervened. As historical geographer
Andrew Hill Clark notes, “Initially, Colonel Lawrence, in charge of the settlement, encouraged
the sowing of oats, barley, turnips, and potatoes but discouraged the bread grains (wheat, rye,
indian corn) as taking too much out of the soil until the settlers had manure.” Despite the
agricultural basis for the settlement, Lunenburg remained partially dependent on government
provided rations, and the community remained particularly deficient in bread grains and meat.
Clark’s assessment of early agriculture in British Nova Scotia outlines both the problem and the
solution for the province during the 1750s: “Except for fish….virtually all the food was brought
into Halifax from elsewhere; under pressure, and in inadequate amounts, it came from the
Acadians until 1755 (including live animals and salted meat derived from confiscations of that
year) and, before and after, from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania.” 5
The Acadian expulsion disrupted this local provisioning system, making the colony even
more dependent on external providers. Historian Julian Gwyn’s analysis of the economic impact
on Nova Scotian agriculture outlines the collapse of provincial agriculture and the long-term
effects of this dramatic policy: “It ensured the retardation of agricultural exports at least until
after 1815. In economic terms, it was doubtless one of the more destructive political decisions
ever made in British America.” 6 In this light, the Planter migrations of the 1760s were not
progress towards a more robust agricultural sector that could (in time) support the colony with
locally produced surpluses, but rather an attempt merely to restore the economy to a past level.
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Whether this goal was obtainable was questionable, as the New England planters could not
utilize the marshland soils and associated infrastructure as skillfully as the Acadian. According
to Graeme Wynn’s research on agriculture in the Bay of Fundy marshlands, primary production
was for self-sufficiency with occasional trade by sea with Boston. 7
Whether the newly settled Planters could even replicate the success of the Acadian as
farmers was unproven. Julian Gwyn’s research on five townships within the Minas Basin argues
that the Planters’ success as farmers was “mixed,” at best, as per capita output for wheat and
grain products declined over time. 8 Minas Basin was one of the more productive agricultural
regions in the colony. New settlements elsewhere faced even stiffer challenges. The new south
shore settlement of Chester turned to the sea for subsistence due to difficulties with clearing the
land of trees. Even with that task completed, further barriers to farming loomed. Chester
farmers “faced a harvest of stones wherever the plough cut furrow.” Immediate starvation was
staved off by one of the terms negotiated by the incoming planters. The Nova Scotia Council
agreed to supply each settler with two bushels of grain per month for the first year of the
settlement. 9
Chester set an important precedent as other new settlements also faced challenges to meet
basic substance. Writing to the Provincial Council in April 1762, Lieutenant Governor Belcher
brought attention to the plight of settlers in several townships, but “particularly those of Onslow,
Truro, and Yarmouth for want of supplies for provisions and seed corn” that required immediate
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relief from the legislature on compassionate and humanitarian grounds. 10 The chief source of
relief was imported provisions from Halifax.
The Halifax Naval Office recorded entrances and clearances from Halifax harbour from
1749 through 1765 on a ship-by-ship basis. Although aggregate quarterly totals are available for
exports from the port, there was no parallel calculation for imports. A regular pattern emerges
from the first quarter of 1749 with ledgers recording tons of flour, corn, biscuit, livestock, and
provisions entering the port from New York, the Chesapeake Bay region, and Boston. 11 The
Naval Office records from 1765 reflect the same pattern of trade with an increase in volume,
which surely reflected demand from the growth of population in Halifax and an increasing
volume of provisions imported, above all from the mid-Atlantic breadbasket colonies, to sustain
that growth.
New France/Quebec, 1749-1768
With the productive capacity of Nova Scotia severely limited, the fate of British North
America as a breadbasket rested with Quebec. Here, too, the basis for such hopes were limited.
Harris’s research on New France’s agriculture reveals a changing pattern of small scale exports
from 1720-1740, but a general decline after 1742. A pattern of poor harvests, and the coming of
the Seven Years War combined to create an agricultural depression that “debilitated the entire
colony.” 12 Agricultural practices were expansive rather than intensive, and wheat yields
remained low due to the lack of manuring. Crops of peas, oats, and barley along with livestock
husbandry characterized agriculture in New France. 13
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Louis Antione de Bougainville noted throughout his wartime diary of the 1750s about the
shortage of bread and the poor conditions of the harvest. In November 1756, he recounted the
distribution of bread to the habitants which “presented the image of a famine.” 14 May 1757
brought no relief as “bread is scarce,” and the severe shortage of grain dictated that “part of the
land would remain unsowed.” The provisions shortage prohibited the army from mobilizing for
the campaign, although the arrival of flour from France in May temporarily curtailed the worst of
the famine until July when Quebec was again out of bread. 15 In his dispatches to Paris in 1757,
Governor Vaudreuil requested reinforcements but even more importantly provisions as it was
unclear if the forces already present could be sustained. The campaign of 1757 almost collapsed
due to a lack of food. It was only with great effort that provisions for one month were found
within the colony. 16 Provisions sent from France in spring 1758 provided only enough “to
prevent dying of hunger.” 17 Although Bougainville’s journals are, in part, a scathing accusation
of malfeasance against the administration of New France, it is significant that his journal and
Vaudreuil’s dispatches echo one another about the dire effects of provisions on the war effort.
Both acknowledge a larger truth—the agricultural base of New France could not support both
subsistence and the surplus adequate to wage a major war.
Historian Fernand Ouellet’s research echoes Bougainville’s critique of New France’s
government. Service in the militia reduced the supply of agricultural labor, thus reducing
productivity and increasing demand for grain. Many farmers became customers for grain rather
than producers due to military service. The constricting supply and expanding demand created
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opportunity for speculators, such as the intendant Francois Bigot and the contractor Cadet. Due
to corruption and malfeasance, the predictable scarcity caused by the war was compounded into
a major subsistence and economic crisis. Flour prices increased by over 400% between 1756 and
1759. Even if flour could be found, many could not afford to purchase it at such inflated
prices. 18
According to historian George F.G. Stanley’s more measured examination, the colony
could produce approximately 800,000 minots of wheat per year of which 600,000 were required
for subsistence. The remainder was not adequate to support French regular troops stationed in the
colony or provide for First Nations allies. The reduction of the bread ration to two ounces per
day in spring 1758 stretched provisions until the colony was relieved by the fleet mentioned by
Bougainville’s journal, but the distress of the colony was not fully relieved. 19 The harvest of
1759 brought little surplus, and with the fall of Montreal in September 1760 hopes for French
victory in North America collapsed.
In the last years of the French regime the colony was marginally self-sufficient. A poor
harvest or any external pressure created a crisis of agricultural production resulting in famine and
the need to import provisions from Europe. Whether the return of peace in 1760 and the change
from French to British rule would resolve this basic issue remained uncertain. Seeing a potential
opportunity, established colonial British merchants soon penetrated local grain markets in new
British domains. The entry of colonial merchants into a new trade relation was a calculated
gamble. Were the real difficulties observed by Bougainville simply an aberration caused by the
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war, and could British colonial control and imperial integration overcome such challenges and
effectively incorporate Canada into the British Atlantic grain economy?
The records of the Philadelphia merchant firm of Baynton and Wharton (later Baynton,
Wharton, and Morgan) provide an interesting case study to answer this question. The firm was a
complex collection of trade interests and connections that spanned the British Atlantic. After the
fall of New France in 1760, the company expanded its operations to the new British colony of
Quebec. The arrival of Anglophone merchants into the new market is revealing, and the actions
of John Collins (Baynton and Wharton’s agent in Quebec) offers a precise view of the
opportunities and limitations of integration into the larger grain economy of the British Atlantic.
Baynton and Wharton specialized in the flour and lumber trade with the West Indies as
well as with Europe, Newfoundland, and Halifax. From 1762 to 1766, the firm employed John
Collins, John Govett, and a handful of other merchants in Montreal and Quebec to seek new
wheat and flour exports from Canada for Atlantic markets. This would provide a supplementary
source of grain within an already well-established trading pattern. Collins arrived in Quebec
City in December 1760. It is unclear how he initially was associated with Baynton and Wharton,
or what ties he may have had within the broader merchant community. 20 Writing to Baynton and
Wharton in April 1761, he requested trade items for the Canadian market including clothing,
alcohol, and tropical food that were scarce in the colony. 21 Curiously, there is no mention of any
potential exports from Quebec at this time, although there is regular commentary on the receipt
of letters of credit and bills of exchange accepted in payment for imported goods. A postscript to
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a letter dated February 7, 1762 contained the suggestion that “if a small vessel, laden with
provisions should arrive here [Quebec City] early in the spring, the cargo might be sold to
advantage.” 22 There is no record of this suggestion being followed, however, and the perception
of Collins and the firm about the provisions market shifted at some point in 1762 from Quebec as
a potential consumer of imported provisions to a potential exporter. How and why their views
changed is not addressed in the letters, although it seems likely that the end of the war in Europe
reopened markets for a wider range of imported foodstuffs. 23
Collins noted that storage facilities near the Montreal area were inadequate and
investments in warehouses was urgently required. A key difficulty associated with the grain
trade was the need to store and ship bulky, perishable, and relatively inexpensive products such
as grain required an infrastructure that did not exist as this trade was not common under French
governance. The problems of travel, distance, and transportation remained unresolved for
possible Canadian grain exports well into the nineteenth century.
A pressing concern in May 1763 was whether an export permit would be issued by
Governor John Murray. A June 23 letter reveals that there was no resolution to the question.
Permission was granted to ship 8,000 bushels as far as Quebec City, but it was unknown when,
or if, permission would be granted for export out of the colony despite the fervent lobbying of
Collins. It was not until July 13 that a resolution was reached. According to John Govett’s
letter, “Mr. Collins, after a great deal of trouble, had prevailed with Gen’l [sic] Murray to ship
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off one load of wheat and he is the only person as why who has a permit for doing the same, tho’
twenty people have applied for the same thing.” 24
The delay and seemingly capricious nature of securing a permit provides an important
illustration of the difficulty and fragility of this new trading venture. The elimination of the
political border between Quebec and the rest of British North America did not necessarily
eliminate political obstacles to trade. The power of the governor to embargo grain exports bears
witness not only to his power, but also to the unique role of grain as an export item. Unlike other
goods, access to grain was fundamental to the survival of the colony, thereby providing the
rationale for government intervention into the marketplace to a degree not seen with other
commodities. This hints at a crucial aspect of the relationship between government officials and
merchants. The exact ties between Murray and Collins are not revealed in surviving
correspondence, but securing an early permit when no one else could and later patronage
extended to Collins by Murray suggests their close connections. These circumstances made
Collins a valuable link between the business interests of Baynton and Wharton and Canadian
colonial official—in a hierarchical world of patronage networks, personal relationships were
vital to successful commerce.
The departure of John Collins from Quebec did not end the involvement of Baynton and
Wharton in the Quebec grain trade, although the province’s ability to produce surplus flour
remained a concern in February 1766. In a letter to the company from Collins’ replacement in
Quebec City, George Allsopp reported that this years’ crop was “more abundant in straw than
wheat,” and in his estimation the entire province was not capable of exporting more than 50,000
bushels even in good years, which was “no great object for a whole province.” For Allsopp the
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best opportunity in Quebec arose from the scarcity of currency in the colony, which allowed him
to purchase wheat for cash at an advantageous rate far below what farmers paid for their debts to
the company. 25
This aspect of inter-colonial British economic history illuminates a significant point.
Canadian political economist Harold Innis suggests the primary exports of New France, and later
the British province of Quebec, remained in fur throughout the eighteenth century. 26 Collins’
trading efforts in grain commodities highlights that while grain did not become a major Canadian
export staple until the nineteenth century, its origins began much earlier. This relatively brief
early episode expands the narrow focus of the traditional historiography. Perhaps more
importantly, it highlights how the elimination of political barriers to commerce were
immediately tested even if the practical difficulties and hazards of navigating on unfamiliar
political and economic terrain remained.
Quebec and Nova Scotia: The CO 16 Records (1768-1772)
The limitations of Baynton and Wharton’s grain trade from Quebec reflect the larger
problems of the colony’s agricultural export economy in these early years, and perhaps accounts
for why agricultural exports are not well researched beyond Fernand Ouellet’s influential
Economic and Social History of Quebec, which outlines how the growth of a small colonial
surplus in 1763-64 (correlating to John Collins’ export permit) gave way to two years of dearth
(as per Allsopp’s observations). A small surplus again in 1767-68 gave way to another poor
harvest in 1769. 27 The period from 1762 through 1769 resulted in four years of small surpluses

25

George Allsopp to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 17 February and 20 March 1766. Baynton, Wharton, and
Morgan Papers, PSA, roll 1.
26
See Harold Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1962).
27
Ouellet, Economic and Social History of Quebec, 85.

83

and three years of shortages. Yet, even this mildly optimistic overview is misleading in light of
the permit difficulties faced by Collins. The Quebec grain export economy was extremely small
in scale even during good harvests and it was non-existent after poor ones. With inconsistent
production, Quebec represented an uncertain addition to the British Atlantic grain economy in
the 1760s.
The Colonial Office 16 (hereafter, CO 16) records for 1768-1772 allow the grain trade
from Quebec and Nova Scotia to be assessed in comparison to other British colonies. This
unique quantitative data provides essential insights about grain the export and import of grain
products. Table 3.1 outlines the annual net exports and imports recorded in the CO 16 ledgers
for the port of Quebec from 1768 to 1772.
Table 3.1: Net Exports and (Imports) from/to Quebec 1768-1772 28

Year
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772

Flour/Bread (Tons)
(148)
(1566)
(411)
69
302

Indian Corn (Bushels)
NA
(16,912)
NA
NA
NA

Wheat (Bushels)
23,362
NA
52,312
194,632
144,667

Quebec enjoyed a general trend of increasing exports after 1770 in the wake of significant
imports, particularly in the crisis year of 1769. The early 1770s clearly saw gains for Quebec
agriculture. Ouellet relies on the CO 16 data up to 1772, and then expands on it with other
sources through 1774 that also indicate improved agricultural production in Quebec up to the eve
of the next major war in North America.
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Exports of wheat from Quebec to southern Europe and in the coastal trade increased
notably in 1771 and 1772, market connections that were broadly similar to other wheat exporting
regions in the thirteen colonies in these years. Externally, Quebec exports focused on the
southern European market and Ireland in addition to the coastal trade. Coastal trade is not
defined within the ledgers by destination, and there is no record of what markets within British
North America are designated by this label. Wheat exports to southern Europe increased to
103,269 bushels in 1771 and 121,856 bushels in 1772, overwhelmingly the major destination.
Coastwise exports increased to over 62,000 bushels in the two-year period, and in an interesting
development almost 50,000 bushels of wheat (approximately 40% of the colonial total) were
exported to Ireland. 29 Historian James Lydon confirms that the grain trade between Quebec
province and the rest of the Atlantic world expanded between 1770 and 1775, with almost half a
million bushels of Canadian wheat to the port of Barcelona alone. 30
Combining CO 16 data with the findings of Lydon and Ouellet reveal a number of
important features of the grain export trade in the late 1760s and early 1770s. First, although the
overall volume of grain exports from Quebec was increasing in the early 1770s, the volatility of
the 1760s was not found in more established colonial wheat exporting regions. Further, the
volume of exports paled in comparison with the mid-Atlantic breadbasket that drew to embrace
much of the Chesapeake. Ouellet cites the arrival of new British merchants as the causal factor
for increased production and, of course, exports. 31 Even if his summation is correct, significant
challenges remained before Quebec could regularly provide a marketable surplus on a substantial
scale.
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Second, the market orientation of Quebec’s grain exports to southern Europe, rather than
the West Indies, is striking. A functioning trade system required both exports and imports. The
commodities received from southern Europe, such as wine and salt, had markets throughout
Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, where the demand for salt for the fisheries was nearly
insatiable. By contrast, exchange goods with the West Indies were limited to sugar and sugar by
products (to be processed into rum), which could not be absorbed into the Canadian economy in
the quantities required for a profitable trade relationship. Quebec’s southern European trade
complemented the production of the mid-Atlantic colonies in an expanding trans-Atlantic market
rather than compete with the already established West Indian trade with the thirteen colonies.
Table 3.2 outlines the net annual exports and imports of grain products from Halifax, a
region that is neglected entirely by Ouellet and Lydon, perhaps for the good reason that its grain
trade even makes the low levels in Quebec seem impressive. Halifax never had a season of
plenty for grain exports, unlike the port of Quebec. Instead, Halifax remained dependent on
external imports of provisions even 20 years after British governance solidified in Nova Scotia
with the founding of the city.
Table 3.2: Net Exports and (Imports) from/to Halifax, 1768-1772 32

Year
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772

32

Flour/Bread (Tons)
(637)
(831)
(773)
(570)
(620)

Indian Corn (Bushels)
(9081)
(15,446), meal (4,150)
(7,811)
(8,799)
(11,823)

CO 16, January 1768-January 1773. DLAR film 412
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Wheat (Bushels)
NA
(208)
NA
(890)
NA

While Quebec’s trade ratio in grain products varied significantly even within the five years for
which data exist, Nova Scotia never enjoyed an annual net export of grain products from 1768 to
1772.
The sources for grain imports into Halifax are notable, and its subsistence was dependent
on the coastal trade from other British colonies. Ouellet states that part of this trade arrived from
Quebec; however, the sheer volume of imports into Halifax and the small amount for Quebec’s
coastal exports makes plain that Quebec was not a major supplier of grain for Nova Scotia. 33
Bread and flour imports into Halifax from 1768 to 1772 ranged between 637 tons and 831 tons
per year in addition to quantities of other grain products. 34 By definition, the coastwise trade
involved trade connections between the various ports of British North America, excluding the
West Indies, which was categorized as a separate regional unit in the CO 16 records. The New
England colonies were also net grain importers. Thus, the agricultural hinterland that supplied
Halifax with grain stretched from New York to the Chesapeake Bay—the greater mid-Atlantic
colonial breadbasket.
The products imported focus on bread and flour (as one category) and indian corn rather
than wheat, per se, which could indicate a lack of milling infrastructure in Halifax, or,
potentially, a lack of baking capacity, depending on the ratio between imported flour and bread.
Further, the disparity between imports and exports suggest that imported provisions were
certainly consumed locally rather than re-exported to other markets. 35
The implications of this are twofold. First, it indicates an under-appreciated link between
Nova Scotia and the mid-Atlantic colonies via the grain trade prior to the War for American
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Independence that extends far beyond the familiar historiographic emphasis on linkages between
New England and Nova Scotia. As far as the grain trade is concerned, New England and Nova
Scotia were both net importers who traded with the mid-Atlantic. This suggests that the colonial
coastal trade was more expansive that previously thought. Second, the war and termination of
imperial connections between the thirteen colonies and Great Britain would have serious effects
on the sustainability of settlement in Nova Scotia. Local production remained inadequate and
redirecting Quebec’s grain surplus to Halifax (even when available) lacked the scale that needed
to be imported and lacked return trade goods essential for a sustainable and mutually beneficial
trade. In short, Nova Scotia was not viable as an expanding British settler colony, especially one
with a major naval base at Halifax that further limited labor for internal agricultural production,
without a major source for imported grain.
The War for American Independence and Economic Reformulation
The War for American Independence created new opportunities and challenges for all
both major regions of British North America. As a long settled colonial holding, agricultural
development in Quebec was the most advanced. The Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia and
post-1784 New Brunswick provided land for potential development. However, the challenges of
establishing tens of thousands of new immigrants into lands mostly untouched by European
settlement presented challenges for both the immigrants and the colonial state that supported
them. Whether or not British North America could simultaneously support the influx of new
royal subjects and increase agricultural output to adequately support them and to replace the US
within the imperial economy remained unproven.
In Quebec, according to Ouellet, grain exports declined almost 40% between 1775-79
compared to 1770-75, but this was not caused by a decline in production. Rather, provisioning
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the British army created soaring local demand with a high capacity to pay for any available
grain. Much as during the Seven Years War, speculation rather than an actual agricultural
scarcity, caused grain shortages. Yet, in 1779, the situation changed when the surpluses of the
previous decade turned to deficit during a series of poor harvests. 36
The export data for this period offers a mixed picture, allowing imperial observers to
support any number of conclusions on the potential of Quebec agriculture. The increasing
volume of grain exports prior to the war and through at least its first two years did have one
important and unforeseen side effect. It raised the hope that there was an existing alternative to
the mid-Atlantic as a source of grain within the empire. Public figures such as Lord Sheffield
seized upon the early 1770s data, and extrapolated it to imagine what was possible if agriculture
in Quebec (and more speculatively) in Nova Scotia continued to flourish. With waves of loyalist
refugees flowing into both colonies, all that was (in theory) required was to provide the proper
encouragement for an agricultural boom fueled by a prudent mix of labor, land, and a guaranteed
market. The loyalist provided the first, the land existed, and the markets could be guaranteed via
a strict application of the Navigation Acts against the newly independent United States.
How British North America could replace the thirteen rebellious colonies as a source of
grain within the empire formed the second element of Lord Sheffield’s formulation for the postwar imperial economy. The plan remained subject of intense debate between Sheffield and his
critics in the 1780s. Developing Canada and Nova Scotia into the new imperial breadbasket
rested on decidedly shaky evidence. In the CO 16 records, Canada fluctuated between a net
importer and net exporter of grain depending on the state of each year’s harvest. Nova Scotia
had no record as a source for agricultural exports and was itself a significant imported foodstuffs.
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Nonetheless, Sheffield projected in his Observations on the Commerce of the United States that
further agricultural development not only could make British North American self-sufficient, but
that an adequate surplus could also begin replacing US exports to the West Indies. With the
appropriate changes made in governance, Canada and Nova Scotia “will soon amply supply the
principal articles wanted in the islands, except Indian corn and rice; and should there be
difficulty in getting these articles, the cheapness of wheat and pease in Canada will soon afford a
good substitute.” 37
Replacing the US in the West Indian market was only the beginning of Sheffield’s design
for a reorganized British Atlantic economy. Canadian surpluses would also displace US
producers from their markets in Iberia and the Mediterranean. Sheffield’s Observations noted
that:
There never was any market in Europe for the wheat and wheat-flour of America,
except in Spain, Portugal, and the ports of the Mediterranean. Before the war, the
wheat from Canada began to be preferred in Spain…. the Spanish purchaser had the
advantage of manufacturing it, and there being a demand in Canada for a low-priced,
but strong red wine of Spain, for which there was none in the American states, the
Canadian merchants had great advantages, and they may still be increased. 38
Sheffield held an optimistic view of existing commerce predicated on his understanding of
mutually beneficial consumer desires in Iberia and Canada. The unspoken assumption underlying
the theory was that migration of farmers to Canada and Nova Scotia would soon produce an
agricultural surplus on a scale sufficient to replace the US in varied Atlantic markets. Further, he
expected producers and consumers to change their market behaviours to conform to a politicallyinspired economic program that favored a British imperial system.
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Sheffield acknowledged that this new commercial geography would include notable
transition costs for the slave societies of the West Indies colonies with their massive need for
imported food until the agricultural base in Nova Scotia and Canada developed. However, this
small cost to one interest group within the empire was a necessary (and temporary) burden that
could be offset by other changes. Streamlining customs administration, curtailing smuggling,
and encouraging a diversified agricultural economy in the Caribbean would effectively
reformulate imperial trade shorn of the US and its past integral role in colonial trade. 39
Sheffield’s optimistic perspective on the potential of British North America was
contested. Brian Edwards, the Jamaican planter, historian, and (later) Member of Parliament,
had an assessment that stretched beyond the immediate crisis of 1784, which made him skeptical
of Sheffield’s projections about British North America as an imperial granary. For Edwards, the
provisions crisis in the Caribbean was not a temporary condition but rather a permanent reality
that could not be overcome within the confines of a strict mercantile system.
If any man of sense and character, acquainted with the soil, population, and
resources of Canada and Nova Scotia, will publickly aver that those provinces
can, for years to come, furnish the West India islands with one half the supplies
which have hitherto been furnished by the United States, on any terms short of
ruin to the purchasers, and at the same time take the rum of the islands in
payment; I will, as publickly acknowledge that my arguments have been all along
founded in error, and heartily agree with Lord Sheffield that, on every principle of
honour, humanity, and justice, the unfortunate loyalists of Nova Scotia are
entitled to the preference of our custom. 40

Edwards stressed several significant problems for the post-war imperial economic system.
While acknowledging the benefits of supporting Nova Scotian loyalists as an abstract matter of
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principle, two interrelated difficulties blocked that goal. The first was geographical and
environmental, could an adequate surplus be achieved in a timely fashion in the northernmost
colonies, or at all? Second, if an adequate level of agricultural production could be
accomplished, how would enough demand for West Indian rum (and presumably other sugarbased products) in British North American be created? He concluded that a satisfactory solution
could not be achieved. The volume and expense of US provisions and lumber was such that it
chiefly demonstrates the mockery of referring the disappointed [West Indian]
planter to Canada and Nova Scotia. Even if nature had not, as unfortunate as she
has, shut up the navigation from the former of these provinces six months in the
year, and devoted the latter to everlasting sterility; there is this plain reason in the
nature of things that forbids the planter to look to those countries for effectual
relief. “It is inconsistent with the nature of commerce, to furnish an adequate
supply to so vast and so various a demand; immediately and unexpectedly. The
demand and supply must grow up together, mutually supporting, and supported
by each other.” It will require a long series of years to bring them to a level. 41
Edwards implies that given enough time for the supply and demand relationships to develop,
Canada could offer some relief to the embattled West Indian planter, though not on a year-round
basis. Nova Scotia, unfortunately, was a hopeless case due to the environmental limits of
agriculture there. As a West Indian planter Edwards was obviously an interested observer in the
post-war debate about imperial trade. The lower costs and larger amounts associated with US
imports were persuasive to him and others with similar needs.
Observers in the United States were also intensely interested in these political and
economic debates. A pamphlet by “An American” in 1784 pithily noted that “the idea that
Canada and Nova Scotia being soon a substitute for the commerce of the United States,
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considering the coldness of the climate, barrenness of the soil, long winters, and harbours
inaccessible for almost seven months in the year, appears to me too absurd to require a serious
refutation.” 42 According to Harris, grain was grown, but was constrained by soil and
climatic conditions which rendered the region a net importer of wheat and flour. 43 This
environmental rationale is strikingly similar to that of Edwards, from a practical point of
view the legal resumption of the US grain trade was imperative and faced no realistic
rival.
Focusing on the geographic basis of agricultural production and trade provides an
obvious critique to Sheffield’s theories. Yet another crucial element underlies the basic
assumptions of this debate. Sheffield’s essay suggests that given time and appropriate
encouragement British North America would become the new granary of the empire and produce
enough surplus for foreign exchange. Edwards and “An American” saw the Canadian landscape
as an inherent stumbling block to this type of development that no amount of time, effort, or
government policy could overcome. Each grappled with the new post-war political and economic
landscape. How changing political circumstances intersected with the continuity of longstanding economic needs and trade patterns was not clear either in theory or in practical
application. Underlying the debate, however, was a common theme: what could Canada and
Nova Scotia become, and what role would they play in the reconfigured empire? This carried
significant consequences for imperial policy makers, West Indian planters, and US merchants
and agricultural interests. The debate about the role of British North American agriculture in the
imperial and Atlantic economy, however, skipped over an even more basic matter. Could the
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colonies in question even produce enough food to support themselves in the immediate post-war
period?
Upper and Lower Canadian Agriculture, 1783-1793
The pamphlet war sparked by Sheffield represents a policy debate about the state of trade
and what it should become in the new political circumstances of the post-1783 empire. These
varied projections and their various incarnations depended upon agricultural development in
newly expanding settler colonies. What should ideally be done for the empire rested uneasily
alongside what could practically be accomplished in agricultural fields.
The most stable and heavily settled region of British North America in the wake of the
war remained Quebec. While the incoming settlers to the Maritimes and to Upper Canada
sought to establish a basic level of subsistence and (potentially) an exportable surplus, the hopes
for a closed imperial system that excluded US grain rested with Quebec. Conclusive quantitative
evidence on grain are elusive for the 1780s. However, Ouellet offers valuable insights about
exports from Quebec and Montreal. Overall, the scale of trade was minor. Moreover, his
calculations do not include any data for the Maritimes, nor for grain traded across the US border
until 1808. 44
Cross-border trade after the war was made especially complex by the independent status
of Vermont until 1791, some of whose leaders clearly considered joining Canada due to “her
nearness to the Canadian frontier and the St. Lawrence Valley.” Negotiations between Governor
Haldimand of Canada and Vermont settlers to establish the state as a royal colony were
unsuccessful, but many Montreal merchants as well as many Vermont citizens openly advocated
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for direct trade. This advocacy was rewarded in 1786 when British governor Lord Dorchester
allowed Vermont to export lumber, naval stores, agricultural goods, “or anything else of the
growth and produce of Vermont” via the St. Lawrence and to “import the manufactures of Great
Britain and East and West Indian products on the same terms as the Canadians.” 45 This view
emphasized Vermont’s use of Canada and the St. Lawrence as a conduit to Atlantic markets, yet
the trade connection could also provide a source of provisions in times of need.
Ouellet’s analysis of the 1780s Quebec grain economy presents a mixed picture.
Recovery from the war effort was not clear until 1786, when flour and other exports increased.
The same agricultural disaster that struck the rest of British North America also effected Quebec.
By summer 1788, it was clear that famine stalked the land. Prices for flour, corn, and other
necessities of life increased, while relief efforts by government officials fell far short of dire
needs. 46 The government of the late-eighteenth century, particularly in British North America,
did not have robust institutional resources to respond swiftly to the crisis. The primary tool for
relieving famine conditions concerned regulating trade laws as well as basic forms of direct
assistance. For example, by 1790 Lord Dorchester prohibited grain exports from Quebec. 47
A ban on grain exports was not an unusual exercise of government power, and it drew on
similar policies in Ireland and Guernsey during the same period. However, the ban exports was
not an adequate response. Dorchester turned to the US for “temporary” relief by expanding the
licit cross-border trade networks between Vermont and British North America to openly include
non-British commerce. A notice in the 12 February 1789 edition of the Quebec Gazette
announced that imports of bread, flour, biscuit, and all other types of grain would be permitted

45

W.A. Mackintosh, “Canada and Vermont: A Study in Historical Geography,” The Canadian Historical Review,
Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1927), 12-16.
46
Ouellet, Economy and Social History of Quebec, 135-36.
47
Ibid, 136.

95

until the first of August. 48 In justifying this course of action, Dorchester cited the rapidly
increasing price of provisions and worsening local conditions as imperatives for bold action. 49
This brought little quick relief as the flow of supplies from the US into Canada by land proved
inadequate. With the specter of famine haunting his administration, Dorchester expanded his
authorization for US trade to include seaborne trade in June. Further, he requested the help of
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and the commanders of both the Newfoundland and Halifax naval
establishments to facilitate this trade due to the “urgent necessity of the case.” 50
The creation and development of Upper Canada as a separate province after 1791 caused
another problem. Historian Douglas McCalla argues that Upper Canadian production of wheat
was substantive, but the exact amount produced and consumed there in its early years are
conjectural. By his estimate, approximately 80% of Upper Canadian production was required for
local consumption, population growth and increased grain production, also caused growing local
demand. 51 The lack of infrastructure in newly-settled colonial spaces also limited agricultural
production as well as long-distance trade. The mills required to transform wheat into more
lucrative and transportable flour did not exist until government investments in the late 1780s and
1790s stimulated private investment into grist and saw mills. Moreover, transporting wheat to
the mills remained challenging for farmers. 52 Manufacturing cornmeal remained easier for most
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settlers, particularly those distant from the grist mills. 53 Local consumption patterns favoured
growing corn, and the low price for corn products made it uneconomical for export to distant
markets even in the case of a surplus.
Of course, the existence of surpluses was far from assured, especially in early years of
colonial development, which the government recognized by offering early loyalists provisions
for three years after settlement. The end of government rations coincided with the ‘famine year’
of 1788-89, which reduced many settlers to poverty and starvation. The limits of poor harvests
could not be overcome by grants from the King’s Stores, which were distributed by the military
as a type of social welfare effort. 54 During better times, local military demand provided a nearby
market to sell grain. This thriving local trade served both an economic and a political purpose as
military contracts for grain was a lucrative matter for patronage in Upper Canada’s House of
Assembly. 55 The military market included a further advantage for local farmers since military
garrisons in the province paid higher than market prices for their supplies. 56 Given strong local
civilian and military demand, trade of surpluses to distant markets in the Maritimes, Great
Britain, or even the lucrative West Indies was a distant dream.
The case of the ‘famine year’ was extraordinary, yet underscores a familiar pattern. As
noted in the writings of French officials, like Bougainville in the 1750s, as well as British
government records, like the CO 16 ledgers of the late-1760s and early-1770s, the agricultural
economy was marginally self-sufficient in good times but subject to scarcity on regular intervals.
The swift expansion of population by loyalist refugees only deepened this situation. In this light,
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Dorchester’s opening of trade by land with Vermont and with the mid-Atlantic via oceanic trade
reflected a practical and urgent need to supply an expanding settler colonial society with external
provisions for subsistence. Given that the agricultural potential of Nova Scotia was more limited
than that of Quebec and that the number of loyalist refugees to the Maritimes was far more
massive relative to the pre-war population, there can be little optimism for the likelihood of its
sustainability without external imports of grain and other provisions.
Nova Scotia Agriculture, 1783-1793
The thriving pamphlet war waged a trans-Atlantic debate about the imperial roles of
Canada and Nova Scotia and their ability (or lack thereof) to adequately replace the now
independent thirteen colonies as a source of provisions for the British West Indies, yet within
Nova Scotia itself there was little question about its agricultural limitations. Works by scholars
such as Julian Gwyn, Neil MacKinnon, Maya Jasanoff, and James Walker have highlighted the
challenges to settlers and, especially, the material and emotional difficulties of reconstructing a
familiar society for the enormous number of loyalist refugees and decommissioned troops who
moved there in the 1780s. 57 The challenges were voluminous. Beyond securing shelter and
daily bread, fashioning coherent land claims via surveys for government-distributed land proved
controversial. The relations between loyalist refugees and earlier settlers was often strained.
Whether, and to what degree, the promises made to the loyalists by the British government
would, or could, be honoured was constantly tested. Simply put, the colony was not prepared for
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the influx of new inhabitants, and the legal and material infrastructure required to support
colonial expansion did not exist.58
By the end of 1783, the need for external provisions for Nova Scotia was clear. The
provincial government was not disinterested or hapless, merely overwhelmed by the crisis. Few
palatable solutions existed. Writing to Lord North in December, John Campbell noted that with
the introduction of disbanded regiments in the colony in need of assistance from the government,
the colony required “a considerable supply of provisions….as early in the spring as possible.” 59
The need was two-fold. Beyond the humanitarian motive, the supply of provisions was directly
linked to the peace and stability of the province. Fears of discontent among loyalist settlers and
demobilized soldiers were noticed even in Whitehall. Writing in June 1784, Lord Sydney
assured Governor John Parr that the British government was aware of the crisis facing the
colony, and that a continued flow of provisions from His Majesty’s government to the afflicted
would relieve their distress and reassure them of the Crown’s continued interest in their
welfare. 60
By September 1784, it was clear that food supplies from within the empire were
inadequate. Writing to Lord Sydney, Parr informed officials in Britain that due to dire scarcity
and with the advice of the Council, he had declared that “no scruple or difficulty should be made
of admitting the people of New England to import fresh provisions” into the colony. Further, “it
was agreed that any restriction on such an importation might be attended with bad
consequences.” 61 Parr’s identification of the people of New England in his letter to Sydney,
rather than to Americans in general, is intriguing. Parr had only been in the colonies since his

58

MacKinnon, This Unfriendly Soil, 79.
John Campbell to Lord North, December 18, 1783. PANS, roll 13860.
60
Lord Sydney [Secretary of State] to John Parr [Governor, Nova Scotia], 7 July 1784. PANS, roll 15230.
61
Parr to Sydney, 29 September 1784. PANS, roll 13860.
59

99

appointment as governor in 1782, and he may have simply associated all Americans with New
Englanders who played such a prominent role in the coastal trade. New England itself was not an
exporter of food products, and the links between the Mid-Atlantic States and Halifax are clearly
outlined in the Naval Office records of the 1750s and 60s. While New England could have been
a shorthand term for all Americans, Parr probably strategically cast his policy to British officials
as a regional accommodation as opposed to a broader opening for all US merchants and ships.
The need for New England merchants to openly trade with Nova Scotia indicates the
scope of the emergency faced by the colony, since it waived the privileged position in the
Navigation Acts for imperial trade by British ships owned and manned by British subjects.
Although this exemption did not last, it is noteworthy that even the proclamations forbidding US
vessels from Nova Scotian harbors also contained permission for importing American
agricultural products into the colony on British ships. 62 This step toward a more stringent
implementation of mercantile doctrine would certainly be open to corruption. For example,
Sydney complained to Parr of US merchants colluding with British revenue officers in the West
Indies and Nova Scotia to acquire British ship registers to facilitate illicit commerce. 63
One of the key questions of integrating the newly arrived loyalists into Nova Scotia
society was the reassurance that their past sufferings would receive compensation from the
British government. Provisions were a down payment upon that promise, and thus took on a
political quality in addition to its importance for subsistence. Sydney noted that British policy
aimed to make Nova Scotia “the envy of the subjects of the neighboring states” through the
gracious intervention of the government in “relieving the wants of those who have become
settlers in Nova Scotia.” Yet the distance between the intent of imperial policy and its
62
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implementation was profound. Immediately after recognizing the need for efforts on behalf of
loyalist settlers, Sydney decried the “immense expense” of such work and that “issuing further
supplies cannot now be a measure of necessity.” As early as March 1785, Sydney instructed Parr
to ensure that “government in the future be put to the least possible expense.” 64
The need for practical frugality and political idealism uneasily coexisted. A two-thirds
provisions ration was promised until May 1786 to at least 15,000 loyalists spread throughout
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 65 The scope of supplies required was immense. Writing on 28
May 1785, Sydney informed Parr that the government had reached an agreement with
contractors to supply 3.8 million pounds of flour and 3.1 million pounds of pork to the colony for
military use as well as to supply loyalist settlers for the next year. 66 Although the source of these
supplies was not specified, most would have to arrive as imports to the colony.
These measures had little effect to curtail the thriving US grain trade with Nova Scotia.
The December 1785 minutes of the Council and House of Assembly increased some trade
restrictions yet exempted grain products from prohibition.67 This exemption persisted for the
next several years. Each session of the Council would advise and consent to a proclamation by
Parr allowing for the importation of US agricultural products for a specified period of time,
which correlated to the timing of the sessions of the Assembly and Council. 68 Not including
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smuggling and trade collusion that thrived for several decades, the Provincial Assembly provided
trade exemptions to sustain the flow of provisions into the colony. 69
Two interesting elements surface from Governor Parr’s interactions with his Council and
the Provincial Assembly. First, the power structure of the empire in the post-war period
reconsidered the quasi-independent status of the colonial governments as one of the root causes
of the American Revolution. Nevertheless, the power to suspend imperial trade regulations still
rested in the hands of colonial governors in emergency situations such as impending famine.
Second, the United States was the only practical a source for needed provisions, especially given
the enduring pattern of the colonial grain trade and expanding demand with the influx of settlers
outpacing improvements in internal agricultural production. Perversely, the outcome of the War
for American Independence rendered Nova Scotia more dependent on US provisions.
The dream for Nova Scotia to be part of an imperial granary did not disappear even in the
face of these difficulties. Reforming pamphlets circulated through the 1780s to explain recent
agricultural failures and how to solve them. For example, S. Hollingsworth in 1787 simply
counseled patience about the slow development of Nova Scotian grain exports:
In the present situation of the province, it cannot be supposed that, since her
population has increased to six or seven times more than it was before the
rebellion, there is any to spare, either one or the other [flour or grain], so as to
become articles for exportation, as least for sometime to come. The lands are,
however, in most places, well adapted for the cultivation of wheat, barley, rye,
oats, pease, and beans; they are already growing in large quantities in many
places. 70
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Hollingsworth’s assessment hints at a crucial underlying limitation. Even substantial increases
in production might only meet growing local demand, rendering grain exportation in any
substantive volume a distant dream.
Whether there was an adequate increase in production of wheat to meet the local demand
cannot be directly proven, but it seems unlikely. A memorial from settlers in Annapolis in April
1787, part of the best farming region of the colony, for example, requested additional rations due
to scarcity. Yet Lord Sydney informed Parr that the government must decline the application
noting that
any additional favour shown to them would consequently produce other
applications, which considering the immense expense already brought upon this
country for supplies of provisions, and other articles issued to these people, could
not be attended to. I must, therefore, desire you to inform the petitioners that their
application in the present instance cannot be complied with. 71
While it is easy to dismiss Sydney’s orders as callous, it points to two significant issues. First,
eighteenth-century government was not designed to function as a welfare office. Funds were
limited, and social expenditures were minimal even in cases of the “deserving poor” such as the
loyalists. The allowance of provisions for new settlers and refugees was extraordinary and
temporary rather than a new and ongoing standard. Second, Sydney feared that the settlers of
Annapolis were just the first of many similar cases. If scarcity was a concern in Annapolis, one
of the more agriculturally advantageous regions of Nova Scotia, then conditions in other portions
of the colony might be disastrous and result in a flood of applications for relief that the British
government could not provide. Nova Scotia was far from becoming a grain exporting region as
hoped for by Hollingsworth. The ability of the colony to even feed itself was questionable.
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Much like Canada, Nova Scotia faced a serious famine in the late 1780s. A case study of
the Hessian and Waldeck settlements provides a clear picture of suffering as well as a remedy
available to settlers if government relief was not forthcoming. The community was unable to
survive and warned that if outside assistance did not arrive soon the people would “fall under the
unavoidable necessity to fly to some other country for the relief of their distressed families.” 72
An exodus out of Nova Scotia was no idle threat. Parr had recognized the phenomena two years
prior. Writing to an unidentified correspondent in July 1787, he complained that once the bounty
of provisions ceased, many loyalists had fled the province. 73 The need to find a solution was
essential, and the response was a variation on a familiar theme. Drawing on the 1783 example of
the province permitting US agricultural products into the colony, in July 1789 an Order-inCouncil permitted the importation of bread, corn, and flour into all the provinces of Atlantic
Canada. 74
Superficially, admitting American produce into the colony was an emergency response to
a specific crisis. While true, in part, it reflects a much longer pattern of agricultural need and
integrated Atlantic trade reaching back to the 1740s. The political separation of the post-war era
did not sunder these commercial and humanitarian connections. Traditional trade patterns
persisted after US independence. If international agricultural trade was only legitimate during an
emergency, then colonial Nova Scotia was fundamentally shaped by the management of a
perpetual crisis or provisions that involved a dynamic commercial relationship the US, the
Canadas, and the British and foreign West Indies.
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According to historical geographer Andrew Clark’s landscape analysis, “Nova Scotia is
not, and never has been, a very suitable area for growing wheat.” 75 This is valid due to local
environmental conditions that were made even more forceful due to dependency on cheap and
plentiful external sources of wheat, above all from the mid-Atlantic colonies and states. A
strictly environmental analysis of the issue is incomplete. Graeme Wynn’s research on
agriculture in the Bay of Fundy points to a richer understanding of the relationship between
imported provisions, local production, and consumption within the colony. In his analysis,
“cheap, fine flour and other grains from the American states offered stiff competition to coarser
Nova Scotian products, however, and marshland farmers soon concentrated on livestock for
market production.” 76 This adds another layer of complexity as it suggests that not only did
temporary scarcity drive demand for American grain, but market-based decisions about the best
mix of agricultural and cattle production deepened the local commitment to US imports. Such
local imperatives in Nova Scotia forced the hand of Nova Scotia leaders to continue permitting
agricultural trade with the US on a “temporary,” but perpetual, basis.
The outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793 caused a sudden reassessment of
trade policy between the United States and the British Empire. War created enormous additional
demand for provisions as contractors supplying British forces in the Caribbean required more
than could be purchased within the empire. A May 1794 letter from John Wentworth, the new
governor of Nova Scotia, to Archibald Mitchell, a commissariat contractor, outlines the only
practical solution to this problem in a familiar manner. Although Mitchell’s contract favored
fulfillment in the colonies, this was only operative if His Majesty’s colonies “were capable of
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furnishing” the amount required. 77 Wentworth allowed for the importation of provisions from
Boston, “given that no other remedy existed.” 78 The state of war also seemed likely to disrupt
Nova Scotia’s agricultural supplies if (or when) its militia was need for defense. By the end of
the year a gloomy governor Wentworth sorrowfully reported to the Duke of Portland that “any
diminution in cultivating lands would immediately cause such a scarcity of food as to induce
numbers to remove to the U. States.” Still, he projected that a surplus in excess of local demand
would undoubtedly exist in a few years and be available for export. 79
By 1794 it was clear that British North America could not produce the needed grain
surpluses to sustain colonies in the British West Indies or to supply military needs in a time of
war. Moreover, while Quebec and the Canadas had self-sufficiency within its grasp, Nova Scotia
and the Maritimes more generally struggled to feed its own growing population. In a perverse
conclusion to the volatile revolutionary transition, the limitations of British North American
agriculture helped make the ties between US agriculture and the empire as strong after the war as
they had been before it. In the absence of quantitative evidence, the changes in economic
relations in the Jay Treaty sheds useful light on official perspectives about the status of North
American agriculture in 1794. The treaty formally reopened Britain’s West Indian possessions
to trade with the United States, thereby legalizing a thriving clandestine trade. This effectively
terminated modest Canadian trade with the West Indies. 80 While Jay’s Treaty was certainly
shaped by multiple commercial and geopolitical factors, the trade concessions granted to the
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United States was a pivotal plank that made plain that Canadian and Maritimes agricultural
production was inadequate as of 1794.
Three broad and neglected patterns are clear from this assessment of post-war agricultural
development and trade policy in British North America. First, there is a remarkable continuity of
grain trade connections in spite of the political rupture and demographic growth after 1783. The
establishment of Halifax as a naval base in 1749 had made the city dependent on external sources
of subsistence from its inception. The lack of local production and infrastructure, in turn, created
a distant agricultural hinterland mid-Atlantic states. Then departure of thirteen colonies from the
empire in 1783 (and eventually Vermont) did not change this pattern. Direct support from the
Crown for provisions to ease the suffering of the loyalist refugees and demobilized soldiers was
planned as a temporary measure rather than a sustainable economic alternative. A variety of
machinations by provincial, imperial, and US interests conspired to restore the pre-war colonial
trading relationship.
Second, increases in British North American grain production were consumed by rapid
increases in local population as well as demand heightened by British military forces in North
America in peace and war. Even ardent boosters of a strict mercantile system acknowledged this
reality as something that needed to be overcome. The particular nature of grain as both a market
commodity and as a requirement for daily subsistence made any restructuring of the grain
economy a pressing demand that could not take a backseat to imperial political ideals. As a
result a policy solution that liberalized the grain trade, either formally or informally, was
required. As the West Indian planter and historian Brian Edwards noted, “trade will no doubt in
such [a] case revert in a great degree to its ancient channels.” 81 Even in the absence of liberal
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trade policies that favored the open exchange of goods, the imperatives of the grain trade (based
on the brute facts of where it could be grown in large amounts, and where demand was most
profitable or essential for survival) meant that it rarely varied from the accustomed patterns that
it had taken by the mid-eighteenth century, if not before. The question remaining was whether or
not government regulation would support or attempt to challenge the environmental and
economic imperatives of the trans-Atlantic grain trade.
Third, the overall state of British North American grain surpluses also retained the low
(or non-existent) yields of the 1750s and 1760s. Although self-sufficiency for local consumption
usually could be met, occasional years of modest surplus remained interspersed with crisis
shortages that required imports from the US. Beyond the need for subsistence during those
trying times, the uncertainty introduced into the grain market by these fluctuations between
surplus and dearth made British North American grain supplies unreliable for consumers. This is
in marked contrast to the consistent availability of mid-Atlantic grain products throughout the
eighteenth century. In the post-war era this provided a vital advantage for the presidential
administration of George Washington as it entered negotiations to officially reintegrate the new
US nation into the British Atlantic and the trade of other entangled Atlantic empires.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE OPPORTUNITIES AND COSTS OF NEUTRALITY, 1793-1809

The changing geopolitical environment of the 1790s created both opportunity and danger
for the new United States. After over a decade of formal exile from the British Atlantic economy
during and in the wake of the Revolutionary War, the outbreak of war in Europe officially
reopened a number of colonial era trading routes to US merchants that had only been informally
accessible since the American War for Independence. The ‘normalcy’ of the colonial era trading
relationship now reemerged legally, thereby bringing to a close the aberration of the
Revolutionary period rupture. The changing fortunes of war, however, would again cause
temporary disruptions in Anglo-American trade. Yet these were ephemeral as the strength of the
traditional economic relationship proved durable even under intense political strain. The larger
European struggle would shape American economic and foreign policy for the next two decades
as the federal government struggled to protect domestic interests as the major European powers
sought to deploy US commerce as part of their increasingly bitter ideological and military
conflict.
Changes in American politics also influenced US policy. The transition from Federalist
rule under George Washington and John Adams to the Democratic-Republican administrations
of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison after the so-called ‘revolution of 1800’ was significant
for varied reasons. Nevertheless, foreign and economic policy remained remarkably consistent
until the destruction of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in 1805 and the new French and
British policies towards neutral traders that accompanied this martial turning point. Starting in
1806, the Jefferson administration attempted, with little success, to coerce European powers with
the threat of US trade sanctions in order to gain concessions for American commerce that, by
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extension, would raise the status of the US as a major force in the Atlantic economy. Jefferson’s
desperate embargo gamble in 1807 did not halt trade as it was openly evaded by Federalists and
Republicans alike, and the experiment further revealed a profound division within Jeffersonian
political economy. Its grand vision of a yeoman republic with limited government and minimal
internal taxation relied on foreign trade and customs revenue to fund the national government,
which otherwise would collapse. How these contending goals could be balanced reflected the
uncertain place of the US in an Atlantic World at war. 1
Because the outbreak of war in Europe in April 1792 did not involve the United States as
a belligerent power, it opened rich possible rewards for neutral trade. In theory, the US remained
allied with France due to treaty obligations during the American Revolution. However, in April
1793 President Washington declared neutrality. Historian Reginald Horsman has stressed that
neutrality and the European conflict provided the US with the opportunity to expand west even
as US trade in the Atlantic might be threatened. 2 Another series of calculations were foremost
for US merchants. As a practical matter, the increasingly desperate war between Revolutionary
(and later Napoleonic) France and Great Britain deployed naval power to interdict (or protect)
Atlantic trade and even sought to govern what products were exchanged with Americans. US
commerce increasingly diversified over the war years from 1793 to 1807 to include-exports of
colonial goods to continental Europe.
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The potential profits were vast. According to historian Douglass North’s now classic
examination of the early republic economy, “the commercial and trade policies of England and
France and the response of the American government to them were the source for every
expansion and contraction.” 3 The focus on exports and re-exports for European markets as the
core vehicle for American prosperity has been dubbed the “Taylor-North” thesis. The European
war placed most trans-Atlantic trade into the hands of neutral powers, particularly the United
States. For North, 1793-1808 marked “years of unparalleled prosperity” for the United States
due to the importance of exports to the overall economy and the expansion of that sector during
this timeframe, the increase of imports at favorable prices, and the expansion of domestic
manufactures driven by the profits produced by the export sector. 4
The “Taylor-North” thesis has been challenged by historians such as Donald Adams, who
provides a quantitative analysis that questions whether or not US trade connections during the
early republic actually created prosperity for the American people, and, if so, did any particular
interest group within society disproportionately benefit from external trade. According to
Adams, the North-Taylor theory places too much emphasis on export-led growth creating
prosperity from 1793 to the start of Jefferson’s embargo in 1808. Adams proposes an alternative
based on a highly theoretical economic analysis that demonstrates that the benefits of US exports
accrued to a narrow selection of merchants, while the public as a whole paid for those profits
with increased prices and stunted domestic growth. To support this conclusion, Adams
differentiates between true domestic export production and the re-export of imported goods and
demonstrates that there was no increase in per capita domestic exports prior to the embargo. 5
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Major profits in US exports were chiefly within the carrying and re-export trade, and the profits
of that trade were absorbed by the merchant class and shipbuilding interests. Most average
people paid for this profit through higher prices for consumption, diminished exports of domestic
goods in favor of foreign ones, and higher shipping costs due to the diversion of merchant
vessels away from the domestic coastal trade. Adams is also critical of the North-Taylor thesis
because it does not provide any means by which the profits of foreign trade were transferred
throughout society. This is particularly true when the export trade is examined from a regional
perspective. According to Adams, the northern states controlled 66% of exports in 1793, by
1807 this increased to 71%. The south only had 23% of exports in 1793 and 14% in 1807, and
suffered further from higher shipping costs, insurance rates, and increased freight charges that
transferred wealth from the southern agricultural interests to northern mercantile ones. 6
The carrying trade denoted the non-domestic products carried in US ships. Tropical
produce such as sugar, coffee, and tea could be safely carried to Europe under the protection of
American neutrality. As a neutral power, merchant vessels under the protection of the US flag
were not subject to capture by belligerent powers. However, this practice soon caused political
difficulties for the Jefferson and Madison administrations. The balance of naval power in the
Atlantic decisively favored the British after Trafalgar in October 1805, and Napoleon’s European
empire turned inwards through the mercantilist-style Continental System in 1806. As the
European war expanded from armed conflict on land to an economic war with sweeping Atlantic
implications, it ensnared the US and posed daunting challenges for the federal government.
The fact that the US economy would be significantly affected by the European war was
immediately clear in 1793. Grain (and its related products) was a civilian necessity whose
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availability had a profound influence on social stability, and it was also the foundation of
military provisioning. As a result it was among the first commodities regulated as part of the war
effort. Great Britain passed a series of Orders-in-Council in 1793 and 1794 that formed the
lasting basis for British maritime strategy throughout the war. The order of June 8, 1793
prohibited any neutral vessel from carrying grain to France. Further regulations issued on
November 6 expanded the prohibition to any trade with France or its colonies that had not been
legal during peace time. A third order in January 1794 mandated the capture of any vessel
sailing to a blockaded port. 7 Through these Orders-in-Council Britain hoped to isolate the
teetering French regime that faced rebellion at home and a multi-front foreign war.
This effort provoked complaints from early US analysts after the War of 1812 as being
the key first step towards outright war. Writing in 1815, Treasury Secretary Alexander Dallas
complained that the Orders-in-Council amounted to “an avowed design, to inflict famine upon
the whole of the French people” an action “at that time; properly estimated throughout the
civilized world” to be “so glaring an infraction of neutral rights” that it “did not escape the
severities of diplomatic animadversion and remonstrance.” 8 Dallas’ statement reflects the
sensibilities of 1815, rather than those of 1793, yet he correctly identified two important
elements of British policy. First, the nature of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
would witness the use of sea power to isolate France from external trade. Second, that access to
food supplies would be a key feature of that effort. The political protests that he cites, however,
were not evident in 1793 as the policies of Washington, Adams, and the first Jefferson
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administration emphasized peaceful trade with Great Britain rather than the protests that would
come in Jefferson’s second administration and that of Madison.
In an effort to protect American trade and to settle key issues remaining between the
United States and Great Britain as a result of the American Revolution, President Washington
dispatched John Jay to London for negotiations that failed to reach consensus on many key
points. The British were able to avoid any clarification of neutral trading rights or resolving the
practice of impressment. 9 Despite those lingering issues, the negotiations protected AngloAmerican trade. Under the terms of the Jay Treaty, the British government allowed US
merchant vessels to trade with British possessions in the East and West Indies provided that
those vessels landed their cargoes only in the US. The United States was granted “reciprocal and
perfect liberty of commerce and navigation” with British possessions in Europe. The treaty,
however, did not protect American merchantmen from inspection by the British Navy. Other
clauses allowed the British Navy to inspect American merchant ships and seize any property
belonging to the enemies of Britain as contraband of war. Contraband was defined as “all arms
and implements serving for the purposes of war, by land or sea.” British men-of-war were also
authorized to “turn away” US merchants from any port under control of the enemy. 10
Historian Eliga Gould persuasively argues that there was another, deeper meaning hidden
in the text of the Jay Treaty. For the first time, the independent United States was regarded as a
fully “treaty worthy” nation by Great Britain. The Constitutional order provided for a national
government that could negotiate international treaties and enforce the terms of those treaties on
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the several states. 11 Although the treaty was a milestone in foreign relations, it was domestically
explosive and provoked strong reactions across the US political spectrum. It is intriguing to note
that this disagreement was fundamentally driven by partisan rancor. Neither of the nascent
parties proposed any alternative to trading with the British and its substantial benefits. Rather,
the conflict was over the terms of how US trade would reenter the British imperial economy.
This domestic debate over US trade policy would explode again during Jefferson’s second
administration, but the practical forces shaping trade remained stable for the next decade and
generally benefitted the American economy.
One of the primary beneficiaries of these structural conditions were grain farmers. In her
analysis of the early republican political economy, Joyce Appleby wrote that “the new European
demand for American grains…..created an unusually favorable opportunity for ordinary men to
produce for the Atlantic trade world.” 12 The transition to grain as an export commodity in the
Chesapeake region was well underway by the 1790s, which expanded the traditional MidAtlantic granaries of New York and Pennsylvania. However, Appleby’s analysis is incorrect in
identifying Europe as a new market, as Iberia and southern Europe were already long-established
consumers of American produce. Consumption patterns in Great Britain did open some new
markets, but variables within British customs regulations that attempted to balance the
competing interests of British landowners and British consumers made this an uncertain
market. 13
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An unintended benefit of the creation of the new US federal government under the
Constitution was the more reliable quantitative data gathered by the United States Treasury
Department concerning American exports and cargo destinations. This data was compiled by
Timothy Pitkin and published as A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States (1816).
Pitkin’s analysis noted the growth of both American exports to the West Indies and the growth of
the American carrying trade for Caribbean produce. Pitkin relied on unpublished statistics
generated by the Treasury Department outlining the extent and value of American exports and
re-exports, but it is unclear exactly what records he used. 14 According to Pitkin, the outbreak of
war in 1793 benefited the United States as a neutral power because the war threw the colonial
trade of the East and West Indies into American hands. 15
This temporary gain was enhanced by a further modification of British law in January
1794 that allowed any product carried from French colonies in the Caribbean to a neutral port to
then be re-exported to Europe as the product of the neutral power rather than that of France.
This became known as the “broken voyage” rule. 16 The value of goods re-exported from the
United States to Europe doubled between 1791 and 1795, growing from $2.8 million to $5.6
million and would triple to over $18 million by 1799. 17 The expansion of trade was aided by
another British trade act in January 1798, which allowed for the direct importation of French
colonial goods to a British port on neutral vessels or via a neutral port within Europe. This
legislation remained in place until 1802. 18 The broken voyage rule allowed for an American
“carrying trade” of non-US produced products (usually from the Caribbean) to be carried on
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American ships to Britain or to neutral ports in continental Europe. This practice became
increasingly lucrative as well as increasingly controversial as Napoleon’s continental empire
expanded and British sea power came to dominate the European coastline.
The geopolitical conflict of the 1790s also provided opportunities for American
produced goods, particularly agricultural ones, to be exported on a larger scale than before.
Pitkin’s statistics provide a quantitative assessment of US grain exports and highlight the
fluctuating state of the export trade under the second Washington administration. The
quantitative data for 1793 represents American trade during the first year of the French
revolutionary wars, 1794 the first year of trade under the Jay Treaty, and 1796 the conclusion of
Washington’s presidency.
Table 4.1: US Grain Exports, 1793-1796 19

Year

Wheat (bushels)

Flour (barrels)

Corn (bushels)

Meal (bushels)

1793

1,450,575

1,074,639

1,233,768

189,715

1794

696,797

846,010

1,505,977

241,570

1796

31,226

725,194

1,173,552

540,286

A number of trends can be deduced from this export data. Unprocessed wheat exports virtually
disappeared, while flour exports experienced a significant decline. Corn exports are relatively
stable, while corn meal exports more than doubled between 1793 and 1796. Superficially, this
would indicate the influence of wartime conditions on the demand for US grain products, but
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environmental forces provide a more persuasive explanation for corn as a grain export
substitution in these years.
The Hessian fly infestation affected the supply of American wheat and flour to foreign
markets. It first appeared in the northern US during the late 1770s. By 1794, the valuable wheat
crops of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware suffered its ravages that then expanded its range
to Virginia by 1795. 20 Geopolitical considerations could influence grain markets, however, the
dual nature of grain as both a trade commodity and a natural product subject to fluctuating
growing conditions could complicate even the most open of markets. With the overall decline of
wheat and flour, corn, and in particular corn meal, became more important.
The overall export statistics provide an overview of the scope and scale of grain exports
during Washington’s administration. Tracing the consumption patterns of exported US grain
provides a key marker to analyze changing trade in the 1790s and to compare to the CO 16
statistics of the late 1760s and early 1770s. The American State Papers outline the markets for
US grain products during the 1790s. A regional approach is utilized here that follows the
categories in the CO 16 records (see chapter 2) to allow for a more telling comparison and
assessment of change over time.
Table 4.2: Commodities exported to West Indies, 1793-96 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports. 21

Year

Flour (Barrels)

Wheat (Bushels)

Corn (Bushels)

1793

567,767 (53%)

25,017 (2%)

640,878 (52%)

Corn Meal
(Bushels)
36,843 (97%)

1794

322,606 (39%)

2,396 (>1%)

473,173 (32%)

45,433 (93%)

1795

274,431 (40%)

NA

683,553 (35%)

79,271 (77%)

20

Bread
(Barrels)
64,992
(85%)
50,033
(73%)
65,828
(91%)

Brooke Hunter, “Rage for Grain: flour Milling in the Mid-Atlantic, 1750-1815” Ph.D diss, University of
Delaware, 2001, 169-72.
21
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1796

524,540 (72%)

1,082 (3%)

793,467 (68%)

427,655 (79%)

128,174
(71%)

The West Indies remained the most important market for mainland produce, consuming a
majority of all corn meal and bread exports from 1793-1796 and the majority of flour and corn in
1793 and 1796. Within this broad statistical outline, there are some significant trends. The
French West Indies and British West Indies remained the most important markets, with the
Spanish colonies lagging behind. Demand for flour in the French West Indies remained stable
after 1793, however, demand for corn and corn meal products collapsed in 1794. The British
West Indies demand for wheat and corn products remained relatively stable, with a
preponderance of imports in the form of corn or corn meal. The cheaper price of corn products
shaped this trading pattern.
The second major market for US produce was Iberia and southern Europe. In the State
papers, this region encapsulated Spain, Portugal, the various Atlantic islands of these two
powers, and (much less importantly) Italian ports.
Table 4.3: Commodities exported to Iberia and southern Europe, 1793-1796 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports 22

Year

Flour (Barrels)

1793
1794
1795
1796

191,905 (18%)
161,891 (20%)
42,881 (6%)
23,020 (3%)

Wheat
(Bushels)
750,805 (52%)
552,021 (79%)
99,344 (70%)
1,650 (5%)

Corn (Bushels)
492,335 (40%)
682,542 (46%)
511,194 (26%)
50,211 (4%)

Corn Meal
(Bushels)
87 (>1%)
182 (>1%)
446 (>1%)
8,244 (1.5%)

Bread
(Barrels)
767 (1%)
2,621 (4%)
1005 (>1%)
832 (>1%)

In a departure from the West Indies, unmilled wheat and unground corn are the significant export
commodities, likely the result of the more robust milling capacity in Europe. The decline in
wheat and flour can be explained as another manifestation of the Hessian fly crisis, however, the
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precipitous decline of corn imports requires more explanation. Unlike the case in the West
Indies, the progress of the French Revolutionary wars represented both an opportunity and a
barrier to American commerce.
The War of the First Coalition against France encompassed a number of nations
including Spain. The collapse of the Toulon campaign (1793), the occupation of San Sebastian
by French forces, and increasing fears of British designs on Spain’s American empire led to
Spain’s withdrawal from the Coalition. In consequence, Great Britain and Spain declared war on
one another, thereby imperiling Spanish seaborne trade. 23 Sir John Jervis’ victory over the
Spanish fleet at St. Vincent (February 1797) made plain the consequences for Spain’s changed
alliance. The introduction of the Royal Navy as a hindrance to US-Spanish trade counteracted
the political efforts of Spanish and US diplomats to encourage trade between the two nations.
The Pinckney Treaty of 1795 regularized trade relations between the US and Spain.
Under articles 15 and 16 of the treaty, liberty and security of trade was guaranteed to merchants
of both nations. Included within this guarantee was a provisions that “free ships shall also give
freedom to goods” with the exception of weapons and other contraband. Excluded from the
definition of contraband were “all provisions which were for the sustenance of life.” 24 These
regulations contained two important elements for US trade. First, the carrying trade with Spain
was now protected by law. Second, the definition of contraband explicitly protected American
agricultural exports to Spain. Superficially, this should have encouraged trade, but the statistical
analysis demonstrates that the diplomatic unity was less important that British naval superiority.
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As a result Spain disappeared from the list of the primary trading partners for US grain products,
and would not return through 1800. 25
The reason for Portugal’s disappearance as a major trading destination in 1796 and 1797
is less clear given the ongoing alliance between Great Britain and Portugal. As Spain changed
sides in the European conflict, Lisbon became an even more important strategic partner for the
Royal Navy, which included victualing facilities. Complaints from Admiral Jervis and other
British naval officers lamenting the lack of provisions available at Lisbon correlates with the
decline in American grain imports during that time period. 26 Reconciling the discrepancy
between supply and high demand remains elusive.
Great Britain and Ireland form the third key marketplace for US grain exports. This trade
underwent changes in British import duties in 1773 (see chapter 2) that now made direct trade in
grain products profitable for American merchants. The 1773 law set tariffs for imported grain
based on the market price for grain products. This basic structure remained in place during the
1790s, introducing a degree of volatility to the marketplace.
Table 4.4: Commodities exported to Great Britain and Ireland, 1793-1796 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports 27

Year

Flour (Barrels)

1793
1794
1795
1796

191,947(18%)
77,580 (9%)
34,599 (4%)
53,622 (7%)

Wheat
(Bushels)
539,603 (37%)
46,896 (7%)
NA
19,720 (63%)

Corn (Bushels)
1,730 (>1%)
15,814 (1%)
147,727 (8%)
237,504 (20%)

25

Corn Meal
(Bushels)
2 (>1%)
56 (>1%)
4,488 (4%)
37,913 (7%)

Bread
(Barrels)
679 (>1%)
404 (>1%)
552 (>1%)
75 (>1%)
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The trading pattern from 1793-1796 offers a mixed picture. Wheat imports are significant in
1793, and the relative decline of wheat and flour can again be attributed to the Hessian fly
problem.
The fourth primary market for grain during the Washington administration was Europe.
Although the State papers include a number of European ports stretching from Russia to Iberia,
the only ports to record any imports of US grain during the period were France and the Hanse
towns of Hamburg and Bremen. One of the benefits of independence was that US merchants
could now take advantage of opportunities closed to them during the colonial period.
Table 4.5: Commodities exported to Europe (other) 1793-1796 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports. 28

Year

Flour (Barrels)

1793
1794
1795
1796

2,052 (>1%)
88,368 (11%)
174,064 (25%)
88,696 (12%)

Wheat
(Bushels)
117,485 (8%)
69,150 (10%)
41,929 (30%)
3,350 (10%)

Corn (Bushels)
6,251 (>1%)
9,400 (>1%)
513,351 (27%)
107,637 (9%)

Corn Meal
(Bushels)
NA
348 (>1%)
16,951 (17%)
62,103 (11%)

Bread
(barrels)
128 (1%)
588 (>1%)
6153 (8%)
904 (>1%)

Despite Washington’s neutrality proclamation and the threat of the Royal Navy, opportunities
outweighed the risks for US grain merchants trading with France in 1794. Racked by famine and
misgovernment, France faced starvation. Under protection of the French fleet, an American
convoy delivered 24 million pounds of grain to the embattled nation. Threatened by recent bread
riots, this crucial import provided an important measure of internal stability though at an
extraordinary cost to French naval forces. The increasing superiority of the Royal Navy,
however, soon curtailed further large merchant convoys from reaching France. By mid-1795 it
was clear that the French navy could not secure safe passage through the blockade.
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Fortunately for France, victory on land provided other sources of grain and diminished
the immediate need for grain imports. 29 Other economic considerations intervened into this new
trading relationship. The value of US grain and tobacco entering France far exceeded the value
of French products sold in return. The resulting trade imbalance was covered by specie, thereby
making American grain an expense on the French treasury. Exacerbating this injury, Americans
used the specie from France to cover their own imbalance of trade with Great Britain. Indirectly,
the ultimate beneficiary of US-French trade was Great Britain, even though at war with France. 30
Even at this early stage of the long war, it was clear that US grain exports would benefit the
British Empire in one way or another and could only cross the Atlantic with some British
acquiescence.
By the end of Washington’s presidency in 1796, the US had avoided directly
participating in the war that embroiled Europe. However, isolationism was not a possibly for the
US as the strong links between the American economy, Europe, and the European empires could
not be severed. In parting, Washington offered a few words of sage advice that had guided his
administration through a perilous time:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our
commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as
possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled
with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests
which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged
in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our
concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by
artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. 31
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Washington’s address was predicated on a seemingly simple principle. By remaining politically
neutral but economically engaged with other nations, the US could reap the benefits of economic
development without the costs associated with conflict. Underlying this assertion, however, was
the unexamined assumption that the various European powers would continue to view commerce
and politics as distinct from one another. The world of 1796 had a place for neutral trade, but
whether or not those circumstances could survive the changes wrought by an increasingly
desperate war remained unclear.
The incoming administration of John Adams followed the theory espoused in
Washington’s Farewell Address. In his inaugural address in 1797, President Adams noted that

Indeed, whatever may be the issue of the negotiation with France, and whether
the war in Europe is or is not to continue, I hold it most certain that permanent
tranquillity and order will not soon be obtained. The commerce of the United
States is essential, if not to their existence, at least to their comfort, their
growth, prosperity, and happiness. The genius, character, and habits of the
people are highly commercial. Their cities have been formed and exist upon
commerce. Our agriculture, fisheries, arts, and manufactures are connected
with and depend upon it. In short, commerce has made this country what it is,
and it can not be destroyed or neglected without involving the people in
poverty and distress. 32
Adams closely echoed Washington. Political engagement and economic relations must remain
distinct. This is particularly important as the wars sparked by the French Revolution continued
to expand across Europe and to the West Indies. As the war spread, more American commercial
interests would inevitably be affected. Adams elaborates on the rationale for preserving the
status quo as a matter of mutual advantage and interdependence. In his formulation, each nation
had a vested interest in supporting American neutrality and by extension American trade.
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Adams’ framework can be directly applied to the grain trade. The statistics for the first
and concluding year of his administration follow.

Table 4.6: American Grain Exports by Year, 1797-1800 33

Year

Wheat (Bushels)

Flour (Barrels)

Corn (Bushels)

Meal (Bushels)

1797

15,655

515,633

804,922

234,799

1800

26,853

653,052

1,694,327

338,103

In overall volume, 1797 and 1800 are consistent with the returns from Washington’s
administration in the wake of the Hessian fly crisis of 1795. Wheat and flour exports remained
depressed, while those for corn and corn meal continued to be robust.
The overall data, however, conceals a significant shift in the US grain trade during the
Adams administration. When analyzed by market, a new and somewhat unusual pattern
emerges.
Table 4.7: US Exports by Market, 1797-1799 34

Year

1797

33
34

Exported
to/Amount Wheat
(bushels)
Spain: 6,400
Portugal: 5,246
BNA: 3,340
Madeira: 583

Flour (barrels)

Corn (bushels)

Meal (bushels)

FWI: 148,774
BWI: 79,870
Danish WI:
72,682
Spanish WI:
65,966
Dutch WI:
26,870

BWI: 245,975
Danish WI:
140,976
FWI: 129,678
SWI: 89,465
Madeira: 56,658

Danish WI:
131,758
BWI: 45,544
SWI: 36,776
FWI: 10,701
WI (general):
9,297

Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States, 91, 100.
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1799

BNA: 7,703
Madeira: 2,353

BWI: 198,958
Spanish WI:
99,107
Danish WI:
64,561
Dutch WI:
50,883
FWI: 39,560

BWI: 495,721
Portugal:
350,192
WI (general):
90,000
BNA: 77,957
Madeira: 65,945

BWI: 100,000
Danish WI:
97,527
SWI: 15,695
Dutch WI:
13,532

The West Indies had long been a significant market for American agricultural exports. The State
Papers hint that this relationship represents almost the entirety of American exports for these two
sample years. Beyond the corn trade with Portugal, British North America, and Madeira in
1799, every entry of any quantitative significance is from the West Indies. The reasons for this
change are many. The trade with France had collapsed due to the expansion of French-occupied
territory in Europe that could supply grain, and the expense of American provisions in relation to
French exports to the US. The Spanish trade was interdicted by the British Royal Navy, and
trade with Britain itself competed with increasing imports from Ireland. 35
Overall, the 1790s under the Federalist administrations of Washington and Adams saw
the continuation of a grain export economy that retained most features of the colonial era. The
war in Europe fueled slight variations, but the theme remained familiar. With the exception of
exports to continental France between 1793 and 1795 (as a result of wartime increased demand)
and a collapse in exports to the French West Indies in 1799 (due to the tensions of the QuasiWar), the pattern remained largely consistent with the CO 16 era of 1768-1772.
The election of 1800 ushered in a new political party, and, in theory, a new combination
of domestic and international interests that would affect trade relations with the rest of the
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Atlantic world. The revolution of 1800 was momentous as a peaceful transfer of political power
from one rival faction to another for the first time under the Constitution, yet it did not loom
significant in terms of commercial policy. According to historian Drew McCoy, the political
economy of Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman republic depended on three factors: “a national
government free from any taint of corruption, an unobstructed access to an ample supply of open
land, and a relatively liberal international commercial order that would offer adequate foreign
markets for America’s flourishing agricultural surplus.” 36
Despite significant disagreements between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans on
the existence of corruption within the federal government, these last two elements of the yeoman
ideal suggests continuity between the two parties as both believed in westward expansion and
continued engagement in the Atlantic economy. In isolation, this would have resulted in a
reasonably stable political economy for the early republic. Jefferson’s inaugural address closely
echoed the themes already noted by Washington and Adams:
The assurances, indeed, of friendly disposition, received from all the powers with
whom we have principal relations, had inspired a confidence that our peace with
them would not have been disturbed. But a cessation of the irregularities which
had effected the commerce of neutral nations, and of the irritations and injuries
produced by them, cannot but add to this confidence; and strengthens, at the same
time, the hope, that wrongs committed on offending friends, under a pressure of
circumstances, will now be reviewed with candor, and will be considered as
founding just claims of retribution for the past and new assurances for the future
…We cannot, indeed, but all feel an anxious solicitude for the difficulties under
which our carrying trade will soon be placed. How far it can be relieved,
otherwise than by time, is a subject of important consideration. 37
Jefferson’s oblique reference to the Quasi-War with France was an implicit criticism of
Adams and recast those circumstances as a temporary deviation from the correct
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principles of US diplomacy. At a deeper level, Jefferson connects his proposed foreign
policy to Washington’s farewell and Adams’ first inaugural address. Philosophically,
each of them are promoting neutral American economic intercourse without the
encumbrance of any political connection. Despite the similar goals for encouraging US
commerce, the two political parties differed on how that goal should be pursued.
Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans were ideologically favorable to France and
less accepting of Adams’ and the Federalist closer relationship with Britain.
According to Eliga Gould, this transition in attitude toward Great Britain meant
that “there was bound to be trouble.” 38 His analysis is correct in part. The potential
sources for trouble stretched beyond the bilateral relations between the US and Great
Britain, which represented only one part of a multi-sided puzzle. In his 1922 work The
Continental System: An Economic Interpretation, Eli Heckscher uncovered evidence
from as early as 1801 that indicated that Napoleon’s general economic strategy in the war
was to impoverish Britain by denying it access to continental markets. 39 Thus,
Jefferson’s adherence to American neutral trade, the seeds of the Continental System, and
the British responses to the system as manifested in the Orders-in-Council also have their
roots in 1801.
Although the multi-national framework supporting neutral trade had begun its decline,
the actual practice of the grain trade remained robust.
The quantitative data for wheat and flour exports during the first Jefferson administration
follow.
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Table 4.8: US Flour Exports (Barrels), 1800-1803 40

Region

1800

1801

1802

1803

Great Britain

172,815

479,720

208,744

203,127

Iberia

21,067

74,182

173,398

291,944

West Indies

411,611

497,021

558,316

592,488

Europe Other

0

0

24,683

26,740

The table illustrates four key points. First, the West Indian market remained the most important
destination for US flour exports by volume and consistency. Moreover, the British West Indies
remained its most important component during this period. Trade with the French West Indies
was also robust, while the Spanish, Dutch, and Danish islands represented lesser markets.
Second, demand for Iberia was variable but increased over time. This reflected the broader
patterns of war. Spain was allied to France until the peace of Amiens in 1802, and peace
increased the availability of seaborne trade by removing the Royal Navy as a barrier.
Third, the flour trade with Great Britain was significant and increasing. This represents a
change in trading patterns as Great Britain was not a traditionally significant market for
American flour exports. Historian W. Freeman Galpin’s research on the British grain trade does
present insight into this branch of American trade. The harvests of 1800 and 1801 in Britain
suffered from heavy rain, frost, and wind damage. In order to preserve domestic peace,
40
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Parliament undertook a remarkably vigorous system of public relief measures including
forbidding the distillation of grain, subscriptions to provide grain at cost to the less fortunate, and
direct charity. A bounty was established until October 1800 to subsidize the importation of
foreign grain. 41 Despite these measures, the price of grain continued to rise, which threatened
social stability and compelled the government to allow imports from anywhere without regard to
its source or the nation of the ships carrying it. Thus a combination of environmental factors
limiting domestic production and political concerns provided a broader market for US producers.
The fourth important lesson here is the absence of exports to the rest of Europe (other
than the famine years of 1794-96, associated with the French Revolution). While not surprising
in and of itself, its significance arises when these statistics are considered in light of the growing
conflict between Great Britain and the US over the carrying trade. The carrying trade
complicated the US trading pattern by conflating domestically produced goods with foreign
products being transported under the neutral American flag. The carrying trade denoted the use
of neutral American ships to transport the produce of European overseas colonies to the
continent of Europe. This protected the colonial goods from capture by the British navy and
provided a new source of profits for US merchant interests. There is a distinct difference
between American trade patterns with Great Britain and French-influenced continental Europe
revealed here. These profits came at a political cost. By combining American domestic produce
with the carrying trade, British officials suspected that all American trade subverted the
European blockade, and US official documents could not abate this suspicion since the export
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value of domestic produce and the broader carrying trade was not differentiated in government
statistics until 1803.42
Thomas Jefferson provided the most cogent outline of his political and economic
philosophy in his second inaugural address in March 1805. The address clearly voiced the
principles of his first administration and provided a guideline for his remaining time in office as
well as for the Madison administration that would follow. He noted with satisfaction that the
United States “endeavored to cultivate the friendship of all nations...and cherished mutual
interests and intercourse on fair and equal terms.” 43 Peace and trade abroad supported Jefferson’s
domestic agenda as well. The scourge of internal taxes could be avoided through a combination
of frugality and revenuebs derived from taxes placed on imports, which were “paid cheerfully by
those who can afford to add foreign luxuries to domestic comforts.” 44 The happy coalescence
betwrokeneen Jeffersonian political ideology and fiscal policy was based on maintaining peace
and trade relations between the United States and as much of Europe as possible. Without this
source of income from imports, the contradiction within Jeffersonian political economy—that a
frugal national government could have the funds to operate, pay the national debt, and resist
internal taxation—could not be sustained. This imperative informed the deep and long-standing
economic priorities for US government leaders that persisted from the colonial period to the
early national one and defied easy modification.
The grain trade in Jefferson’s second administration remained robust. Grain represented
a significant portion of American domestic exports. The pattern of where the grain trade went,
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however, is mixed. As Table 4.9 shows, the West Indies markets remained the most important,
while the Iberia and continental Europe were relatively flat from the previous four years. Trade
with Great Britain plunged in 1804 and did not recover until 1807.
Table 4.9: US Flour Exports (Barrels), 1805-07 45

Region

1804

1805

1806

1807

Great Britain
Iberia

7,140
205,807

36,752
149,406

127,619
136,699

323,968
157,156

West Indies

511,950

528,130

410,201

640,758

Europe Other

4,115

4,395

23,217

20,255

The comparative statistics for exports to Great Britain between Jefferson’s first and second
administrations declined. This was not, however, due to growing political tensions between the
two governments. Improved harvests in 1804 and 1805 and peace between Prussia and Great
Britain provided both an increased domestic supply and an alternative source. Napoleon’s
dismantling of Prussia at Jena and Auerstadt in October 1806 stimulated Anglo-American trade
for the final year above. 46
The financially beneficial situation for the US as a neutral player in foreign affairs began
to end in 1805. In the decade following Jay’s Treaty with Great Britain, as historian Eliga Gould
notes, “the United States became, with Britain’s tacit consent, the most important neutral carrier
in the Western hemisphere…..during which US merchants engrossed the carrying trade of
France, Spain, and eventually, Britain.” 47 Whether this trade existed as a matter of right under
international law (as Jefferson proposed) or by British sufferance (and thereby subject to
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unilateral reinterpretation) was undefined. The primary point of conflict between the United
States and Great Britain in 1805 was not over American exports, but rather the carrying trade.
The carrying trade doctrine stipulated that if the goods were first landed in the United States,
they would be ‘naturalized’ as American goods. This is known as the “broken voyage” rule. As
French power expanded in continental Europe and British naval power destroyed the capacity of
France to maintain a presence at sea, economic warfare between the two powers was inevitable.
In July 1805, a British court ruled in the Essex decision that the “broken voyage” rule
was illegal. 48 In essence, under British law the carrying trade was reinterpreted to constitute a
breach of the Royal Navy’s blockade of Europe. The Jefferson administration protested this
change without success. The Essex case was the first manifestation of a rapidly escalating
economic conflict between France and Great Britain that would virtually eliminate neutral trade
and placed the US in a difficult (if not impossible) commercial situation.
For James Stephens, a British writer with extensive connections to the British
government and Admiralty, US neutral trade with France denied Britain’s rights as a belligerent
power. Particularly, Stephens argued that American trade between France and French colonies
in the Caribbean violated Britain’s blockade because it was illegal for US ships to conduct that
trade in peacetime. Known as “the rule of ’56,” this unilateral policy attempted to manage
neutral trade based on a broad application of policy rather than the actual content of each ship’s
cargo.
This more stringent interpretation of neutral trade redefined the carrying trade as illegal
commerce which could rightfully be interdicted by force. American trade was really French
trade hidden behind the neutral flag of the United States. In Stephens’ analysis, in earlier wars
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British sea power transferred French colonial holdings from an asset into an expensive liability.
US interference allowed France to enjoy the benefits of a colonial empire without paying to
sustain a navy or merchant marine to conduct colonial trade. Therefore, according to Stephens,
Britain was justified in interdicting neutral trade with France as a means of prosecuting the war
and starving the French treasury of funds. 49 Thus, the Polly case in 1800 did not prejudice the
question of any future restrictions by the Royal Navy as the case did not set a binding precedent
under international law.
Not surprisingly, the US government and American popular opinion rejected Stephens’
interpretation of international law. Moreover, the Jefferson administration was much less
flexible towards British demands than that of Washington had been. In a response to War in
Disguise, Secretary of State James Madison wrote that neutral trade should not be interfered with
because neutrals form “a trade auxiliary to his prosperity and his revenue” by “liberating his
naval facilities for war.” Not only was American trade beneficial for Great Britain, international
law did not allow for a belligerent power to interdict neutral trade, unless the vessel was carrying
“instruments of war” or was entering a blockaded port. Any further control of trade between a
neutral and a belligerent power was illegal, and British efforts to redefine belligerent and neutral
rights to constrain the US carrying trade were illegitimate. 50 In essence, the Polly case was a
binding precedent, and the Essex decision abrogated settled international law.
Madison was correct that US trade benefitted Great Britain, whose imports of American
goods included significant amounts of cotton, provisions, and other imports. However, Madison
disregarded two important variables. The British merchant marine could still trade under its own
flag through the protection of the Royal Navy. Napoleonic Europe faced opposition from the
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Royal Navy, which posed an increasingly effective barrier against seaborne trade. Simply stated,
Great Britain could protect its merchant marine, while Napoleon could not.
At its roots, the argument between Stephens and Madison rested on two factors. First, the
expansion of Napoleon’s European empire left the US as the only major neutral trading power.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the legal protection for foreign produce ‘naturalized’ by
American carriage in addition to the bona fide export of grain, lumber, and other commodities
raised in the US were the same in Jefferson and Madison’s conception of trade. Both should be
protected under the rules of neutrality regardless of what the product was or its point of origin.
International law protected all trade except in cases of a strict blockade of individual enemy ports
and provided a narrow definition of contraband. Trade interdiction should be a case-by-case
system of management rather than a broad statement of general policy as advocated by Stephens.
Responses to the growing conflict reflect the complicated and intertwined nature of trade.
The place of American produce within the broader carrying trade provoked criticism in the
United States as well as in Great Britain. The carrying trade, according to the American
pamphleteer “Columella,” was positively dangerous to Americans. Writing in 1806, Columella
wrote, “there are foul vices growing and flourishing among us, and they deserve to be vigorously
struck at. Those who, by their unlawful procedures… have implicated their country in a dispute
with which the community in general has not immediate concern, except the dread that its
consequences may be generally ruinous.” 51 In essence, tying together domestic and foreignsourced commerce threatened to embroil the entire United States into a conflict for the benefit of
a small handful of merchants.
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Prominent Jeffersonian political figures echoed Columella’s critique. In an 1806 speech
before Congress, the arch-conservative Democratic-Republican Representative John Randolph of
Virginia forcefully noted that the debates over foreign trade was not just about the relationship
between nations, but also about the relationship between factions within the United States. To
him, the carrying trade only “covers enemy’s property” rather than the “fair, the honest, the
useful trade that is engaged in when carrying our own productions to foreign markets, and
bringing back their productions in exchange.” He regarded any potential conflict with Britain
over the carrying trade as a “fungus of war” that would promote the urban-merchant interest over
the true agricultural interests of America. 52 Randolph represented an older strand of DemocraticRepublican political theory that was waning, but his reaction towards federal use of economic
restrictions as policy encapsulated a key strand of the domestic debate in sharply divided
American political opinion.
Conversely, some British observers criticized the British stance on the carrying trade.
Alexander Baring, a merchant with close ties to Philadelphia’s banking community noted
By assuming that rule to be law [law of ’56], and that our not enforcing it was the
effect of our indulgence, all the privileges which the neutral held, as he thought by
right, were considered by us to be held by sufferance; a doctrine which enables us
to establish the most inconsistent practice under the mask of the most consistent
theory. 53
Baring’s criticism rests on two grounds. First, the law was inconsistently enforced and created
an uncertain legal climate that introduced more risk into an international economic system
already brimming over with geopolitical uncertainty.
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Second, the authority for the rule of ’56 rested on the British government’s interpretation
of maritime law rather than under a generally accepted international interpretation. This hints at
another, more fundamental debate on the place of the US in the Atlantic World. Although Jay’s
Treaty did recognize the US as a treaty-worthy partner for the nations of Europe, the real power
disparity between the new republic and the European empires remained. In the absence of clear
international law, Britain could, and did, interpret the existing norms of international customs to
its own advantage. By 1805, the calculation between allowing Americans freer access to
continental markets and restricting that access changed due to wartime policy.
The pamphlet conflict reflected an underlying reality. From 1803 to the embargo in 1807,
American exports remain relatively steady, while the carrying trade (re-exports) dramatically
increased in value. 54 Pitkin’s statistics demonstrate the increasing importance of these
philosophical debates. While domestic produce of grain and other products remained important,
an increasing percentage of American trade was in re-exports. There is a strong correlation in
these trades. British imports from the US consisted primarily of domestic produce. Trade with
continental Europe consisted primarily of carrying trade re-exports. Separating the two strands
was not possible for US trade without ruinous consequences, but the clearly bifurcated trading
pattern provided a rationale for British efforts to reinstitute the rule of ’56. In an unhappy
coincidence, the increasingly desperate war in Europe and British efforts to weaken Napoleon
economically through naval power collided with the increasing importance of the carrying trade
to the US and had dramatic consequences.
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President Jefferson’s hostility towards British trade policies and desire to promote US
economic interests resulted in the first of several laws in 1806 that attempted to use economic
policy to influence British treatment of the US. In that year, Congress passed a limited nonimportation act prohibiting a few British goods of little consequence that did not take effect until
November 1807. In addition, imports from British colonies were excluded from the act. 55
Despite the ineffective nature of the Non-Importation Act of 1806, it implemented the Jefferson
administration’s interpretation of international trade law as presented in Madison’s War Without
Disguise. The loopholes within the law that permitted the most profitable sectors of British trade
to proceed unhindered were also a precursor to the problems that would plague future
Democratic-Republican economic policies. In short, it proved impossible to meaningfully
restrict British trade without harming US economic interests at the same time.
Napoleon’s Berlin Decree in November 1806 marked the beginning of systemic
economic warfare between France and Great Britain through the implementation of the
Continental System. From 1793 to 1806, the relative balance of naval power between Britain
and France as well as the existence of other neutral trading partners limited interference with US
trade; however, the intensifying war left the United States and its trade interests vulnerable to the
larger powers even as the federal government attempted to assert US commercial rights.
The declaration of economic warfare inaugurated reciprocal measures by Britain and
France designed to bankrupt their enemy and thus destroy their fiscal capacity to conduct war.
Similar and less systemic measures of this sort already existed, however, the new measures
eliminated neutral trade. Under the terms of the decree, Great Britain was declared blockaded,
all ships and goods from Britain or its colonies were subject to seizure, and any trading vessel
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that called on any port within the British Empire was refused access to any continental market
under French control. 56 In response and reprisal, the British government issued the Orders-inCouncil of January 1807, under which the whole of Europe was declared blockaded unless legal
trade was allowed to British merchant ships. Further, the coasting trade in Europe was also
barred. Taken together, neutral trade was officially illegal in the eyes both superpowers.
National interests, perceived national interests, and pride also factored in to economic
choices. Outside of economic regulations that affected American commerce, Britain also
asserted the right to stop and inspect United States merchant ship to search for deserters from the
Royal Navy, which caused consternation in the United States and cast British efforts to
reconfigure trade patterns in a dark light. A memorial from the New Haven Chamber of
Commerce to President Jefferson outlines the basic complaints against the over-exertion of
British power and its impingement on American independence. The chamber expressed outrage
at British interference with American trade and “the unwarrantable impressment of seamen” and
expressed the willingness of the Chamber to support “every measure of government calculated to
accomplish this important object.” 57
Impressment almost resulted in war in 1807; removing sailors from private vessels may
create indignation but firing on a vessel of the US navy could have been considered an overt act
of war. In June 1807, the HMS Leopard caused an international scandal by firing on the USS
Chesapeake in an effort to recover four British deserters sailing on that ship. Three men were
killed and sixteen wounded; all four alleged deserters were taken aboard the Leopard. 58 Britain
did disavow the action and returned the three surviving sailors, but the incident soured Anglo-
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American relations. President Jefferson concluded that the limited non-importation law was
ineffective, and the Leopard incident gave him the political capital to advance a more aggressive
policy.
Addressing Congress in October 1807, Jefferson outlined a series of British abuses of
American trading rights. Beyond the problem of impressment and the particular case of the
Leopard and Chesapeake, British interference in American trade was unsustainable both
politically and economically.
The Government of that nation [Great Britain] has issued an order interdicting all
trade by neutrals between ports not in amity with them; and being now at war
with nearly every nation on the Atlantic and Mediterranean seas, our vessels are
required to sacrifice their cargos at the first port they touch or to return home
without the benefit of going to any other market. Under this new law of the ocean
our trade on the Mediterranean has been swept away by seizures and
condemnations, and that in other seas is threatened with the same fate. 59

Without an effective means of resisting British incursions by force, and with negotiations
seemingly fruitless, a new approach was required.
A new policy proposed by Jefferson took a form that the New Haven Chamber would not
have expected or supported. While the Chamber had argued that “our citizens have already
formed commercial habits, which are too firmly established to yield to a different policy,” it also
believed that “the commerce of the country will amply reimburse the necessary expenses of
protection.” 60 New Haven’s opposition to trade restrictions was typical for New England port
cities that relied on foreign trade for economic survival. However, Jefferson paid little heed to
the merchant interests. Instead, Jefferson called for a complete embargo on all US foreign trade.
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Previous experience suggested that denying Europe access to American consumers would
succeed in securing political concessions. Jefferson’s policy built on memories of boycotts
against British colonial trade management in the 1760s and 1770s, when popular action against
colonial taxation policies such as the Stamp and Townsend Acts caused changes in British policy
based on the real or perceived effects of American market closures on the British economy. This
view of the past success of economic coercion shaped Jefferson’s economic policies. As the
historian Doron Ben-Atar notes, the embargo was the “culmination of Jefferson’s long-held
commercial views” that “American commerce could be used as an instrument for forcing the
belligerent nations to do American justice and to respect the republic’s honor.” In this
assessment the Embargo Act was the product of a genuine ideological stance that saw little value
in merchants, in general, and of British merchants, in particular. 61
Under the terms of the embargo, the United States would not engage in foreign trade until
its rights as a neutral power were respected by Britain and France. The possibility of war in 1807
over the Leopard incident drew into question the ability of the United States government to pay
for war for the first time under Jefferson. In his 1807 Report on the State of Finances, Treasury
Secretary Albert Gallatin proposed a basic principal of Jeffersonian-Republican fiscal policy in
the case of war. In all circumstances, sufficient revenue must be collected to fund the peace time
establishment, pay interest on existing debt, and the interest on any debt sustained as a result of
war expenses. Further, loans were preferable to increased taxation to meet extraordinary
expenses as loans were the product of accumulated capital rather than a burden on citizens. 62 In
the fall of 1807, Gallatin informed Congress that the only way that a war could be funded
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through loans and investment in government securities would be by capitalists whose money was
idle under the embargo law. 63 The US lacked an adequate system of internal taxation to fund a
war in the absence of substantial private investments into the war effort.
The American Embargo Act was only one of several trade restriction measures passed in
winter 1807. British Orders-in-Council in November and December 1807 prohibited all neutral
trade with Europe unless the vessel first entered a British port. 64 Napoleon’s first Milan Decree
of November 1807 further stipulated that any British goods on any vessel, or the cargo of any
vessel that stopped at a British port trading with Europe, should be confiscated as contraband. 65
The second Milan Decree the next month stipulated that any trading vessel that submitted to
British inspection on the high seas, visited Britain, or paid any British duties were declared
British property for purposes of French law. 66 This was a perverse reapplication of earlier
policies governing Anglo-American trade under the Polly doctrine of 1800. Landing in a British
port naturalized the imported products as British goods. These decrees transferred what had been
an ad hoc arrangement into the official economic and political policy of all European territory
under the control of Napoleonic France, which by 1807 included all of Europe outside of Russia
and Portugal.
Taken together, the embargo, Orders-in-Council, and the Milan Decrees created multisided political and practical difficulties. By the dawn of 1808, foreign diplomacy, domestic
politics, and the very real problems of enforcement combined to complicate Jefferson’s designs.
The effort was not automatically doomed to failure, as it did create a series of conversations in
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the British press about the role of American neutral trade. Interested parties on both sides of the
Atlantic sought to manage the situation to gain advantage from the morass.
Some British merchants stressed the public benefits of accommodating American
demands. Alexander Baring noted that the true beneficiary of increased US trade with Europe
was actually Great Britain. The trade surplus Britain had with the United States covered the trade
deficit with other trading partners. Even more importantly, the trade surplus enabled Great
Britain to sustain the war effort against Napoleon:
I [Baring] have shewn, that, even supposing the cordial co-operation of America
in the execution of the Orders in council, there would be a diminution of our
receipts from the continent of four or five millions sterling. The moderate state of
our foreign exchanges for some time past, shews how much we want this large
aid, which our American connection indirectly afforded….In this manner we have
paid to a considerable extent, for the support of our fleets and armies in the
Mediterranean and the Baltic, and by sending our manufactures to America; a
circumstance which must be easily understood by those who know the effect of
the general circulation of exchanges, and that bills are frequently drawn in Paris,
or Madrid, whilst the real transaction in merchandize, which gave rise to them
may have taken place in Russia or in India. 67
Other British commentators offered a more systemic examination of the crisis. Citing the
existence of immutable economic laws, “A Merchant of the Old School” noted that
It was, no doubt, the speculation of that consistent Christian character, the author
of “War in Disguise,” and of the other ingenious persons who devised these
measures, that they will curb the enemy’s trade, and get rid also of every rival, by
destroying the traffic of our friends. Unhappily for the speculation, there is a
contradiction involved with this fine plan. It happens unluckily, that in every
description of trade there must be a buyer as well as a seller. We must have some
customer able to pay for our goods, otherwise we need not manufacture them, for
we cannot sell them. 68
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This exchange presents a series of familiar arguments. Whether wealth could be gained via the
control of trade or through allowing trade to proceed unhindered echoed the arguments set forth
by Adam Smith and the debates of the 1780s on the place of post-war American trade with Great
Britain. Both emphasized the benefits of accommodation, but not necessarily for the reasons that
Jefferson or Madison would have embraced. Rather than presenting an argument supporting the
political rights of the US as a neutral power, both see concessions to the US as a matter of selfinterest for Great Britain. Providing money for the struggle against Napoleon by drawing wealth
out of his own dominions was the key goal, and US interests were incidental to pursuing British
goals.
While British merchants did criticize British policies, some Americans reacted with
striking outrage toward Jefferson. The Boston Chamber of Commerce had supported protests
against impressment by the Royal Navy, but also warned that “the habits of the country, so long
and firmly established could not be suddenly changed, without producing consequences the most
distressing and destructive.” 69 Boston’s opposition to trade restrictions was typical for New
England port cities that relied on foreign trade for economic survival. The goal was the
protection for trade, not an embargo of undefined duration. American farmers and grain
merchants also suffered without dependable foreign markets. In his travels through the US, John
Lambert discovered in his visit to New York City that “after the embargo took place, the price of
provisions fell to nearly half… and European commodities rose in proportion.” 70
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Ineffective enforcement, domestic opposition, and the lack of apparent effect on British
or French policies created three difficulties for Jefferson’s embargo. Even more serious was the
effect of the law on the nation’s fiscal condition. Income from customs duties provided
approximately 96% of federal revenue in fiscal year 1807. 71 Treasury Secretary Albert
Gallatin’s December 1808 report to Congress noted that “if the embargo and suspension of
commerce shall be continued, the revenue arising from commerce will, in a short time, entirely
disappear.” 72 From fiscal year 1808 to 1809, federal tax revenues fell by over 50%, and a budget
surplus of $7 million became a deficit of $2.5 million. 73 This loss would be unsustainable unless
a radically new and politically unsustainable program of internal taxation was created to fund
government operations.
President Jefferson’s eighth annual address to Congress in November 1808 signaled the
end of the embargo. Although neither Great Britain nor France rescinded the trade regulations
that led to the embargo, Jefferson attempted to claim the benefits of the law outweighed the
costs. The experiment failed in extracting concessions from foreign powers, but the protection
offered to American seamen from impressment and property from seizure was an adequate
repayment for the privations caused by the law. 74 In essence, this protection was bought at the
price of idling a lucrative sector of the American economy, capital resources, and widespread
unemployment for laborers in a multitude of trade-related occupations. Historians have been
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severe in their assessment of Jefferson for good reason. The embargo’s actual impact on France
and Great Britain was negligible. As a practical matter, the Royal Navy already succeeded in
interdicting direct trade between France and its colonies. According to historian Bradford
Perkins, Napoleon saw little value in the produce of the few remaining colonies. In Britain, the
embargo caused a rise in the price of grain and disrupted a few minor elements of the economy
such as linen production, but the ultimate victim of the American embargo was the United
States. 75 According to Douglass North, the embargo caused a “collapse in domestic prices and
widespread unemployment.” 76
The period from Jay’s Treaty in 1794 to the Embargo Act of 1807 represents the norm for
American grain exports as a crucial Atlantic trade good in the late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth century. The importance of this trans-national trade has been missed due to
historiographic priorities that favor an overly political analysis that presumes economic rupture
with the start of US independence. For grain exports, however, both Federalists and DemocraticRepublicans supported farmers and promoted access for their products in foreign markets. It
could be argued that Federalist policies were actually more successful in this pursuit. The
historiographic implications of this are significant, as it questions the conventional wisdom that
links Democratic Republicans and the image of Jefferson’s beloved yeoman farmer. As historian
Bradford Perkins and others persuasively argue, the embargo was an economic disaster for the
United States. However, why it was such as disaster has been insufficiently examined. The
embargo failed because the continuity of economic interests and trading patterns from the
colonial era, the Federalist administrations of Washington and Adams, and the first six years of
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Jefferson’s regime could not be undone—even temporarily—without a tremendous blow to the
US economy.
It was not until 1806, and the start of economic warfare between Great Britain and
France, that the geopolitical protection for neutral trade across the Atlantic shifted. Jefferson’s
conflation of domestic exports with the carrying trade of goods from the West Indies under the
banner of neutral trade rights collided with British and French conceptions of imperial control,
leaving the US in an increasingly untenable position. The second Jefferson administration’s
management of foreign policy, domestic interests, and trade struggled to reconcile multiple
competing pressures with few obvious answers and no easy solutions. The United States was
trapped as a neutral trading power between France and Great Britain as the Napoleonic Wars
transitioned to a long-reaching system of economic warfare between contending world powers.
One must concede that the Embargo of 1807 did succeed in preserving peace at a time when war
was a very possible outcome of the Chesapeake-Leopard incident. The potential costs of that
conflict are unknowable. The policy attempted to create an ideal solution for multiple problems,
however, the law was hamstrung by popular resistance and the need for federal customs revenues
to sustain Jefferson’s view of a limited federal government and his conception of the domestic
political economy. The moderate policy extracted its own costs, not only in lost revenue and
private profits but also in internal dissent and the lesson that trade legislation was not an effective
tool of international diplomacy.
British North America played a two-fold and unappreciated role in the geopolitics of the
grain trade from the 1790s to 1809. If Jay’s Treaty represented a confession of Canadian
inability to assume the role of the US as a granary within the empire, it did not surrender ongoing
efforts to do so. Efforts to promote agricultural development and trade in the Canadas as well as
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the Maritime Provinces continued throughout this period with varying degrees of success.
Geography played an important role as well. The policy failed because Americans had options
other than obedience. Thus, the embargo is also an inherently Canadian story. The existence of
British North America as both a consumer of US grain products but also a conduit for illegal
American trade during the embargo presented Jefferson and other American officials with a
series of law enforcement challenges. The legally flexible attitudes of British colonial officials
encouraged open defiance of unpopular trade prohibitions and further exacerbated the already
contentious relations between the governments of Great Britain and the United States even as the
goods of each side were much sought after.

148

CHAPTER 5
GROWING, TRADING, AND SMUGGLING GRAIN:
FEEDING BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1794-1809

The state of British North American agriculture directly led to Jay’s Treaty in 1794 and
had significant lasting consequences for Anglo-American relations from the mid-1790s to the
Embargo of 1807. Agricultural development in this period was modest and reflected ongoing
continuity with earlier colonial conditions. Despite continued population growth and
immigration, British North America remained incapable of replacing the US as the primary
source of agricultural products in the Atlantic economy. The pattern of fluctuating export
volumes and occasional local shortages present in the 1760s remained the norm to the start of the
nineteenth century, and starting in 1802 a gradual decline in agricultural surpluses is clear. Thus,
when Anglo-American relations collapsed in 1807, the revival of agriculture in the North
American British colonies was important. In a perverse set of circumstances, it was not only
local production that contributed to the importance of British North America to the grain
economy. The colonies also provided a means for disenchanted US producers to utilize longstanding trade routes by land to the Canadas and by sea to the Maritime colonies to circumvent
the embargo and remain integrated with the larger Atlantic economy.
The Canadas, 1794-1807
Much of the scholarly literature about Canadian agriculture during this time focuses on
the agricultural crisis in Lower Canada after 1802. This has been the subject of numerous
contentious volumes debating alternative interpretations about the reasons for the decline in grain
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exports due to some combination of production failure and/or increasing local consumption. 1
Assessing early agriculture production in the Canadas is difficult due to the lack of quantitative
data, as Robert Armstrong’s Structure and Change: An Economic History of Quebec notes, no
agricultural census was conducted there prior to 1827. 2
Historical assessments of Lower Canadian agricultural development has produced a
significant and emotive, yet somewhat misdirected, series of inquires between two major
contending interpretations. In essence, the conflict between Fernand Ouellet and the Laval
School and their opponents in the Montreal School are not based on evidence. Lacking any
broad agricultural census data, both the Laval and Montreal schools rely on export records and
the question of whether the export data can be used as a proxy for production is hotly disputed.
The inability of Quebec grain production to serve as a replacement for US imports is agreed
upon. 3
Agricultural production became a proxy to assess the overall state of the FrenchCanadian economy (and even society) in these debates. Both sides agreed that grain exports
from Quebec declined after 1802. Conclusive quantitative evidence about grain exports from the
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United States, Canada, or the Maritimes remain elusive for the 1780s. Ouellet’s work does offer
some insight about exports from Quebec and Montreal, the scale of trade is relatively minor and
in some cases is incomplete; this also does not include any data for the Maritimes or for grain
traded across the US border until 1808. 4 Whether the decline in exports and the inability of
Canada to take the place of the US as an imperial granary was due to increasing domestic
demand (as proposed by the Montreal School, thus indicating a productive but not export
oriented agricultural economy) or as a sign of declining production (as proposed by the Laval
School, thus indicating an agricultural society in crisis) is not important to this study. Export
statistics remain the most applicable quantitative resource to assess the state of Canadian
agriculture, yet the critical issue here is to assess the consequences (rather than the causes) of
that decline.
Demand for grain in Britain stimulated Canadian production throughout the 1790s.
According to Ouellet, “during the decade 1793 to 1802, Quebec’s agriculture finally knew
prosperity.” 1802 was the high point of wheat exports from Quebec. Yet, he also notes that
production failures resulted in the export volume diminishing by half in 1803. The 1804 and
1805 harvests were also mediocre. A short recovery in 1807 briefly concealed a general decline
in export surpluses that effectively eliminated Quebec as a substantive actor in the imperial grain
trade. Declining production was accompanied by grain speculation and monetary inflation.
Combined, these factors further suppressed exports and fueled a rise in prices for Quebecois
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consumers. 5 Given the new settlement of “late loyalists” in Upper Canada, the new province
provided little to spur grain export. Even in the banner year of 1802, only about 4 percent of
grain exports from the Canadas originated in Upper Canada. 6
Conflating what was theoretically possible for Canadian agricultural development versus
what was actually possible was a long-standing problem related to utopian colonial hopes (see
chapters 2 and 3). Writing in February 1808 to Lord Bathurst, John Caldwell’s report on the
state of Canadian agricultural potential was reminiscent of Lord Sheffield’s optimism 30 years
prior. In Caldwell’s opinion, the prosperity of the colony depended on the development of
agricultural markets beyond Great Britain. In particular, he advocated for US exclusion from the
grain markets of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. Beyond the fisheries, if the British military
and the West Indies drew on Canadian suppliers, rather than US ones, both the colonies and the
crown would benefit. However, he also favored continuing grain imports into the Canadas from
Vermont and New York as a practical necessity. 7
Caldwell’s report illustrates a number of significant elements of the British North
American grain economy in early 1808, and its timing is especially valuable in the wake of the
embargo declaration, even though reconciling his observations with Ouellet’s account of Quebec
agriculture is not possible beyond 1802. The continued trade across the international border is
well supported. Caldwell, once again, reopened the idea of the Canadas as a replacement source
of grain instead of the US. However, the text also hints at a significant problem with this goal as
the military forces of Great Britain in Atlantic Canada and the vital Newfoundland fisheries
depended, at least in part, on US supplies. Combined with the continued trade across the land
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border between British North America and the US, Caldwell’s critique of the state of the grain
trade also serves as evidence of its continuity. Continuity, in this case, meaning a direct
acknowledgement of the continued role of US producers and traders in the British Atlantic grain
economy.
In his travels through the US and Canada, John Lambert also commented on Canadian
agricultural development. Writing in 1810, he hinted at problems for grain exports beyond the
lack of supply proposed by Ouellet and the competition of US producers suggested by Caldwell.
There was demand for grain in Great Britain that did provide a certain stimulus to production,
but the increased demand did not amount to a reliable or permanent market for Canadian
surpluses.
Within the last twenty years, great quantities of wheat have been raised in Canada,
and exported to Great Britain. The temporary scarcity experienced in England, at
certain periods, increased demand for that article, and encouraged the Canadians to
cultivate with more spirit than, till then, they had been accustomed to. The demand
did not always answer their expectations, and has been for some years in a
decreasing state. 8
Parliamentary statistics further suggest that Lambert overstated the market for Canadian
grain in Great Britain. Only starting in 1801 is there any record of imported Canadian
grain into the home country and that was a relatively paltry 6,433 hundredweight. This
increased to 41,870 in 1802, and from that peak declined into insignificance. With the
exception of a brief aberration in 1807, Canadian flour exports to Great Britain remained
minimal. For unprocessed wheat, the statistics are slightly more hopeful. 1795 saw a
significant export crop, however, it was not until 1800 that yearly exports again
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approached 20,000 quarters. After four years of exceptional export volumes, wheat
exports also declined until a brief revival starting in 1807. 9
Nova Scotia 1793-1807
Jay’s Treaty provided a commentary on the state of agriculture in Nova Scotia. The
waves of loyalist migration had not resulted in a new imperial granary. The best case estimate is
that population increase and growing grain production were roughly equal, but even this is likely
an optimistic assessment of actual economic behavior. The important tie to US grain imports,
both for local consumption as well as to support the British military and for re-export remained
strong.
The war in the West Indies between revolutionary France and Great Britain provided a
real opportunity for Nova Scotian agriculture, but whether or not the opportunity could be seized
was less certain. In response to a letter form Archibald Mitchell, a commissariat officer with
contracts to supply British forces in the Caribbean, Lieutenant Governor John Wentworth noted
that although the contract specified that the supplies should be drawn from British colonies, there
was no prohibition on purchases in the US provided that the British colonies could not provide
the quantity of produce required. Soon after, Wentworth noted that he had authorized importing
provisions from Boston as “no other possible remedy existed.” He expressed hope that local
production would one day support both consumption and export, but at the present time this was
not the case. 10 In an April 1795 memorial to Wentworth, the provincial assembly lamented the
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presence of many US imports in the colonial economy. They limited domestic production and
interfered with Nova Scotian efforts to compete in the lucrative West Indian markets. Yet, the
memorial made a significant exception to this complaint by specifically excluding US imports of
wheat, flour, corn, and bread from prohibition. 11
Five years later, conditions had not improved. In 1800 US exports of corn to Great
Britain interfered with colonial imports. As a result, Wentworth dispatched local merchants and
military contractors Lawrence Hartshone and Jonathan Tremain to Canada for supplies of flour.
This flour was intended for both military and civilian needs as “scarcity is already commanded
and we apprehend will seriously increase from the great diminution of our crops last year.” 12
This situation illustrates two important elements of the grain trade. First, the important
intersection of military and civilian demand in the Nova Scotian economy. Grain was a local
subsistence concern as well as with notable imperial military interests that facilitated longdistance markets. Second, it underscores the fragility of Nova Scotian crop yields. A poor
harvest in 1799 created scarcity only a few months later that could only be fulfilled by external
resources.
Wentworth assured Lord Hobart in 1803 that no Parliamentary restriction on trade with
the United States due to fears of smuggling was required as “the value of corn, flour, provisions,
and other legally imported articles necessary for this country [Nova Scotia]” was such that any
smuggled goods would be “a very insignificant trifling amo’t [sic].” 13 Wentworth’s letter
provides an intriguing insight into the expent of foreign resource dependency. The need for US
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grain imports was so lucrative and consistent that legal trade in produce was more profitable than
any potential returns from illicit commerce.
The long-promised surplus for domestic Nova Scotian production remained in the future.
An April 1804 memorial from the merchants of Halifax lamented that the province “is not yet so
far advanced in agriculture as to produce sufficient for the inhabitants and trade.” 14 Wentworth
was also obligated to write to contractor George Harrison, that although “Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick do not produce more flour or bread corn than necessary for the consumption of their
own inhabitants….the large purchases unavoidably made for His Majesty’s service from the
United States of America” could be used at least until wheat exports from the Canadas could be
procured. 15 The formulaic nature of this correspondence stretching over two decades is telling.
A declaration of grain shortages in the province is followed by a temporary admission of US
grain due to extenuating circumstances. This is followed by a statement of a pious hope that
soon a locally produced surplus would render these measures unnecessary. The protests of
Halifax’s merchants are also formulaic as they remonstrated against US trade with the West
Indies as a detriment to local interests but also exclude US grain imports from that protest. The
relationship between grain production, consumption, and trade patterns linking the colony to the
resources of the United States remained a basic and persistent need that was essentially
unchanged from before the War for American Independence.
There were public and private efforts undertaken to encourage wheat production in Nova
Scotia, and thereby reduce the influence of US imports on the colony. The provincial
government attempted to increase grain production through economic incentives, including a
bounty placed on wheat grown on new lands in 1806, but such measures failed to adequately
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encourage the expansion of wheat farming. 16 Beyond more acreage devoted to wheat, private
interests also encouraged agricultural intensification. A circular pamphlet distributed by The
Board of Agriculture offered prizes specifically for Nova Scotian farmers. Among others, the
board offered a gold medal for ascertaining the most effective use of seed and soil preparation
for wheat growth, 50 guineas for the best essay on the culture of wheat in the province, and a
piece of plate for the most satisfactory experiment on the planting of spring wheat. 17 These
efforts held potential promise for the future even as the deep connection to US agriculture
persisted.
The Embargo, Enforcement, and Smuggling to the Canadas
In theory, the Embargo Act of 1807 withdrew the US from all economic contact with the
outside world. The philosophical arguments for and against the Act were outlined in chapter 4,
yet there were additional difficulties to severing the long-standing trade relationships between
the US and foreign consumers. Most obviously, elusive effective law enforcement challenged
the ability of Jefferson’s government to implement the embargo on a citizenry that maintained
close economic connections with the outside world.
The fact that the embargo reduced American exports of both domestic products and the
re-export of foreign goods is clear (see chapter 4). One of the unforeseen effects of the total
embargo was the transfiguration of what had been a question of seaborne commerce and neutral
trading rights into a national economic crisis that affected every corner of the country including
regions far from the sea. The experiment in isolationism also affected the cross-border trading
routes between the United States and the Canadas and New Brunswick. Originally, it was unclear
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if the embargo included land trade or only ocean-borne trade. A prohibition on trade across the
Canadian land border was included in a supplementary embargo act passed in March 1808. 18
The Canadas had a long cross-border trading relationship with Vermont and New York.
Negotiations between British governor Lord Dorchester and Vermont resulted in an 1786
agreement to allow Vermonters to export lumber, naval stores, agricultural goods, “or anything
else of the growth and produce of Vermont” via the St. Lawrence and to “import the
manufactures of Great Britain and East and West Indian products on the same terms as the
Canadians.” 19 Canadian merchants convinced the British government to allow free trade between
the United States and Canada. In addition, American goods exported through Canada would be
considered Canadian for purposes of imperial trade legislation. 20 By 1791, the artificial
boundary between the United States and British North America established by the Treaty of Paris
that separated the Empire of the St. Lawrence ceased to exist insofar as British trade regulations
were concerned. According to historian Chilton Williamson, by 1798 “the boundary had all but
disappeared from the consciousness of Vermonters and Canadians…..the sense of American
nationality was so weak and the commercial connections with Canadians so numerous that the
Vermonters’ feeling at this time towards the Canadas was almost as it had been before the
American Revolution.” 21
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The long-standing pattern of cross-border trade survived in the political climate of the postUS independence period. Writing from Lewistown, New York, on his return journey to Canada,
John Melish made a careful note on the influence of smuggling between the two countries.
A very considerable portion of the trade of the river, and these towns, is derived from
Upper Canada and the United States; and exports, chiefly grain, flour, provisions,
potash, timber, naval stores, furs, & c. have late been very great. The imports are
chiefly British goods, with which the inhabitants contrive to supply a considerable
part of the United States, by smuggling and the Americans, in return, smuggle tea,
coffee, & c. to the Canadians. 22
Melish’s account reflects a well-developed system of exchange based on supply and
demand of various commodities. Local citizens paid little heed to legal prohibitions and
formal political denunciations of open trade policies were accompanied by outright evasion
of the law. The embargo, then, merely added a variation on the familiar theme of local
defiance towards unpopular trade regulation.
As a precautionary measure in April 1808, President Jefferson authorized Treasury
Secretary Albert Gallatin to arm and man customs enforcement vessels and instructed
Vermont governor Israel Smith to use the militia in support of the embargo, if necessary. 23
Jefferson’s proclamation charged that “sundry persons are combined, or combining and
confederating together on Lake Champlain….for the purposes of fomenting insurrections
against the authority of the laws of the United States.” He further called for all civil and
military officers, as well as all citizens, to “be aiding and assisting by all the means in their
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power by force of arms or otherwise to quell and subdue such insurrections or
combinations.” 24
Lambert’s observations in the area found little popular support for Jefferson’s
embargo measures, and active opposition to its subsequent enforcement mechanisms.
The Vermontese were much enraged at the idea of being considered, and
denounced as rebels, in consequence of a few frays between the Custom-house
officers and smugglers; and many of them, as I passed through that state on my
return to Canada, declared to me, that the disturbance existed only in the
president’s brain. 25
Lambert’s allusion to Jefferson’s intellectual state is superficially a gratuitous personal
quip based on policy differences. On closer examination, it exemplifies a deep strain of
popular opinion that rejected stringent federal law enforcement that transgressed a
matter of local concern.
Jefferson issued a similar proclamation for the Oswego region of New York with its
parallel circumstances to those in Vermont. The President again authorized the use of troops to
protect customs collectors as “a virtual civil war erupted between local residents violating the
embargo and customs officers trying to enforce it.” Three months later Gallatin called for militia
support to repress popular discontent and judicial obstruction. Bands of armed smugglers openly
menaced customs collectors, and in August 1808, 60 smugglers attacked the customs house. 26
New York governor Daniel Tompkins appealed to Gallatin and Jefferson for more help, by the
end of the month three companies of regulars patrolled Oswego, Sackett’s Harbor, and
Plattsburg. 27 Not surprisingly, the soldiers tended to be unpopular with local civilians. Joseph
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Rossell, an observer in Oswego, regarded them as “a banditti of rapscallions” and a public
celebration was held upon their leaving the community. 28
Public meetings dispatched remonstrances to Congress demanding that the Canadian
portion of the embargo be lifted on the practical consideration that the law would adversely
impact the local economy. 29 A more theoretically-minded commentator writing as “A Citizen of
Vermont” regarded a close examination of the law as a matter of loyalty “to the whig principles
of free-inquiry that we owe our revolution and our liberties.” In his opinion, the government’s
reaction to danger on the high seas did not justify a land embargo. He continued that the
embargo would destroy commerce, and thereby solve the foreign relations problems of the US,
by disconnecting American prosperity from the European war. 30 The federal government faced a
stiff challenge to its authority as it attempted to enforce a law that was opposed by most people
who lived on the northern borderlands with British North America. US law enforcement efforts
received no help from British officials in Canada and smuggled goods found easy markets on
both sides of the border. 31
Efforts to enforce the embargo on Lake Champlain and along the St. Lawrence failed in
spite of government efforts. Many militia deployed to uphold the law deserted, and those that
remained did little to stem the tide of US goods flowing north. Sympathetic militiamen were
corruptible, and international laws regulating privateering could be manipulated to support
“collusive capture” of friendly vessels posing as “prizes.” Many traders simply carried their
cargos to towns near the border and waited for a favorable opportunity to cross. 32 Even if
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smugglers were caught by federal authorities, local judges and juries were reluctant to convict. 33
Other, bolder smugglers openly fought federal authorities if they attempted to enforce the
embargo law.
Although reliable statistics for the extent of smuggling during the embargo are elusive for
obvious reasons, the increasingly stringent measures taken by the Jefferson administration to
enforce the embargo clearly indicate that the volume of illegal trade was substantial. Historian
Alan Taylor noted that the embargo functioned as a stimulant to cross-border trade with farm
produce from the states routed through the Canadas. Further, the lack of American competition
stimulated Canadian exports. 34 Contemporary observer John Lambert emphasized both the
efforts by US officials to curtail smuggling and the failure of these efforts.
The facilities afforded to smuggling, between Canada and the United States,
have been sufficiently exemplified since the promulgation of the Embargo-Act;
for, in spite of the armed militia and customs-house-officers stationed along
the American side of the line to enforce the laws, the timber, pot-ash,
provisions, and almost every other article brought into the province in 1808,
has more than doubled the quantity received from thence in 1807. 35
Parliamentary statistics for the export trade to the West Indies suggests that Lambert
underestimated the effect of the embargo on cross-border trade relating to flour. From 1800 to
1806, total bread and flour exports from the Canadas vary between 1,336 and 4,226
hundredweight with the maximum quantity in 1803. 1807 exports amount to 539
hundredweight, but 1808 jumped to 47,782 and then plunged to 5,623 in 1809. 36 1808 was the
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only full calendar year of the US embargo, which explains why Canadian exports increased
dramatically that year and then immediately dropped. Combined with Ouellet’s assessment of
the Quebec agricultural sector in this period, it seems clear that smuggled US produce represents
the increase in exports. That is, US agricultural goods were illegally imported into Canada and
then re-exported at a considerable profit. Thus, the total volume of wheat and flour moving
across the border far exceeded even Lambert’s already substantive estimate.
Smuggling by Sea and the Maritime Provinces
US officials received little help enforcing the embargo at sea from British authorities, who
openly undermined the law. Writing in 1815, Treasury Secretary Alexander Dallas complained
No sooner had the American government imposed the restrictive system upon
its citizens, to escape from the rage and depredation of the belligerent powers,
than the British government, then professing amity towards the United States,
issued an order, which was, in effect, an invitation to the American citizen to
break the laws of their country, under a public promise of British protection
and patronage, to all vessels, which should engaged in illicit trade, without
bearing the customary ship’s documents and papers. 37
Dallas’ diatribe contained a great deal of truth, although why he supposed that British
officials would help American ones curtail trade that operated to the advantage of Great
Britain seems naïve, at the very least. The British rationale for aiding American smugglers
and subverting US law was two-fold. For British officials, the embargo was only one part
of a broader geopolitical chess game between Britain and Napoleonic France. Writing to
his brother Sandy in October 1808, the Nova Scotian political leader Alexander Howe
noted that the embargo represented “the American president’s unconditional submission to
the will of the French government.” 38 He understood counteracting Jefferson’s agenda to
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advance the broader struggle against Napoleonic France. Moreover, there was a material
need for American produce in Nova Scotia, particularly grain as there were no available
substitutes. These factors combined to create a pragmatic British response to the embargo
that also infuriated US officials.
The original incarnation of the law did not function as designed, so the Jefferson
administration continuously modified it as shortcomings in the policy manifested themselves. In
one reform, Jefferson attempted to enforce the embargo by inserting a provision into the law
requiring the masters of all vessels clearing US ports to post a bond equal to double the value of
the vessel and cargo. This January 1808 provision stipulated that all fishing vessels leaving port
post a bond amounting to four times the value of the vessel and cargo to ensure that the ship
would not enter a foreign harbor. 39 These measures proved inadequate, and an April 1808
addition to the law mandated that any vessel leaving an American harbor must load all cargo
under the supervision of revenue officers. A further requirement was imposed on all masters and
mates of trading ships to provide proof to the customs service of the port where the cargo had
been landed within four months. 40
British and colonial merchants and officials spared no efforts to make the US embargo
untenable. The May 4, 1808 Nova Scotia Council meeting minutes record two superficially
contradictory responses to the embargo. A petition from Halifax merchants complained that the
efforts to procure American produce prior to the implementation of the embargo had been so
successful that the province could not absorb all of the imports. Thus, the merchants pleaded for
permission to export the excess to the West Indies and Newfoundland. Sir George Prevost,
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Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, agreed to the request, and opened provincial ports to all
British vessels trading with any port in the US. This measure did not result in the desired
volume of trade. Thus, permission to freely trade in American produce in Nova Scotian ports
was extended to neutral American ships carrying cargos of naval stores, specified lumber
products, and all provisions including bread, biscuit, wheat, and flour under the same customs
laws pertaining to British merchant ships due to a lack of available British merchant shipping. 41
Lord Castlereagh deemed Prevost’s actions “counteracting the effects of the American
embargo by permission of the import of American produce into Halifax was judicious and well
timed, and I am happy to find it is productive of corresponding effect.” 42 Prevost’s actions show
a canny imperial administrator attempting to reconcile a number of competing goals. Local grain
production remained inadequate to support the colonial population or the military base at
Halifax. The duration of the embargo was unknown, but the particular nature of grain products
as perishable commodities prohibited the indefinite storage of surpluses within the province.
The broader interests of the empire, especially demand for provisions in the slave societies of the
Caribbean, further encouraged Halifax to operate as an entrepot for re-exported goods. In
essence, Prevost was required to balance both the needs of his own province as well as distant
imperial holdings. This balancing act created another problem. The lack of British merchant
shipping available to support the entrepot function of Halifax required Prevost to permit the use
of US vessels in carrying British trade. This represented a clear reinterpretation of British trade
laws by a colonial administrator rather than the imperial government in the metropole. The
subsequent approval of London underlines the major demand for US provisions in the British
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empire as well as the considerable authority wielded by colonial governors such as Prevost in
Nova Scotia. The response to the embargo and the reworking of British trade law was
innovative, yet in practical terms it ensured continuity in the grain trade of the colonial era prior
to the American Revolution.
Prevost’s legal flexibility and its subsequent approval by British officials in London was
recognized by US officials. Provisions to the Embargo Act were added in January 1809 to allow
the president to employ military force to uphold the embargo and to suppress any riots against
the trade laws as well as to seize any ships and goods where “there is reason to believe that they
are intended for exportation.” Customs officials were empowered to refuse any goods to be
loaded on a trading vessel if in his judgment “there is an intention to violate the embargo.” 43 This
power was extended to “any such person as he [the president] shall have empowered for that
purpose, to employ such part of the land and naval forces or of the militia….which may be
judged necessary” to compel obedience to the embargo. 44 These increasingly aggressive terms
represented an increase in executive power and sparked swift protests, above all in the New
England borderlands. The Massachusetts legislature typified the response by many in New
England. In a memorial to the US Congress, it called for a repeal of the embargo as it would
“not only complete the destruction of commercial prosperity but prove highly dangerous to the
public liberty, and domestic peace of this people.” 45 A force consisting of six navy gunboats
patrolled the harbors of New England; three small warships as well as the frigate Chesapeake
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were assigned to cruise between Block Island Sound and Portland, Maine, in order to curtail
illicit commerce. 46
This enforcement regime differed critically from previous systems of trade control, such
as the colonial era boycotts. Rather than using the authority of the federal government to
manage international trade as a foreign affairs question and using diplomacy as a means of
extracting concessions from foreign powers, the armed forces of the US now were deployed to
manage the economic behavior of US citizens. This trend would accelerate as life under the
embargo wore on.
New laws increased the bond requirements for American fishing and coastal vessels and
mandated that all vessels be loaded and unloaded under the supervision of the Customs Service,
most notably under the Force Bill added in January 1809. This legislation allowed the president
to employ military force to uphold the embargo and to suppress any riots against the trade laws,
even permitting the seizure any ships, carts, and goods where “there is reason to believe that they
are intended for exportation” and empowering customs officials to refuse to allow any goods to
be loaded on a trading vessel if in his judgment “there is an intention to violate the embargo.” 47
This power was extended to “any such person as he [the president] shall have empowered for
that purpose, to employ such part of the land and naval forces or of the militia….which may be
judged necessary” to compel obedience to the embargo. 48
The embargo was, in theory, directed at all US commerce. Both the domestic trade and
the carrying trade were curtailed by the abolition of legal trade. However, the increasing focus
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on domestic trade management primarily affected US produce. This particularly meant grain and
other agricultural products that formed the plurality of American external trade during this era. 49
The use of customs enforcement to regulate domestic trade on the fear of embargo violations
compounded difficulties for American farmers and grain merchants.
The embargo proved unsustainable. In Nova Scotia, the underlying economic
motivations that favored allowing US merchants access to the province had not changed.
Provisions remained a problem for the colony, both for local consumption but also as a potential
source of supply for other imperial consumers and the military. The regularly scheduled 1809
Parliamentary proclamation on trade policy validated, rather than repudiated, Provost’s free trade
policy, suggesting that such a generous policy remained a viable policy option and tacitly
acknowledged the authority of the provincial government to modify grain trade laws based on
local need and by local authority. The new regulations still permitted trade between the US and
British North America, however, this remained limited to certain enumerated articles including
lumber products, livestock, and grain “of any sort,” all of which could be exchanged in
provincial harbors for manufactures of Britain or its colonies. 50
Parliamentary export statistics document an increased volume of bread and flour in the
Maritime Province’s trade as a result of the embargo. For Nova Scotia, bread and flour exports
to the West Indies from 1800-1807 did not exceed 1,000 hundredweight in any year, but 1808
recorded exports of 12,376 hundredweight and in 1809 of 9,717 hundredweight. New
Brunswick reflects a similar pattern. From 1800-1807, bread and flour exports exceeded 1,000
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hundredweight only in 1806. In 1808, exports exceeded 30,000 hundredweight and declined to
8,912 in 1809. 51
Two main lessons can be drawn from the Parliamentary trade data. First, much like the
case with the cross-border trade with the Canadas, the embargo coincided with increased British
North American trade in flour. The correlation between the embargo years and export volumes
suggests a causal relationship. Second, the statistics illustrate the deep continuity in longstanding agricultural trade networks and routes. Even the serious exertion of the US federal
government could not redirect the accustomed patterns of exchange that built on foundations of
economic self-interest coupled with the urgent need to feed societies that were not self-sustaining
agricultural colonies.
Conclusion
By March 1809 it was clear that the US embargo policy was a failure. Internal dissent,
the economic effects on the US, and British policies receptive to continuing trade in the absence
of official American political sanctions combined to make the embargo unenforceable.
According to historian Reginald Horsman, the Embargo Act “shattered American trade and
finances, created bitter internal opposition, and left no possibility of stepping up the pressure on
Great Britain by further escalation of the economic measures.” 52 From the first debates in
Congress, there was a healthy skepticism that the law could or should actually be enforced.
Enforcement was almost impossible due to the lack of an internal road network and the reliance
on sea communications to transport goods for the domestic market. Outside of other

51

“Accounts Relating to the Trade and Navigation with British N. America and W. Indian Colonies, 1805-14,”
House of Commons Sessional Papers, Vol. XIV, Paper No. 417, 6-9. https://parlipapers-proquestcom.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1816-004749?accountid=14583
52
Reginald Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815 (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1985),
109.

169

commodities, grain exports to British North America and through British North America to the
rest of the British Atlantic economy multiplied. Jefferson’s effort to interdict the grain trade
through legislation and enforcement could not succeed in ending the well-established trade
connections between US producers and British imperial consumers.
Repealing the embargo solved, at least temporarily, the political and economic
conundrum of Jefferson’s second administration. As President Madison entered office in spring
1809, further geopolitical changes provided new opportunities and new dangers for US farmers
and grain merchants. These new conditions were primarily driven by the ongoing war in Europe,
whose consequences reverberated across the Atlantic. British, Spanish, and Portuguese forces
combined to resist Napoleon’s territorial ambitions in Iberia. An unintended effect of this
military alliance was its spur to vast new demands for provisions and a deeper connection among
US agriculture, British capital, and the Napoleonic Wars.
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CHAPTER 6
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PENINSULAR WAR
On the surface, the Peninsular War of 1808-1813 in Iberia has little to do with the United
States or with American agriculture. The US was not a belligerent power, nor did any of the
belligerent powers seek to enlist direct American intervention in the struggle. However, this
apparent detachment is more a result of the subsequent historiography rather than an accurate
reflection of the US role in Iberia. The American connection to the conflict is obscured as a
result of historiographic division on the study of the early nineteenth century. Two articles focus
directly on the United States and the Peninsular War; the first by W. Freeman Galpin in 1922 and
the second by G.E. Watson in 1976. 1 Beyond these two studies, histories of the period are
generally divided between a domestically oriented examination of Jeffersonian political economy
emphasizing the internal development of the Jeffersonian republic and the use of trade
restrictions to claim international respect, or occasionally on the growing conflict with Great
Britain that would culminate in war in June 1812. Conversely, sources on the Peninsular War
generally treat the conflict as a European event with little direct connection to American affairs
outside of the context of the broader economic policies pursued by European powers. 2 The
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measures taken to sustain the triangular trade among Great Britain, Iberia, and the United States
by British authorities, US merchants, and Iberian officials even in a time of war illustrates the
interconnected nature of the early republican economy, the European grain markets, and the
British imperial economy. Importantly, these connections are consistent with pre-Napoleonic
and indeed pre-American Revolution patterns of exchange, as suggested by the works of
McCusker, Menard, and Lydon, even if wartime circumstances modified some of the nuances
within the supply-and-demand relationship. This situation also allows commentary on the state
of agriculture in the Canadas and Maritime Provinces as there was little-to-no surplus to sell. As
a result, Great Britain was dependent on the United States to supply domestic consumption and
to support military operations and allies. The changing economic and political circumstances
also provided a test for the divergent strands of Jeffersonian political economy with significant
domestic consequences for the US.
Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 re-established some of the trading
relationships of the United States to the Europe by altering the lager geo-political framework of
the conflict. The opening of British trade with Spain, Portugal, and the colonial empires of those
countries provided markets for British exports, while opening the peninsular markets created a
gaping hole in Napoleon’s Continental System. This expansion of trade counteracted any
potential damage by the American embargo on the British economy. Conversely, the
introduction of a British army into Iberia and the war’s destruction stimulated both a potential
market for American produce and a possible means for the United States to more effectively
influence British policies through the restriction of trade. This fact was not immediately
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apparent or utilized by the United States, which still clung to Jefferson’s total embargo as official
policy. By March 1809, however, it was clear even to President Jefferson that the embargo
policy was a failure. It was repealed and replaced by the Non-Intercourse Act, which prohibited
trade only with France and Great Britain. 3 The law mandated that all goods manufactured in
Britain, France, or any of their possessions be banned from the United States. 4 This policy
transition provided the legal basis for American trade to Spain and Portugal. Despite the very
close connections with Great Britain, the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal remained independent
nations, and therefore were not subject to these US trade restrictions. This intentional loophole
was sustained by every American law regarding external trade until 1814. Even the declaration
of war by the United States against Great Britain in June 1812 did not change this relationship as
strong demand for American wheat and flour persisted. It was not until the end of the peninsular
campaign in late 1813 and the collapse of Napoleon’s empire that British demand collapsed. The
persistent and artificial divide between direct trade with Great Britain and trade with Britishdominated Iberia allowed for a continuation of the grain trade to support the war effort, which
also sustained the significant integration of British capital and US agricultural exports.
Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal in November 1807 created a new front in the ongoing
war between Great Britain and France. With peace in central and eastern Europe secured
through the defeat of Austria at Austerlitz, the Prussians at Jena, and the Treaty of Tilsit allying
Czar Alexander with Napoleon, the only remaining territory in Europe in potentially unfriendly
hands was Iberia. Obedience to the Continental System was a requirement for all French
controlled or allied states, and, in theory, the assault on Portugal and the increasing pressure
levied against the tottering Spanish monarchy was an effort to perfect the continental system by
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closing the last European ports open to British commerce. Under terms of the Treaty of
Fontainebleau signed between Napoleon and Charles IV of Spain in October 1807, the Kingdom
of Portugal would be dissolved and a series of new independent principalities created. Included
in this was a provision that one principality would be given to Manuel Godoy, a favorite of the
Queen of Spain and the most powerful minister in the kingdom. 5 By November 29, as French
General Junot’s troops entered Lisbon, the Portuguese Prince Regent, along with “the contents of
the treasury, the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Portuguese state, and as many as 15,000
individuals” fled under the protection of the British fleet. 6 Popular rioting against Junot’s troops
in December 1807 was crushed, leaving control of the country in the hands of the French
military and a handful of subservient civilian officials.
Peace in other parts of Europe allowed Napoleon to focus substantial attention and
resources on Spain. After a complex series of plots and counterplots between Godoy, King
Charles, and Prince Ferdinand (later King Ferdinand VII) over the throne, an “impartial”
Napoleon arbitrated the dispute. Meeting with all parties in the French border town of Bayonne,
Napoleon compelled Ferdinand to abdicate in favor of his father Charles. Charles, in turn,
abdicated in favor of Napoleon, as “the only person who in the state of things prevailing can
reestablish order” when the Dos de Mayo uprising in Madrid threatened the stability of any
centralized government despite its suppression by French troops under Marshal Murat. 7
Effectively, the throne was vacant until filled by order of Napoleon. 8 By May 7, Murat was in
control of the central administration until such time as Joseph Bonaparte arrive to assume the
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throne; this was accomplished by decree on June 6 as the edict was published throughout Spain.
The passive Spain of Napoleon’s schemes and the Spain that actually greeted the arrival of King
Joseph in early July were far different from one another. Those parts of the nation not under the
direct control of the French army had risen in open revolt against the Bonapartes. Spurred by the
ill-treatment of Ferdinand and the example of the Dos de Mayo, the provincial authorities and the
people of Spain rejected the imposition of French authority. As a result, the specter of a brutal
war loomed over the land.
The collapse of central authority in Spain and Portugal devolved authority to local and
provincial bodies which then sought military assistance in order to fight against Napoleon. As
early as June 6, a delegation from the principality of Asturias arrived in London to seek British
assistance in exchange for reopening their ports to British trade. An agreement between the
British government and Spanish patriot forces promising support was announced on June 15 as
the revolt spread through Aragon, Galicia, Leon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and the rest of Spain. 9
By the end of July, King Joseph had fled back to France in the wake of the battle of Bailen;
defeat on the battlefield combined with the general uprising rendered Spain ungovernable
without the interjection of more French forces. The chaos provided a potential opportunity for
Great Britain that had not existed since the early days of the French Revolution- the opportunity
to commit a relatively small force of British soldiers to the continent to directly challenge France
with the support of a militantly anti-French countryside that needed logistical and monetary
support rather than a large number of British soldiers.
The first British expeditionary force to Iberia landed at Mondego Bay, Portugal, in
August 1808. Commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, this force was victorious at the battles of
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Rolica (August 17) and Vimerio (August 21) against Junot’s isolated corps. These victories,
combined with the uprising of the Portuguese countryside and the supremacy of the Royal Navy
compelled Junot to seek terms. 10 Unfortunately for Wellesley, he was superseded in command
on the evening of the 21st by Sir Henry Burrard and again on August 22nd by Sir Hew Dalrymple.
Under the Convention of Cintra (August 22) negotiated by Dalrymple, Junot was allowed to
evacuate Portugal. Despite disagreeing with the terms of the convention, Wellesley signed the
document. 11 Domestic outrage over the convention resulted in the recall of all three officers to
face a court of inquiry. All three were exonerated, but Wellesley would not return to the
peninsula until April 1809. The temporary disgrace left command of the British forces in Iberia
in the hands of Sir John Moore. Misunderstanding the full complexity of the Spanish situation
and underestimating the scale of French re-enforcements committed to re-establishing Joseph on
the throne, Moore launched an invasion of Spain. In theory, this was in conjunction with
Spanish troops and logistical support. By the time Moore’s forces arrived, most of the Spanish
troops had been defeated and the promised logistical support never materialized. 12 After a
harrowing retreat, the desperate battle at Corunna resulted in the death of Moore. The evacuation
of what remained of his army in January 1809, and the British presence in Iberia verged on
collapse.
Despite the controversy of Cintra and the failure of Moore’s campaign, the events of the
fall of 1808 and early winter 1809 contained many lessons that would shape the rest of the
peninsular campaign. The most important of these lessons was logistical. The ability of an army
to survive was directly linked to the ability of its commissariat to furnish the required supplies.
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How this task was accomplished formed one of the fundamental differences between the French
army and the system established by Wellesley upon his return in April 1809. According to
historian Jac Weller’s study on Peninsular War logistics, Napoleon “supplied his armies by a
system of marauder, which amounted to forced requisition or worse.” 13 Noting the link between
the forced requisition of supplies and popular insurgency, Wellesley strictly forbade the practice
thereby promoting local support but also obligating the construction of a more robust- and
expensive- logistical system based on the purchase of local surpluses whenever possible but also
on the importation of supplies from distant lands in order to fill the magazines. 14
The relocation of the Portuguese monarchy to Brazil in 1807 had left a power vacuum in
Portugal itself. In theory, political control was invested in a regency council established in
September 1808 that ruled in the name of and under the direction of King Dom Joao, who
remained in Brazil in the wake of Junot’s invasion. In practice, authority over economic and
military affairs devolved upon British officers and British support systems. William Carr
Beresford (later Lord Beresford and a Portuguese marquis) was officially entrusted with the
reformation of the Portuguese army. In practice, wartime demands on labor, money, and food
resources transfigured Beresford into “a de facto viceroy” who exerted a broader authority than
his official title suggested. 15 British financial aid became an increasing share of the Portuguese
budget. Part of the agreement between Great Britain and Portugal was a provision for the
material support of the Portuguese forces operating under British command. After April 1809,
an amount determined by Wellesley was transferred from the British Army commissariat to the
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British Aid Office, which in turn transferred the funds to the Portuguese treasury via the British
minister in Lisbon. 16 Although this direct subsidy often fell short of the amount desired, the total
amount of aid was a substantial expense to Wellesley. 17 These arrangements also provided an
unusual set of formal duties for Wellesley. In April 1809, in addition to his appointment as the
commander of Britain’s army in Portugal and control of the Portuguese subsidy, he was also
appointed “commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army and began to run that entire nation. He
controlled the enormous annual subsidy paid by Britain to Portugal and all Portuguese imports.
He had primary legal authority over all males aged 16 to 60.” 18 Although it is an
oversimplification of a complex series of dynamics, by April 1809 Portugal effectively operated
as a protectorate of Great Britain; a trade relationship with one was a de facto trade relationship
with the other.
The introduction of Wellesley and the British army commissariat into Portugal on an
official basis connected the commissariat with the Portuguese merchant class. Chief among
these merchants was Henrique Teixeria de Sampayo (also spelled Sampaio in some sources). An
article published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine after his death outlined his political and
economic significance. As British troops entered into Portugal, supplies in enormous and
increasing quantities for British forces and Portuguese military personnel was required. Induced
by a “liberal commission” in 1808, Sampayo contracted to supply 30,000 men, which amounted
to “one hundred and fifty tons of bread, four hundred large oxen, and five hundred pipes of wine
per week.” Efforts to replace him with a British commissariat officer were unsuccessful as
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Sampayo’s agents were already active in “all the productive districts to buy up or forestall, not
only present stock, but the crops of the succeeding year. The rich Beira, a fruitful province for
grain and cattle, was already his own. In every town, from the Tamego to the Tagus, there might
be found an agent of the great contractor.” His reach extended to Ireland, where his business
connections provided wheat, flour, and barley; other brothers were dispatched to the United
States and the empire of Morocco, for the same purpose.
Upon his arrival in Lisbon in April 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley retained Sampayo’s
services as he was “in full possession of the confidence of the public authorities, Portuguese as
well as British.” Wellesley’s faith was amply repaid in the winter of 1810-1811. Besieged
within the lines of Torres Vedras, Sampayo’s planning and industry provided:
magazines [that] were full, to overflow, of all the necessities of life. Magnificent
in extent and convenience, as were the public granaries and storehouses, they
were found insufficient for the immense quantities of commissariat stores and
provisions that were daily landed….while the Tagus bore on its ample bosom
supplies of all the munitions of war to the amount of millions! While the
besiegers were eating their horses, the besieged were in possession of all the
comforts enjoyed by the British soldier under a liberal government. 19

Sampayo provides a direct link between the British commissariat, Portugal, and the United
States. According to Historian Troy Bickham, the “dummy Portuguese merchant house of
Henrique Teixeira de Sampaio [Sampayo] officially imported the flour so as to get around any
potential American embargoes or non-intercourse acts.” 20 The ability to skirt US governmental
policy was a critical factor in the expansion of the direct Iberian trade as the region served as a
valuable clearinghouse for Anglo-American trade. Jefferson’s Embargo Act was replaced by the
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Non-Intercourse Act in March 1809, which only abolished trade between the US and British or
French ports. 21
In writing Levi Hollingsworth on April 24, Thomas Hollingsworth noted that opening
this trade legally would cause a substantial rise in flour prices from $6.50-6.75 per barrel to
$7.50-8.00 per barrel. Two days later he relayed news from Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin
confirming the legalization of English trade as of June 10. 22 Direct access to the English market
was especially important for US grain merchants as the state of the British harvest in 1809
remained unknown. The changing trade pattern was largely a result of negotiations in April
1809 between David Erskine, the British Minister to the United States, and President James
Madison, who reached an agreement to repeal the Orders-in-Council in exchange for the US
ending the Non-Intercourse Act against Britain. 23 In April 1809 Madison ordered the revocation
of the Non-Intercourse Act. 24 Unfortunately, Erskine had exceeded his instructions and the
agreement was later repudiated by London. 25 According to historian W. Freeman Galpin’s work
The Grain Supply of England during the Napoleonic Period, imports of American grain directly
into England during the spring and summer of 1809 were substantial, although later limited by
constant changes in American foreign policy. 26 This policy was overturned in June 1809 as the
prospect of a commercial treaty with Great Britain prompted a change in policy. A third change
in US trade policy re-imposed restrictions between Great Britain and the United States in August
1809. Inconsistent policy and inconsistent enforcement of trade laws made legal subterfuges
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such as Sampayo’s important not only for legitimate trade but also as a useful intermediary to
enable indirect trade should the geopolitical circumstances require it. According to Galpin, the
indirect trade via Iberia was commonly used throughout the remainder of 1809: “undoubtedly
much of the export from America left for a port in the Spanish Peninsula, but was finally sold in
Great Britain.” 27
Although the letter is vague as to the particular mechanism of continued trade, a
September 21, 1809 letter from William Morewood to Levi Hollingsworth hints at this type of
quasi-legal exchange. Morewood, noted that trade could be continued by a “more circuitous
route” if Hollingsworth did not object. 28 The attraction of Lisbon as an intermediary market
between the US and Great Britain was reinforced by American customs procedures. Since NonImportation did not apply to that port, Treasury Secretary Gallatin frankly admitted that it was
not known whether any smuggled British goods were involved because salt (Lisbon’s principal
export) was untaxed and thus customs collectors did not actually examine the cargos. 29
The quality of the 1809 grain crop provided another challenge for American agriculture.
A February 12, 1810 letter from John and George Morewood, business correspondents of Levi
Hollingsworth in England, that “American flour is not gaining in estimation of the people of this
country. The importations of the last year were of an indifferent quality…. Fine flour will move
freely where an inferior quality is altogether unsaleable.” 30 Geopolitical circumstances would
change in 1810, however, and the US grain trade to Britain itself dwindled to insignificance by
1812. 31
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Given the unpredictability of the British market, US merchants eagerly assessed the
possible opportunities from a series of circumstances in Iberia. Wartime destruction, the
foraging practices of the French army, the introduction of the British army, and the virtual
collapse of civil government combined to severely limit local agricultural production, thus
creating a need for imports to provide basic subsistence not to mention the surpluses required to
sustain the armed forces. Combined with the repeal of the embargo and confusion throughout
1809 on trading policy with Britain itself, Iberia became a lucrative market, provided, of course,
that entanglement with actual fighting was avoided. The firms of Levi Hollingsworth and Son in
Philadelphia, a related family firm of Worthington and Hollingsworth in Baltimore, and the firm
of Robert Ogden in New York City all recognized the potential as well as the inherent dangers of
expanding their trade with Iberia during the war.
A letter from William Cooch to Levi Hollingsworth on April 11 indicates both the
confusion of the time as well as the potential. Cooch inquired as to what effect the recent
disasters of Moore’s Expedition in Spain might have on the markets, and asked that
Hollingsworth inform him “should any occurrence take place that in your opinion will rise the
price of flour.” 32 The reopening of foreign trade contributed to the rapid increase of demand for
exports due to the state of Portugal and Spain. A May 9 letter from American merchant Charles
Wilson in Cadiz to Levi Hollingsworth noted that recent intelligence from Lisbon reported that
there was no knowledge of the end of the embargo, and there was currently no flour in the
Lisbon markets. This would change in Wilson’s judgement. The surplus of American flour
merchants in Madeira would inevitably flood that market leading those traders to shift to Cadiz
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or Lisbon to dispose of their cargos. However, this was a temporary and limited market as
10,000 barrels of flour would be sufficient to glut the Lisbon market as well. 33
The progress of the war demanded caution. A June 3 letter from John Hollingsworth to
his father Levi suggested that any ship voyaging to Spain or Portugal should “touch at some
intermediate port to enquire the state of those countries.” 34 The advance of French forces would
limit potential markets for American grain; however, fear of a second US embargo act in the
wake of the collapse of the Erskine agreement was a more immediate threat for Wilson, On June
7, Wilson informed Levi Hollingsworth that information from Lisbon indicated that the markets
were “very dull” for American produce, but Robert Meade, a fellow US merchant in that city
requested the dispatch of more flour as it may be sold “to advantage about September or
October; he has about 10,000 barrels on hand and conceives it would be folly to attempt forcing
a sale at present, there is no flour in the port besides what he holds.” 35 Writing directly to
Hollingsworth on July 21, Meade repeated the assessment that the markets were currently dull,
but also noted that the local harvest was indifferent, and the retreating French destroyed all of the
fields of wheat in the local provinces. The introduction of large bodies of English troops and this
destruction “have induced the gov’t [sic] to take off all duties on future importation of flour, rice,
corn, grain, and dried vegetables.” More hopefully, Meade reported that it would be possible to
sell 10,000 barrels of middling flour to the army as “superfine flour is found too good for the
soldiers.” 36 A letter the following day from Charles Wilson to Levi Hollingsworth noted that
Meade had been offered $12 per barrel by the “government” for 50,000 barrels of flour and
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50,000 quintals of rice at $7 per quintal; he declined the offer in preference for chancing the open
market. 37
Wilson does not directly state which government made the offer; Wilson’s location in
Cadiz and the context of the letter on the question of quarantines for American vessels suggests
that the Supreme Junta in Cadiz, which functioned as the central Spanish government during this
period, made this offer. Another letter from William Jarvis, another US Merchant in Lisbon
July 26 noted that the Portuguese harvest was “middling” and that “little grain could be obtained
from any country other than the United States, we are persuaded that flour and grain must keep
up, unless large shipments are made from thence.” 38 A later missive dated September 11 noted
the arrival of 18 American vessels laden with about 100,000 bushels of wheat, corn, and rice in
Lisbon harbor; this caused a temporary decline in prices, however, more imports would be
needed as “there is but a very small quantity of grain in the country.” 39
What accounts for the dramatic change in tone from the letters of May and June to those
of July is unclear as none explains a new crisis to cause a rapid change in market conditions.
Wellesley’s advance towards Spain was underway; however, the battle of Talevera that ended
this advance was not fought until July 27-28. 40 It is possible that all three merchants anticipated
local harvests as sufficiently dire to create the real possibility of famine, thereby providing an
opportunity for US grain merchants. It is also possible that each had sources of information that
they did not fully disclose. Whatever the cause, the letters proved remarkably accurate as
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wartime demand, large government contracts, and robust American exports characterized
commercial interactions for the next four years.
Wellington’s retreat from Talavera was only one of the defeats suffered by the antiFrance alliance in 1809. The failure of the Walchern expedition against the Low Countries and
the collapse of Austria in the wake of the battles of Aspern-Essling and Wagram (July 9, 1809)
left Wellington’s forces in Portugal as the only British army in action against Napoleon’s empire,
and Iberia as the only open rebellion in Europe against his authority. 41 The progress of the war
was mixed for Spanish forces. Victory at Tamames (October 18, 1809) matched defeats at
Ocana (November 19, 1809) and Alba (November 28, 1809). 42 Peace in central Europe allowed
Napoleon to provide re-enforcements for Spain; stung by the continued presence of Wellington’s
forces in Portugal and suspecting that the continued Spanish resistance was linked to the fate of
Wellington, Napoleon committed tens of thousands of re-enforcements to the peninsula in early
1810 to eliminate both threats once and for all.
The events of 1809 and early 1810 introduced three vital elements that shaped US grain
trade for the remainder of the peninsular campaign. French occupation and the destruction of
local production increased demand for imported grain. Moreover, the introduction of British
forces to the peninsula and subsidies paid to local allies connected Iberia to the British economy,
on one hand, and to American grain, on the other. Second, the re-imposition by the US of the
Non-Intercourse Act prohibited its direct trade with Great Britain, but did not interfere with trade
to Spain and Portugal. The introduction of a new policy by Napoleon on trade with Great Britain
provided another significant change in the geo-political dynamic.
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A new licensed trade scheme in March 1809 allowed for a limited trade between France
and Great Britain in certain enumerated commodities. Bountiful crops in France and Holland,
along with poor harvests in Britain, created an opportunity for a trade in grain between Europe
and Britain. A limited licensed trade in 1809 and 1810 transferred approximately 1.5 million
quarters of wheat between the two empires even while at war. Other agricultural products such
as wine and brandy were also included under the licenses. 43 Subsequent expansions of the
number of licenses in circulation in France in December 1809 and February 1810 combined with
a spike in grain exports to Britain from Germany, Prussia, Holland, and Flanders filled the need
caused by the failed 1810 harvest. 44
The licensed trade created another problem for Great Britain. In 1810 Napoleon
mandated that all grain exports to Britain be paid for in gold or silver; the specie reserves of the
Bank of England had been reduced by £4.5 million between 1808 and 1811 with almost £1.4
million of this reduction paid directly to Napoleon’s treasury. 45 Other provisions of the license
system included a demand that part of the cargos traded to Britain would contain a percentage of
French wine and brandy in addition to grain products; it was feared that a failure to comply
would result in Napoleon banning grain exports from France as well the grain regions of the
Baltic under his influence. 46 Although Napoleon’s licensed trade was not technically related to
the Anglo-American grain trade, this import substitution reduced the demand for US grain in
Britain, thereby limiting the potential effects of the Non-Intercourse Act. As a net importer of
grain for this period, Britain and Ireland could not supply grain for Wellington and the peninsular
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effort during the 1810 campaign and the winter of 1810-11, thereby compelling him to seek
supplies elsewhere. The need for specie to sustain consumption at home exacerbated the
shortage of gold and silver available to support Wellington’s army in the peninsula.
Conspicuous by its absence is the lack of grain exports from the Canadas and the
Maritime Provinces during a time of famine in the metropole and strong demand for provisions
to sustain the war effort. According to Galpin’s statistics, only slightly more than 24,000
quarters of grain entered into the United Kingdom from British North America in 1810 out of
total imports of over 1.5 million quarters. This amounts to slightly more than 25% of the amount
imported from the United States in spite of the fact that direct trade was illegal under American
law that year. 47 Statistics for British North American grain exports to Iberia were equally
modest in 1810. According to the accounting of Parliament, only 16 total ships cleared Canadian
or Maritime harbors for any port south of Cape Finisterre. The volume of trade was not
substantive. Clearances from Newfoundland to southern Europe, undoubtedly carrying fish,
remained far more common. 48 The US was Britain’s only major and reliable source of grain to
forestall famine. The immediate urgency of the trade had changed, but the fundamental
economic relationship begun in the colonial period had not. The peninsular trade allowed a
profound integration among US farmers, millers, merchants and British capital and consumers
(including the military), who used the larger geo-political situation to satisfy local needs and
interests.
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By March 1810, the only remaining part of Spain under the direct authority of the antiBonaparte Junta was the city of Cadiz. 49 Besieged within the port city and without access to the
hinterland, its defenders required outside sources of grain. Dependency on the United States
raised fears of disruption for British officials in the peninsula. General Thomas Graham, senior
British military officer in Cadiz, complained to Wellington that US traders effectively controlled
the Cadiz grain market, thereby granting an unwarrantable influence over the city. Any
interruption of the neutral American grain trade could transform the defending army into a halfstarved mob, much as the lack of logistical support had done to the besieging French forces. 50
The value of the exchange was not lost on US merchants even though it came with notable risks.
In March 1810, the London merchant firm of Morewood wrote to Levi Hollingsworth relaying
news from Charles Wilson of the saga of the American ship Apollo, which ran aground in a gale
outside Cadiz harbor. The ship and cargo were burnt by the French. The Morewoods expressed
the hope that Hollingsworth’s investment in the vessel was insured. 51 It is intriguing that news
of this disaster in Cadiz reached Philadelphia via business correspondence with London at a time
when direct trade between the two ports was technically illegal, further highlighting the
persistent connections between American and British interests via Iberia.
Outside of the war’s direct impact on Iberian agriculture, 1810 proved to be a difficult
year for production in Portugal and Spain due to the weather. In April and May, Jervis wrote a
series of letters to Hollingsworth advising him that scarcity- and therefore rising prices- would
continue for the foreseeable future as “there has not been known for several years a greater

49

Gates, Spanish Ulcer, 210.
Thomas Graham to Wellington, June 5, 1810 quoted in James P. Herson, “Flour, Full Bellies, and Resupply:
Campaign Logistics at Cadiz” in The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850: Selected Papers, 1999 ed.
Donald Horward. (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1999), 343-345.
51
John and George Morewood to Levi Hollingsworth, March 3, 1810. LH Papers, Box 97, Folder 12, HSP.
50

188

scarcity of flour and grain than now exists.” 52 An uncommonly wet spring “nearly destroyed the
lowlands wheat crop, and the early grains on the uplands were of a very unfavourable
appearance.” Therefore, Jarvis was persuaded that “a favourable prospect offers for
advantageous speculations to this country in those articles [flour, wheat, and corn] as well as
rice, and we recommend your engaging in them unless large quantities have been shipped.” 53 A
subsequent message in June reinforced that the harvest “proves but ordinary,” and that it would
“make little to no impression on the market.” 54
The journal of August Ludolf Friedrich Schaumann, a Deputy Assistant CommissaryGeneral serving with Wellington’s army, demonstrates the effort required to supply the army.
Schaumann’s adventures as one of Wellington’s commissaries started in August 1810 during the
British retreat through Portugal to Lisbon, during which civilians were subjected to “a reign of
terror” by the contending armies. All citizens were evacuated as the French army advanced,
however, there was not adequate warning to salvage the grain harvest from the fields or the filled
barns of northern Portugal. 55 The surviving crop was seized or destroyed by the French, which
exacerbated an already tenuous supply situation. It is interesting to note that Jarvis’ observations
date from June 1810; this suggests that the necessity for imported American grain predated the
French invasion of the country and Wellington’s later orders to evacuate the countryside. A
subsequent letter from Jarvis suggests that the market was subject to certain fluctuations
however. Writing Hollingsworth on September 1, he noted that the price of rice and Indian corn
was in decline due to the volume of imports from the US as well as from the Mediterranean. It is
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curious that Jarvis did not mention wheat or flour here. 56 Three weeks later he observed that
“our market continues favourable for flour and grain, and from the scarcity of wheat in the
country those articles must command good prices during the winter and ensuing spring unless
very large shipments are made from the United States.” 57
The 1810 campaign saw the advance of French forces throughout the peninsula. The
capture of Ciuidad Rodrigo in July and Almeida in August removed the two fortresses guarding
the Spanish-Portuguese border and allowed for the advance of Marshal Andre Massena’s forces
into Portugal. Temporarily checked at Bussaco (September 27), Massena’s advance only ground
to a halt on the outskirts of Lisbon. 58 In retreating towards his seaborne lines of communication,
Wellington eased his logistical burdens and increased those of his enemy. However, this strategy
could only be successful under very specific circumstances. Local supplies must be denied to the
French army, and, second, an alternative supply of foodstuffs sufficient to support Wellington’s
troops, the Portuguese army, civilian refugees, and Lisbon’s entire population had to be found.
This hinged on the availability of American grain imports, as local production was already not
adequate to the demand prior to wartime disruption.
This became Wellington’s official policy by the winter of 1810-11, when the British
army was besieged on the lines of Torres Vedras, outside of Lisbon. The strategic withdrawal
towards Lisbon reflected the difficulty of travel over rugged terrain and poor roads. According
to Sir George Cockburn’s observations of the country,
the defense of Portugal had most to rely on, is the extreme barrenness and poverty
of the country, and the difficult of feeding an army. The defending army may, if
pressed, fall back on its resources, whereas the invading one must bring
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everything with it; add to this the badness of the roads and the steepness of the
mountains. 59
The retreat on Lisbon was more than just a military strategy, despoiling the countryside was also
civil policy that increased the burden on Wellington’s supplies as Lisbon and the surrounding
countryside closely resembled an armed camp with an estimated 420,000 people including
civilians and refugees. 60 The human cost of this could be appalling. British commissariat officer
Schaumann noted in spring 1811 that “even the most appalling scenes of the Thirty Years
War…are nothing compared with the horrors, the misery, and the devastation that I have
witnessed.” 61 If Lisbon suffered, the French soldiers outside the lines suffered more. Writing
home in 1812, William Stothert noted that French “deserters are continually coming in, who
report that the enemy is destitute of bread and the troops have neither wine nor spirits.” 62
Despite the costs, Wellington’s strategy was working.
In May 1810 the US Congress repealed the Non-Intercourse Act and replaced it with a
new policy known as Macon’s Bill #2. It repealed all previous trade restrictions against Great
Britain and France, but threatened that non-importation would be re-imposed if either France or
Britain repealed their restrictions on neutral trade and the other power did not follow suit. 63 In
August 1810, Napoleon issued the Cadore Letter that purportedly repealed the Berlin and Milan
decrees against American trade but only on the condition that the United States enforce a non-
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intercourse policy with Britain. There was well-founded skepticism in the US and Britain that
Napoleon really intended to end trade restrictions. US Ambassador John Armstrong and most
Federalist newspapers regarded it as an effort to divide the United States and Great Britain. 64
The one believer in the Cadore Letter was President Madison, who hoped French revocation of
the Berlin and Milan Decrees would be followed by the revocation of the Orders-in-Council by
Britain. 65 This was not the case; the British government regarded the offer as spurious therefore
Madison re-instated trade restrictions with Britain. 66 The president also called for Congress to
ban the use of British trade licenses, to redouble efforts to prevent smuggling, and to begin
raising an army. 67 The re-established Non-importation Act of 1811 did not restrict the supply of
American grain to the peninsula as the polite fiction of neutral trade with Spain and Portugal
covered such trading relationships.
A more complete quantitative record for American trade can be found in Congressman
Timothy Pitkin’s A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States. Pitkin draws on
Treasury Department and congressional records to assess both trading partners and the exact
commodity of exchange. His research from 1816 and 1817 clarifies and expands on the overall
contours of the link between US grain and the Peninsular War and provides context for the
activities of Hollingsworth and his business associates. Although the Hollingsworth operation
was significant, it fits within the broader pattern of exchange suggesting that other merchants
also saw opportunity.
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Table 6.1: US Grain Exports to Iberia, 1809-1811 68

Year

1809
1810
1811

Wheat
(Bushels)Portugal
43,214
45,588
55,033

Flour (Barrels)Portugal
65,149
88,696
529,105

Wheat
(Bushels)Spain
Nil
13,125
21,199

Flour
(Barrels)Spain
40,047
144,436
306,074

Pitkin’s statistics substantiate US merchants’ enthusiasm for the Iberian trade during war; there
were certain risks, however, to the explosive rate of growth. The statistics also reflect on the
success of Wellington’s gamble of abandoning the Portuguese and Spanish countryside and
depending on imported provisions as an essential part of his strategy. This happy correlation
between British military policy, British capital resources, and US merchant suppliers, however,
could be subject to disruption. The trading relationship between the US and Great Britain
perversely controlled both the fate of the British campaign and the American economy.
One of the more serious effects of Non-Importation was on Wellington’s dwindling
supply of specie. Prior to the enactment of non-importation laws, American imports could be
purchased with bills of exchange that could be used in Britain to buy goods for export to the
United States or to transfer funds to British merchant firms through a triangular trading
relationship linking American producers and British consumers via Iberia. British Treasury
Department bills became a common medium of exchange, as a number of letters between
Hollingsworth and his business associates illustrate. A September 17, 1810 letter from
Morewood to Hollingsworth notes that their mutual business associate Francis Elbing had
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enclosed a draft upon “His Majesty’s Treasury” due in 30 days for the purchase of a cargo of
flour from the ship Hope. An October bill of exchange to Morewood, drawn on the British
government for £1,000 sterling, was endorsed in favor of William Bell of Pennsylvania, another
partner of Morewood and Hollingsworth. Morewood confirmed to Levi Hollingsworth a similar
transaction for £520 drawn on the merchant firm of Bulkeley’s of London. Trade in British
treasury bills remained as an April 13, 1811 letter reported another draft of £1,000 sterling
received by Morewood from Elbing in Lisbon. A confirmation letter to Elbing specified that this
draft upon the treasury was part of the proceeds of Levi Hollingsworth and Sons’ “half interest in
the cargo of wheat and flour” carried by the American brig Factor from Baltimore to the
Tagus. 69
The significant feature of this correspondence is the direct connection it shows between
the British government and US farmers and grain merchants using British treasury drafts rather
than specie as the means of payment. The use of treasury bills implies the acceptance of a fiat
currency in anticipation of further trading relations either in Britain itself or with other merchants
that would accept British treasury notes as currency. Non-Importation potentially limited this
exchange since future trading relationship could be disrupted by government intervention into
these economic relationships. Specie, as a universal store of value in its own right, was, of
course, still acceptable as a currency; unfortunately, the availability of specie is limited,
generally, and especially so on the peninsula as the demand for gold and silver to support the
military effort and in local expenditures far exceeded the supply.
Under Non-Importation payment via bills of exchange or treasury notes became more
difficult. Wellington was compelled to allow the export of specie by US traders “to the great

69

Morewood to Levi Hollingsworth, September 17, 1810. LH Papers, HSP, Morewood to Elbing, April 18, 1811.
LH Papers, HSP.

194

distress of the army and the ruin of the country [Portugal],” as they were delivering “articles of
the first necessity.” 70 Wellington allocated £400,000 for provisions from the US. According to
historian Roger Knight, these funds were funneled through Sampayo’s Lisbon trading house to
facilitate the acquisition of flour, biscuit, and maize “transported to [to Lisbon] in neutral ships
and using British licenses.” 71 Demand remained stiff through early 1811; a February 21 letter
from Thomas and Samuel Hollingsworth to their father Levi on the flour trade through Baltimore
noted that “much [is] coming in daily and is bot [sic] and shipped as fast as it as it arrives,
chiefly for Spain and Portugal.” 72 The key figure connecting the Portuguese government, the
British army, and US merchants was the same Sampayo, who was noted in a March 1811 letter
to Levi Hollingsworth from a Baltimore firm, as “a contractor for the army in Portugal” who was
purchasing “immense” quantities of flour from Gilman and Sons. They hoped that their business
with Sampayo via the Gilmans would increase in time, though the present order was only 4,000
barrels. 73
Unable to break through the Torres Vedras lines and unable to sustain a siege due to the
lack of supplies, French forces under Massena retreated into Spain by March 1811. 74 Guarding
the two major roads over the border against an allied incursion were the fortress cities of
Badajoz, Almeida, and Ciuidad Rodrigo, which became the focus of the campaign. The first
allied siege of Badajoz commenced on May 6. The desperate fighting at Fuentes de Onoro (May
3-5) and Albeuera (May 16) resulted in the repulse of Massena’s counterattack into Portugal,
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however, Wellington’s attempts to storm Badajoz failed. 75 After refitting, Wellington then
besieged Ciuidad Rodrigo in August, which would only be taken on January 19, 1812. Badajoz
suffered the same fate on April 6, leaving control of the frontier in the hands of Wellington. 76
The sieges of early 1812 were only possible due to the logistical support structure
constructed in 1810 and 1811. This permitted Wellington to operate with a secure supply
system, which was dependent on the United States. Overall, American cargos amounted to
nearly half of the total supplies issued by the British army commissariat in 1810 and 1811. 77 The
strategy of depending on imported foodstuffs worked. A June 7, 1811 letter from Richard
Garwood, a business correspondent in Lisbon, to Levi Hollingsworth reported that cargos of
grain were arriving in Lisbon daily; the volume of imports was such that the city had run out of
storage. 78 His letter also touched upon an unforeseen side effect of the American NonImportation Act. Unable to acquire British goods for re-export and concerned about the price of
a return cargo of salt, Garwood attempted to sell one of Hollingsworth’s grain ships. Unable to
sell the ship, he purchased a return cargo of salt “sufficient to ballast with.” 79
By July 1811, immediate starvation was not a concern of Wellington; in a July 4 letter to
Admiral George Berkeley Wellington noted that the store of provisions in Lisbon was much
improved due to recent imports from the United States purchased by the Portuguese
government. 80 The glut within the market did not slow imports however as market surpluses
proved temporary in the face of increasing demands. A letter from the partnership of
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Hollingsworth and Worthington in Baltimore to Levi Hollingsworth in Philadelphia noted the
appearance of Mr. Sampayo in Baltimore, the expectation was that he would offer $8 per barrel
for flour, and that “he seemed anxious to purchase.” The US trade restrictions, however, added
risk to this transaction. The correspondents noted that “were we sure that his [Sampayo’s] bills
on London would do, we think we would make a profitable sale- we wod [would] however,
prefer selling 25 cents lower to get Gilmor’s endorsement or acceptance.” 81 The letter does not
state whether the bills in question were drawn directly on the British treasury, on British banks,
or on British merchant firms, but as this correspondence suggests the mechanism of exchange
was itself complex and risky.
A letter to Levi Hollingsworth from Jonathan Ogden in New York raised the same issue.
Ogden wrote that in anticipation of encountering “difficulties in procuring specie in Lisbon, I
will be content to have my share of the proceeds remitted to Rob’t [Robert] Ogden of Leeds,
Eng. [land] in good bills of exchange.” 82 Whatever the difficulties, the potential market was
vast and expanding. Intelligence received from the firm of Bulkeley and Son in Lisbon noted
that re-enforcements arriving for Wellington’s army had driven demand and prices even higher.
Quoting the prices in Lisbon for September 9, 1811, Bulkeley wrote that flour now sold for $10
to $12 per barrel in the Lisbon marketplace. 83 That price quote is an interesting contrast to the
$8 per barrel offered in the Baltimore market, and the $15 per barrel quoted by Eck only three
weeks prior. A September 25 letter from Hollingsworth and Worthington outlined the terms of
an offer to sell 2,000 barrels of flour to Gilmor and Sons at $8 per barrel for resell to Sampayo. 84
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The price of flour in Lisbon continued to fluctuate based on the volume of arrivals. Less
than one month after Bulkeley’s offer, Francis Elbling reported to Levi Hollingworth that the
1,200 barrels of flour delivered by the ship Jane safely arrived and was sold for $16 per barrel.
More arrivals, however, would likely cause a price decline in the near future. 85 This fear was not
realized. A November 29 letter noted that “the nominal price of flour [in the Lisbon market] is
$15; Sampayo is very sanguine on his expectation of getting more than the price quoted.” 86 Two
December letters from Wellington to Charles Stuart outline the possibilities and difficulties of
the persistent trade for British officials. Stuart lamented that the Portuguese people as well as the
British army would need to be supplied by the United States at least until the next harvest. 87 The
increasing shortage of specie in the military chest made bills of exchange the preferred medium
of payment, but Stuart was authorized to send specie if that was not possible. 88
The statistical analysis provided by Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin and Congressman
Timothy Pitkin lend support for General Graham’s and Lord Wellington’s observations on the
importance of US grain imports even if the impact of the trade was not always apparent.
Secretary Gallatin presented a series of statistics on the Spanish trade that showed US exports to
exceed 380,000 barrels of flour to Spain’s Atlantic ports for the year starting September 1811. 89
Gallatin estimated that the value of exports to those ports alone amounted to over $4.5 million.
HIs figures do not identify purchasers, though historian W. Freeman Galpin claims that “the
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greater share of these supplies was intended for the English armies” is persuasive in light of the
business activities of Sampayo as a provisions contractor with US merchants. 90
By April 1812, Congress passed an embargo and non-importation act for 90 days. 91
Wellington noted this in a May 8, 1812 letter to Thomas Graham in which he observed that the
news of the embargo is of the highest importance as “all this part of the peninsula had been
living this year on American flour.” 92 Although Wellington’s comment suggests that a more
permanent embargo could have given a great deal of leverage to the United States by holding the
grain trade hostage, the die was already cast. The dependency of Wellington’s army, and the
interests of American farmers, millers, and merchants combined to sustain a British licensing
system. The peaceful exchange of US grain to Iberia and the British forces in the peninsula
would continue despite the state of war between the United States and Great Britain.
Wellington’s writings indicate the importance of continuing the grain trade for the British army,
however, the effects on the US economy were significant as well.
Gallatin’s earlier report to congress outlined both the effect of trade disruption for
revenues and the potential danger of a war to the American economy. Gallatin reported that with
the help of loans it would be possible to fund a potential war, but only if customs duties were
increased and “a proper selection of internal taxes” raised to encourage domestic loans, as
foreign ones would be “nearly unobtainable” due to the conflict in Europe. 93 A January 1812
letter from Gallatin to Congress estimated that war would cause customs revenue to decline by
over half. 94 Declines in revenue and increases in expenditures would be met by borrowing;
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however, Gallatin warned that “as the ability to borrow is diminished, the necessity of resorting
to taxation is increased.” 95
Gallatin’s warning represents a significant statement of Jeffersonian political economy,
the role of external trade in the national economy, and the dangers posed to the Jeffersonian ideal
posed by the disconnect between his economic ideas and his foreign policy. Minimal internal
taxation was a hallmark of Jeffersonian policy. In theory customs revenues derived from the
consumption of luxuries provided an adequate substitute for potentially divisive direct taxation.
These two articles of domestic faith collided with Jeffersonian foreign relations, with significant
consequences as the unresolved contradiction between the two reached an inevitable reckoning.
The need for revenue from licensed trade and for external markets to sell agricultural
surpluses denied the United States an important opportunity to hamstring the British war effort in
Europe. Whether this is a missed opportunity, or a foresworn opportunity is not clear. In Donald
Hickey’s “American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812,” he argues that the British
blockade and trade restrictions were not designed to stop American trade with Canada nor could
American laws designed to end trade with the enemy be enforced. 96 Brian Arthur’s How Britain
Won the War of 1812 disagrees with this premise. According to Arthur, over the course of the
war Britain’s blockade limited American tax revenues from customs, thereby eroding political
support for the war and the ability of the federal government to sustain the war. 97 Both
viewpoints can be reconciled through a more nuanced application of both premises. British
authorities used the blockade to sustain politically and materially beneficial exchanges while
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denying market access to less beneficial trading relationships. The provisions for a licensed
trade combined with a geographically selective implementation of the blockade rendered British
interdiction of trade more a “gate” under British control rather than a solid “wall” hemming
Americans in. 98
Licensed trade during war had been discussed by key flour merchants as early as January
2, 1812, six months prior to the actual declaration of war. Jonathan Ogden was certain that a
wartime license could be obtained from the British Consul for the ship Amazon, then loading
grain for Lisbon on the account of H.J. Sampayo. 99 Subsequently, two flour ships with 8,000
barrels of flour departed Baltimore for Lisbon on Sampayo’s account. 100 As the possibility of
war shifted from rumor to near certainty, the British necessity for licensed trade was evident. As
one US merchant explained to another, “the present situation of the British troops in Spain &
Portugal” mean that “American vessels will be permitted to carry commodities by British
cruziers [sic] even tho letters of marque and reprisal be issued.” 101
The existence of a license system was confirmed by subsequent events. Prior to leaving
Washington in June 1812, the recently promoted British Ambassador Foster issued explicit
licenses for US merchantmen to continue the grain trade with the Peninsula. Additional trade
licenses were issued by Admiral Sawyer of the Halifax squadron, Consul Allen in Boston, and
Consul Stewart in New London. By August 1812, over 500 licenses had been issued and they
were openly bought and sold in US ports. The licenses were validated by London and included
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the return voyage from Spain to the United States. 102 As John Melish noted in his 1812
travelogue of his journey through the United States:
The foreign commerce of the United States has suffered severely by the
restrictions of foreign powers; and it will now be materially affected, no doubt, by
the present war; but such is the profusion of provisions and raw materials in the
United States, which some of the belligerent powers cannot do very well without,
that there must be a considerable export trade under any circumstances. 103
The potential of licensed wartime trade created a quandary for many Americans. In an
April 1812 letter to President Madison, Jefferson advised “that commerce under certain
restrictions and licenses may be indulged between enemies, mutually advantageous to the
individuals, and not to their injury as belligerents.” 104 In private letters to Jefferson, Madison
expressed dismay over the use of British licenses to trade with neutral Iberian ports since the
licensed trade was “pregnant with abuses of the worst sort.” His opposition to British licenses
did not extend to ending all trade with Portugal and Spain, however. Madison believed that in
the event of war, Spanish and Portuguese “flags and papers real or counterfeit, will afford neutral
cover to our produce as far as wanted” since “the scarcity all over Europe, and the dependence of
the W. Indies on our supplies” would inevitably create profits for wheat and grain merchants. 105
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin reconciled war and trade on the narrow grounds that Lisbon
and Cadiz remained under Portuguese and Spanish governance, therefore they “are not enemy
ports, altho’ there are enemy troops in both.” 106 In essence, Gallatin’s interpretation of trade
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policy was to officially ignore the British presence. In a long American tradition dating back to
the colonies, Madison’s solution to the conundrum was outright smuggling!
An examination of US Treasury reports to Congress during the war years and the
Historical Statistics of the United States paints an interesting picture of the deepening crisis
facing the US economy as the war progressed. Although the exact figures in these sources vary,
there is a consistent pattern of rising expenditures, a continued reliance on customs for federal
revenue, and the lack of internal taxation. 107 This combination of factors increased the
government’s dependence on loans. Ironically, the ability of the United States Treasury to
borrow was underwritten by continued trade with Great Britain in spite of the declaration of war.
This connection is illustrated by the effect that the unexpected declaration of war in June 1812
created for US merchants in Britain. A misunderstanding arose; many merchants believed that
with the repeal of the Orders-in-Council by Britain that the US Non-Intercourse law was also
repealed. This misunderstanding was perpetuated by Jonathon Russell, American charge
d’affairs in Britain, who advised American merchants to ship their goods home based on his
understanding of Madison’s Non-importation Act. After the declaration of war, he still advised
American merchantmen to return home with their goods because “if the property remained in
England during the war, it would be ruinous to the holders.” 108
In a November 4, 1812 letter to Congress, President Madison hoped that the Congress
would resolve this situation in an equitable manner in the public interest as “it did not seem
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proper to exercise….the ordinary powers vested in the Treasury Department to mitigate
forfeitures without affording to Congress an opportunity of making on the subject such provision
as they may think proper.” Later in the same letter, however, he also expressed the cheerful
observation that “the duties on the late unexpected importations of British manufactures will
render the revenue of the ensuing year more productive than could be anticipated.” 109 The
surprisingly resilient nature of the American economy for the first 12 to 18 months of the war
can be accounted for due to accommodations like licenses and impromptu reinterpretations of
trade law.
This success can be traced through the performance of government loan drives over the
course of the war. Gallatin reported to Congress in May 1812 that in two days lenders had
subscribed $6.1 million of a proposed $11 million loan to the government, of which $4.2 million
was subscribed by banks and $1.9 million by individuals. Books for accepting subscriptions
were opened in banks stretching from Boston, Hartford, New York, Philadelphia, and other
major American cities, and interest rates were not to exceed 6 per cent. 110 The expense of the
war caused an increase in the amount of money loaned to the United States Treasury. By
December 1812, Gallatin reported that a total of $13.1 million had been received, of which $9.1
million was loaned by banks and $3.9 million by individuals at 6 per cent or in exchange for
treasury notes. 111 Although the treasury report provides a breakdown for each back, the record
is silent on who the individual lenders were, or what the origins of the funds for those
institutional investments were. 112
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Timothy Pitkin’s studies estimated the value of flour and wheat exports to Spain and
Portugal at approximately $12 million for 1812 and $15 million in 1813, with additional earnings
from other agricultural commodities. In a slight revision in the 1817 second edition, Pitkin
increased the total exports of the US for the fiscal year ending October 1813 at $25 million; of
which $23 million consisted of agricultural exports “principally of flour and provisions sent to
the peninsula.” 113 The value of exports and customs revenues are linked because customs
revenues fluctuate with the volume of trade. Increased trade between the United States and
Iberia illustrates the crucial intersection of private and government US economic interests and
British private and military ones in permitting this trade to thrive.
If the debate in political circles on the propriety of trading with the enemy with a license
was inconclusive, the actual means by which the system worked was murky. Fears that political
intervention to stop the license system were ever-present in the minds of US merchants. Levi
Hollingsworth noted in a September 16 letter to Vincent Stubbs that “after November, trade may
be stopped again, to please Bonaparte as all our late shipments have been to Spain and Portugal
to feed his enemies, which neither he, or we fear Mr. Madison approves of.” 114 A more
optimistic Thomas Hollingsworth in Baltimore wrote to his father on the same day with the
opinion that “we do not think that congress will interfere with the exportations of flour to the
Peninsula.” 115 It was unclear, however, how long the license system would last. Upon a rumor
that no more licenses would be issued, existing licenses became a valuable commodity
themselves. Prices for a license for Lisbon reached $1,000 and a Cadiz license $1,250 by the end
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of October 1812. Fear of the end of the licenses was confirmed by Jonathon Ogden in November
1812; although existing licenses would be honored no more would be printed. 116 By January
1813, the price of licenses had increased to as much as $2,000 for Lisbon and $2,500 for
Cadiz. 117 A letter from H.J. Sampayo in Lisbon, however, informed Hollingsworth and
Worthington that all American grain ships, with or without a license, were guaranteed safe
passage to Lisbon and Cadiz by order of the British admiral commanding the Lisbon station. 118
Trusting in his correspondent, Ogden dispatched three vessels for Lisbon, since “Sampayo has
the means of getting the vessels away without much risk of capture.” 119
Legal sanction, or, at least, US official acquiescence, to trade did not guarantee profit.
The voyage of the ship Thalia from Philadelphia to Lisbon with a cargo of grain in December
1812 illustrates the potential benefits- and difficulties- of conducting trade under these uncertain
terms. In the 38-day voyage, the Thalia was boarded by an American privateer (and released),
and an English brig of war (and allowed to proceed). On the return voyage, it was stopped again
by two British warships, “treated politely,” and allowed to proceed. 120 Of far greater concern to
Charles Baker, the ship’s supercargo of the Thalia, was the depressed state of the Lisbon market.
Due to the great number of grain ships from America arriving in Lisbon harbor, there was now
an eight-month supply of grain in store, and further trade was restricted by the lack of hard
currency. In a January 17, 1813 letter, Baker lamented that the number of American grain ships
offloading in the harbor were of such number that there was a shortage of lighters. 121 It took two
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weeks until he could report the sale of Thalia’s cargo for bills of exchange drawn on the London
firm of John Bulkeley and Sons. 122
A motion was proposed in Congress in March 1813 to outlaw the use of British licenses,
but it was defeated in the House of Representatives by the single vote of Speaker of the House
and war hawk Henry Clay. 123 In justifying this vote, Clay noted that continued grain exports to
the British army in the peninsula would be paid for in specie, thereby weakening the British
economy and providing injections of capital into the wartime American economy. 124 Clay’s vote
is particularly ironic given his support for the war in Canada, however, there is a deeper
significance as the vote of the House demonstrates both the confused nature of the conflict with
Great Britain as well as collective recognition of the importance of British markets for US
agriculture. Timothy Pitkin’s statistical analysis paints a rosy picture for the American export
trade even through the first 18 months of the war that suggests the value of US trade to the
peninsula not only exceeded Treasury Department estimates, but increased in volume after the
declaration of war. 125
Table 6.2: US Grain Exports to Iberia, 1812-14 126

Year

Flour (Barrels)Portugal

Wheat
(Bushels)- Spain

Flour (Barrels)Spain

1812

Wheat
(Bushels)Portugal
33,591

557,218

8,865

381,726

1813

214,126

542,399

74,709

430,101

1814

Nil

4,141

Nil
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The combined statistics from Pitkin and the Treasury Department are significant, and reflect the
sweeping parameters of trade.

The totals of grain exports are significant, and represents an

increase in exports due both to the demand in Iberia as well as the need for American merchants
to export their product under almost any circumstances. One variation is the dramatic increase in
wheat exports rather than flour in the 1813, which may indicate the desperation felt by American
merchants that trade would soon be closed. One potential explanation for this changed pattern is
the milling requirements for converting wheat into flour. Although harvest occupied a relatively
short period of time in the fall, the mills required waterpower that increased during the spring
run-off. The statistics suggest that wheat was not a replacement for flour exports and the
aberration of this volume can only be explained as a function of a desperate effort to sell as much
grain as possible- processed or not- while it was possible.
Pitkin’s statistics also provide an interesting insight for the export of Indian corn. There
was a substantial volume of exported Indian corn from 1811 to 1813 from the United States to
the West-Indies, Spain, and Portugal. In 1811, the United States exported 2.8 million bushels of
corn and 147,426 bushels of corn meal at a total value of almost $2.9 million. Exports dipped
slightly in 1812 and 1813, totaling only $1.9 million in 1812 and $1.8 million in 1813. 127 Corn
was another significant trade item for provisioning the peninsula. According to S.D.
Broughton’s observations on local cuisine during his service in Iberia, “indian corn is the most
abundant, form its’ answering so great a variety of purposes. It is made into meal for bread and
cakes, and in other respects forms a considerable article of the diet. The horses and mules are
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also fed upon it, while the stalks and leaves maintain the oxen.” 128 The cumulative nature of the
accounts, however, conceals a gradual decreasing demand for American imports that is reflected
in the correspondence of the merchants engaged in the practical business of trade. This was the
reply of British and US officials to the seemingly irreconcilable nature of wartime trade:
licenses permitting continuance of trade due to the mutual benefits would be treated as a form of
neutral trade between the US, Spain, and Portugal despite the role of British money in the
exchange, consumption by British soldiers, and the role of imported provisions to sustain the
civilians of Spain and Portugal, which was a key British military goal.
Congressional sanction and economic interest combined with British permission allowed
the market to exist, but the experience of the Thalia was becoming the norm. As the market
shifted and the demand for continuous imports declined, the profit motive and military necessity
for continuing trade became less compelling. In a March 14, 1813 letter to Levi Hollingsworth,
Jonathon Ogden relayed an extract of a letter he received from H.J. Sampayo in Lisbon.
Sampayo’s news was that although all ships with licenses had safely departed Lisbon, the market
was so glutted with American produce that he “confidently hope no further shipments will arrive
from you.” Four days later, Ogden was slightly more hopeful as Sampayo’s brother had just left
his company in New York with the suggestion that prices might improve given a little time. 129
This optimism was misplaced; by September Ogden received word that the already existing
surplus of 257,000 barrels of flour in the Lisbon market would not be needed by Wellington’s
army. 130
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H.J. Sampayo directly informed Levi Hollingsworth that the flour stocks on hand “were
very considerable, equal to nine months consumption provided there are no further arrivals from
any quarter and as the supply of the combined armies is now drawn altogether from England &
Ireland, any improvement [in price] would only be temporary.” 131 As the war progressed into
1813 the necessity of imported grain declined as the battlefield advanced and other sources of
grain became available. The shortage of grain had been replaced by a surplus with catastrophic
consequences for American exports.
The declining profits from the Iberian licensed trade, and thus lower customs revenue,
necessitated a strong US government loan drive in 1813. Although the war was not successful at
this point for the US, the only material economic change between 1812 and 1813 was access to
international markets, which, in turn, were directly linked to US agricultural exports. The June
1813 Treasury Department report to congress by Acting Treasury Secretary William Jones noted
that “capitalists will advance with greater readiness, and at a lower rate of interests, the funds
necessary for the prosecution of the war” only if taxes could be raised in order to guarantee the
payment of interest and principal on government debt. Dramatically increasing wartime
expenditures, a federal revenue system dependent on customs, and minor efforts at internal
taxation resulted in an estimated deficit for 1813 of approximately $17 million. 132
To secure loan funding, the treasury was compelled to offer a significant discount on
government debt in order to entice investors to lend to the government. In addition to the 6
percent interest rate, the treasury also offered securities at 88 percent of par, which (by treasury
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calculations) gave each investor a premium of $13.63 7/11 cents for each $100 lent. The terms
reopened the debate on imposing internal taxes; Jones argued to Congress that the loans for the
upcoming campaign would require support from internal taxes in order to “facilitate the
obtaining of the loan, and secondly, for procuring it on favorable terms.” 133 In May 1813,
Congress levied a series of internal taxes, however, the stated goals for revenue remained minor
compared to the looming deficit and tax receipts and “could not be expected to aid the treasury
until 1814.” 134
The implementation of internal taxation to support a foreign war represents a break with
classical Jeffersonian political economy. Indeed, the action adopts the very practices for which
Jefferson and other leaders of the Democratic-Republican party criticized the Federalists for in
the 1790s. To support a rapidly collapsing war effort, the Jeffersonians sacrificed an important
ideological principle driven by the foreseeable economic catastrophe that would ensue with the
end of licensed trade.
In Iberia, the supplies provided by the United States aided Wellington’s unsuccessful
1812 Iberian campaign. However this reverse in fortune was temporary. Wellington advanced
into Spain, won the battle of Salamanca, and temporarily liberated Madrid. Despite the
importation of provisions from the United States, the army could not be sustained due to poor
communications with British controlled bases in Portugal and the inability of the commissariat
department to transport supplies to the front. The retreat to the coast began in October.
According to A.L.F. Schaumann, the army was reduced to looting as the weather and a lack of
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victuals created deplorable conditions. In November, the army returned to Portugal to refit and
re-provision for the 1813 campaign. Shortening the lines of communications made provisioning
easier; he noted that “his well-stocked kitchen hampers” made him a welcome guest in the
officer’s mess. 135
The 1813 campaign saw the effective end of the Peninsular War. Wellington advanced
from his bases in Portugal into central Spain. For Schaumann, the advance into the more
agriculturally developed portion of the country made procuring local grain much easier, as he
was able to find entire fields of corn that had not been pillaged by the French army. 136 The battle
of Vittoria on June 21, 1813 destroyed the French army and ended the occupation of Spain.
Ferdinand VII of Spain was restored to his throne, and the French army retreated to the Pyrenees.
By the end of December, Schaumann found himself stationed at Bardos, France, with plentiful
provisions such as capons, eggs, milk, and rice available for purchase. 137
The end of the Peninsular War eliminated both the markets provided by the war and the
leverage that US grain exports held during Great Britain’s prosecution of the campaign. The
inability-or unwillingness- to effectively manipulate the Iberian grain trade testifies to the
persistence of trade and the dysfunctional nature of US economic policy under Madison. Only in
July 1813 was licensed trade outlawed by the United States, and even this did not prohibit the
grain trade between the peninsula and the US under the cover of neutral flags. Enforcement of
the ban on licenses was uneven at best. A US embargo of American shipping, long feared by
American merchants, was not passed until December 1813. 138 Military events in an even more
distant theater of war further influenced US grain exports when Napoleon’s retreat from the grain
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producing regions of Poland and Germany reopened European grain exports to Great Britain. 139
This diminished the markets available for US grain exports.
Pitkin’s statistical data reflects the collapse of American foreign trade to the peninsula in
1814 (see Table 5.2 above). As the war moved to Southern France, the license system collapsed,
and the British blockade of the United States expanded. Total proceeds from the export of
agricultural products amounted to $19 million in 1813, this declined to $2.1 million in 1814.
Overall, total exports in 1814 declined to $7 million from $61 million in 1811, imports declined
to $13 million from $53 million prior to the war, and customs revenue fell from $13 million in
1811 to $6 million in 1814. 140
The December 1813 embargo was repealed in March 1814 at the request of President
Madison claiming favorable changes had occurred in the international situation to reopen trade
with all nations except Great Britain. 141 This political change of heart did not reverse the rapidly
declining fortunes of the US economy. The collapse of Napoleonic France re-opened the
continent of Europe to American trade, and Madison intended for the United States to take
advantage. The bill was passed, but the problem of how to evade the British blockade remained
unresolved. Another unaccounted-for problem was the increased influence of Great Britain in
Europe because of the Napoleonic War. A crucial factor in this situation was the severing US
farmers and merchants from British capital and overseas markets. According to Arthur’s How
Britain Won the War of 1812, the collapse of American finances in 1814 was the culmination of
British strategy for the war. Using the blockade to limit foreign trade was one element of the
plan. The second was to cut off the US from European capital markets by making the
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government a poor credit risk. This lesson learned from the American Revolution was ruthlessly
applied during the second war. By fall 1814, the US government could not find a willing lender
anywhere in Europe. 142 Few European nations could risk souring relations with Britain over
American trade. Perversely, Napoleon’s fear of excessive British control over the continent’s
seaborne trade was the exact result of his fall.
Without British demand, or at least the acquiescence of British authorities, US seaborne
trade all but ceased. This reflects directly on the ability of the US government to attract loans.
In his January 1814 State of Finances report to Congress, Treasury Secretary Jones estimated
that for 1814 almost 75% of expected receipts to the treasury would be in the form of loans. 143
This level of borrowing was unlikely to be sustained, and in April 1814, G.W. Campbell, the
new Treasury Secretary, reported to Congress that loans authorized for the remainder of the year
could not be raised. 144
The end of licensed trade and a tightening blockade is the cause for this decline in
fortunes. Early 1814 represents the transition from the blockade as a British controlled “gate”
into a wall. The end Wellington’s campaign also eliminated any motivation to allow continued
American foreign trade. The naval resources dedicated to the blockade increased. In April 1814,
the blockade was extended to include New England for the first time. 145 Now, the US was
severed from external trade and the treasury could only depend on internal resources.
The collapse of an important government bond syndicate consisting of John Jacob Astor,
David Parish, and Stephen Girard was a contributing factor to the embarrassment of the United
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States Treasury. If the United States continued to rely on loans, Campbell advocated for
“establishing an adequate revenue and pledging the same” to repaying principal and interest on
the public debt as a means to attract renewed investments in government loans. 146 In October
1814, yet another new Treasury Secretary, A.J. Dallas, reported to Congress that the state of
public credit was “so depressed, that no hope of adequate succor, on moderate terms, can safely
rest upon it.” 147 Simply stated, by the fall of 1814 the United States Treasury no longer had the
capacity to attract lenders due to the unstable financial condition of the wartime government. 148
The basis of Jeffersonian political economy rested on one central premise. Under a
frugal and well managed government, customs revenues were adequate to meet federal
expenditures without resort to internal taxation. This premise depended on access to foreign
markets, particularly for excess agricultural products. Above all, Jeffersonian political economy
required peace to function. Untouched by the lessons learned under the embargo, Madison’s
combative foreign policy rendered the Democratic-Republican domestic platform inoperable. To
conduct war, the Jeffersonians became what they had accused the Federalists of being only 20
years prior- an oppressive and over active central government with an insatiable appetite for
invasive taxation schemes designed to support an undesired military establishment. Gaps in the
blockade and the licensed trade allowed the day of reckoning to be delayed, but by the end of
1814 judgement day finally arrived.
Iberia represented one element of continuity in US agricultural exports and integration
with the trans-Atlantic British economy. As Jefferson’s embargo concluded in 1809, official US
trade with British North America also increased. Dependency on US agriculture remained
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particularly acute in the Maritimes, which represented both colonial continuity as well as another
potential opportunity for US lawmakers to use economic policy to influence the British. The
experience of the embargo discussed above, however, draws this theory into question. Although
the broad characteristic that Iberia and British North America both sought US grain are similar,
the particular dynamics of the cross-border trade and its much greater importance for the very
survival of the Maritime Provinces (even in peacetime) represents a much deeper connection
between the British Empire and the new United States that could be accentuated by war but that
also endured without it. Another important distinction is that the Iberia trade carried a thin, but
vital, legal veneer as neutral trade, and therefore allowed at least plausible deniability for all
parties involved on the issue of trading with the wartime British enemy. Trade relations with
British North America allowed no such cover, although whether this curtailed traffic, or if
market pressures would dictate commercial interactions will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
SMUGGLING, WAR, AND THE UNUSUAL (BUT FAMILIAR)
SOLUTIONS TO HUNGER, 1809-1815

In addition to its trans-Atlantic significance, the end of Jefferson’s embargo in 1809 also
reshaped the US grain trade with British North America. As with the Iberian trade, the exchange
of US provisions for access to the British economy via familiar trading routes, the dependency
on American provisions, and the need for a flexible interpretation of the laws of trade in order to
sustain the essential trading pattern. From 1809 until the start of war in summer 1812, open
trade existed between British North America and the US. With the advent of war, a separation in
American policy became apparent between seaborne commerce with the Maritimes and land
trade with the Canadas. The licensed trade with Iberia carried with in a winked upon side effect.
The US government condoned seaborne licensed trade for reasons of higher policy, and that
consent implicitly condoned seaborne trade with Nova Scotia. However, this did not extend
legal permission for exporting grain or other provisions to the Canadas.
For British and colonial officials, the outbreak of war further illustrated the connections
binding together the two constituent parts of British North America. Both the Canadas and the
Maritime Provinces depended on the US as a source of provisions, especially as wartime
pressures increased demand for grain. Thus, American farmers directly supported the British
war effort in the Canadas while the US government simultaneously attempted to conquer the two
provinces by force. In the Maritimes, the context is slightly different as there was no planned
American invasion. However, seaborne trade also directly contributed to the British war effort
by supplying provisions for the Royal Navy and the military establishment. In time a portion of
these imports would be re-exported to the Canadas thus supplementing cross-border trade.
217

The close of Jefferson’s embargo in 1809 ended a dramatic but fruitless experiment in
economic coercion. In Nova Scotia, Lieutenant Governor George Prevost’s opening of Nova
Scotian ports to US ships during the embargo represented a break with official imperial policy,
and was aimed at least in part to discomfort US authorities. Prevost’s reinterpretation of trade
law was subsequently deemed “judicious and well timed” by authorities in London. 149 The
underlying economic motivations behind allowing American merchants access had not changed
with the collapse of Jefferson’s policy. Particularly, provisions remained a problem for the
colony. The regularly scheduled 1809 Parliamentary proclamation on trade policy replaced
rather than repudiated Provost’s free trade policy, suggesting that such a generous policy
remained a viable policy option. The new regulations still permitted trade between the US and
British North America, however, this was limited to certain enumerated articles including lumber
products, livestock, and grain “of any sort,” all of which could be exchanged in provincial
harbors for manufactures of Britain or its colonies. 150 The response by Prevost and Sir John
Sherbrooke, his successor as Lieutenant Governor of the province, is suggestive. A series of
proclamations covering 1809, 1810, and 1811 permitting the importation of enumerated goods
from the US indicates a continued reliance on imported produce.
Allowing Americans any access to British trade networks was not universally popular
among British subjects. Memorials from Halifax merchants regularly complained about
competition from outside the empire in lumber and fish exports to the West Indies, however, the
critique of imperial policy was not limited to trade regulations alone. Incorporated within the
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memorial of July 1809 was the observation that due to “lack of encouragement” the northern
colonies of the Maritimes and the Canadas could not supply the West Indies with all of the
products required. 151 Implied, although not explicitly stated, in the phrasing “lack of
encouragement” was a criticism of the lack of agriculture within the colonies indicating that an
outright ban on American imports was not feasible.
Despite the passage of 30 years with minimal results, the essential formula proposed by
Lord Sheffield’s critique of American trade with the empire still shaped the mentality of the
merchants—with proper domestic encouragement, eventually US agriculture could be banned
from the empire due to increased production in British North America, but that day had not yet
arrived. The Halifax customs statistics for 1809 and 1810 demonstrate that the city was not able
to feed itself on local grain, much less support an export trade. Both reports indicate that the US
exported over 11,000 barrels of flour to Halifax each year. 152
The 1810 report contains another potentially significant source of grain for Nova Scotia.
Over 10,000 barrels of flour were also imported by coastal shipping from Newfoundland,
Canada, and New Brunswick. It is certain that these imports were not from Newfoundland,
however, the ledger does not distinguish between imports from the Canadas (indicating surplus
production and a potential granary in British North America) and New Brunswick (which could
indicate either local production or re-exports of goods from the US via New Brunswick). The
Provincial Council minutes for December 17, 1811 contains a petition from two Halifax
merchants named Hartshorne and Tremain requesting the council’s permission to import grain
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and flour into the province “by way of New Brunswick” under the authority of a proclamation
allowing for neutral vessels to enter into Halifax with certain enumerated cargos including
“wheat and grain of any kind, bread, biscuit, and flour.” An exasperated council referred the
merchants to the Order in Council the merchants cited in their petition as an affirmative answer,
with the notation that the Order should be posted by the customs collector “for the information of
all persons concerned.” 153
This exchange is curious in two respects. First, it seems likely that Hartshorne and
Tremain represented a larger merchant interest in US agricultural imports than just a single
merchant house. Second, the emphasis on US produce first imported through New Brunswick
suggests that the embargo era patterns of exchange through Passamaquoddy (and other Maine
regions) to British North America remained intact should a worsening political and martial
context require a more indirect form of trade.
The land boundary between the Canadas and the US presented another opportunity for
licit and illicit exchange. The pattern, however, was somewhat different from maritime trade.
The travelogue of John Melish’s journeys in North America outlined the general pattern of
exchange in 1810 and 1811 along the St. Lawrence River:
exports, chiefly grain, flour, provisions, potash, timber, naval stores, furs, &c.
have late been very great. The imports are chiefly British goods, with which the
inhabitants [of Upper Canada] contrive to supply a considerable part of the United
States, by smuggling’ and the Americans, in return, smuggle tea, coffee, &c. to
the Canadians. 154
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Melish’s observations provide several clues on peacetime cross border trade. The river
supported a thriving export market for US agricultural goods. He does not indicate points
of origin, it is significant that the destination for agricultural surpluses are distant markets
rather than local consumption. Second, the commodities transported to the Canadas
through the US border communities are all tropical in origin rather than domestic. This
can easily be explained as a result of the taxes placed on legally imported goods and the
subsequent savings realized by illicit trade.
As 1812 dawned, an uneasy peace reigned between the United States and the British
Empire. Whether that peace could survive as the ongoing war in Europe raged was much less
certain. Although the United States was not officially at war with any nation and Great Britain
was not at war with the United States, tensions between the two nations as a result of the conflict
with Napoleonic Europe threated to instigate another expansion of a conflict that now enmeshed
(directly or indirectly) the entire Atlantic World. Congress declared war on Great Britain on
June 18, 1812 in a calculated gamble that a quick, victorious war against a distracted foe would
render concessions from Great Britain on numerous points of conflict ranging from trade policies
to alliances with the First Nations. The glorious vision, however, ignored a host of difficulties as
the question transitioned from should there be a declaration of war to could the US actually
conduct a war.
A simple declaration of war with Great Britain did not necessarily mean that the war was
widely supported in either nation, nor that the means of conducting the new war actually existed.
Although Congress could declare a war between nations, it could not declare a war between
peoples. Remembering the lessons taught by the embargo and other foreign trade restrictions on
the American economy, Congress did not move to sever the seaborne between the United States
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and the British Empire as part of the war declaration. The disconnect between economic
necessity and foreign policy created a peculiar situation in which trade continued in the midst of
war with the explicit and tacit consent of both warring powers; the persistent connection further
illustrates the link between the American grain economy and the British Atlantic. Most
ironically, the war would also illuminate and strengthen the ties between British North American
and the US.
The rationale behind the American declaration of war remains a matter of scholarly
dispute. A sampling of theories range from “desperation” and the desire to avoid disgrace, to
more substantive US considerations of British interference with American overseas trade, US
opposition to British alliances with the First Nations that restricted westward expansion, and
American fury at impressment. 155 J.C.A. Stagg offers an intriguing and persuasive economic
rationale for the US goals that its invasion of Canada was an effort to “affect Britain’s capacity
to exercise its commercial and naval powers against Americans in harmful ways that they could
not otherwise control.” 156 The war was a reactionary measure designed to indirectly combat
British trade regulations by improving the bargaining position of the United States through the
use of Canada as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions on neutral trading rights under the
Orders in Council. This would hold the British West Indies hostage to American goodwill for
provisioning the islands. According to Madison, the failure of the 1807 embargo was because of
illicit trade through Canada, therefore, the conquest of Canada was essential for the full force of
the US commercial coercion strategy to work. 157
155

See Reginald Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815 (Arlington Heights: Davidson, 1985);
Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United Sates, 1805-1812 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1963); Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian
Allies (New York: Vintage Books, 2012).
156
J.C.A. Stagg, “James Madison and the Coercion of Great Britain: Canada, the West Indies, and the War of 1812,”
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1981), 3-34, 5.
157
Ibid, 21-22.

222

Conquest was also a proactive measure to ensure that the West Indies remained
dependent on the United States for food and lumber supplies. In time, British North America
might provide an alternative to US exports. This would eliminate any possibility of the United
States using economic restrictions as a tool to influence British policies. 158 This follows the
logic of casting British North America as a replacement for the US as a source of supply within
the empire espoused by figures such as Lord Sheffield in the 1780s. However, this chapter will
demonstrate that not only did that premise fall short in reality, British North America was unable
to even meet its own wartime consumption needs, nor could it generate a surplus for Caribbean
markets.
British officials may not have expected the declaration of war given that the
objectionable Orders-in-Council had already been repealed, however, closer consideration
suggests that the fear of famine, poverty, and the possible disruption of supplies from the United
States created significant anxiety for British colonial authorities even prior to the outbreak of
hostilities. As early as January 1812, Commissary General W.H. Robinson in Quebec wrote that
“a rupture with the United Sates the most permanent evil might arise as our only dependence at
present is upon the principal towns in the country for the disposal of [commissary] bills.” The
lack of currency was a systemic problem. Robinson estimated the peacetime expenses to
provision the Canadas at £400,000 per year with that of Nova Scotia another £200,000 of which
less than one quarter could be raised locally. The only recourse was to import specie from the US
where “specie is also scarce, the exchange rate equally against England, and whose government
now loudly threatens hostility.” 159
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Later dispatches in May provided little solace to Robinson as the US government made
the exportation of specie to Canada “dangerous and perhaps impractical.” 160 By the middle of
the month the military chest was “nearly exhausted,” although Robinson expected to receive
£30,000 from Halifax and the Bahamas; despite this transfer, the expenses of the colony’s
defense could not be “defrayed without assistance from home.” A May 18, 1812 dispatch from
Robinson to Commissary-in-Chief J.C. Herries in London noted that the policies of the US
government had “already occasioned a considerable increase in the price of every article of
provision in these provinces and will soon produce a scarcity if no alteration takes place.”
Further, supplying the active provincial militia would require an immediate increase in
shipments of salted meat to the Canadas from England, while Robinson promised to purchase
flour, pease, and pork locally “upon the best terms I can make.” 161
Demands on Robinson’s commissariat in the event of war would be substantial. His
estimated supply and demand report provides an interesting insight into the problems of flour
supply in British North America. Basing his estimates on needing to feed an army of 7,050
(including women and children) for 400 days as well as 2,500 embodied militia for one year
would require slightly over 3.5 million pounds of flour. In addition, another 1.2 million pounds
were designated for shipment to Halifax based on a requisition from October 1811. Combined,
the estimated demand amounted to slightly over 4.8 million pounds. Robinson’s magazines held
862,884 pounds of flour in hand, and he estimated that he would receive 2.9 million pounds
more from contractors in Lower Canada leaving him with an estimated deficit of slightly over
one million pounds of flour. Conspicuously absent from Robinson’s estimates are any estimated
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contributions from Upper Canada, England, or the United States, although he notes that “the
supplies of flour and pease may with certainty be provided in this province,” he does not specify
where, how, or with what money the flour deficiency would be filled. 162
Imports to Halifax follow a slightly different pattern in the spring before war. Direct
shipments from Quebec provided one potential source of grain, although no shipping entered into
Halifax from Quebec during the first quarter. However, Naval Office records suggest that ports
of origin for these supplies differ significantly from Robinson’s expectations. The ledgers record
one ship from Boston with a cargo of flour and corn listed individually as well as “twenty three
sail of American vessels entered under the orders of the Governor in Council…between 20th
March and 16th May 1812.” In total, these 23 vessels carried 7,405 barrels of flour, 9,481
bushels of corn, and 337 barrels of bread. In the quarter ending April 5, 1812 these figures are
out of total imports of 9,937 barrels of flour, 10,181 bushels of corn, 337 barrels and 180
hundredweight of bread. 163 US imports amount to approximately 79% of all flour imports, 99%
of corn imports, and all the bread imports, with the exception of 180 hundredweight imported
from St. Andrews.
The ledger raises two questions without answers. First, why would data from March 20
to May 16 be included on quarterly returns ending on April 5? Second, why would American
shipping with the exception of one entering on March 20 be reported as a group given that all
other entrances are listed individually with information including the name of the ships’ masters,
size of the ship, place the ship was built and when, ships’ owners and specific port of origin. The

162

W.H. Robinson to J.C. Herries, 18 May 1812. LAC, roll C-10867. The answer was not Great Britain: only 1
quarter and 3 bushels of wheat were exported from England to the American colonies and the West Indian Islands in
all of 1812. See United Kingdom, House of Commons “An Account of British and Foreign Corn and Grain,
Exported from Great Britain in the Year 1812” Sessional Papers, 1813-14, Vol. 12, 159.
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1813-003768?accountid=14583
163
Halifax Naval Office Records, January-April 1812. PANS, roll 13969.

225

first question can perhaps be dismissed as an administrative function; the second is potentially
more intriguing.
Trade with the United States in certain enumerated goods, including grain and grain
products, was permitted by an Act of Parliament dated March 25, 1812 and administered through
an Order in Council dated April 8, 1812. Included within this legislation was permission for US
ships to enter into the ports of Halifax, St. John, and St. Andrews for the purpose of importing
“wheat and grain of any kind, bread, biscuit” and for exports to be shipped from the same
colonial ports. 164 The slow communications of the era presented Lt. Governor John Sherbrooke
with a dilemma. Absent timely notice from London, he decided on his own authority to allow
continued access to American merchants. 165 This potentially accounts for the anomaly within
the port records, and speaks to the importance of this trade that the Lieutenant Governor would
extend his authority in this manner, that the imperial government agreed with his conduct, and
the confusion stemmed from the delays in communication rather than any disagreement on what
trading policy should be.
Entrances into Halifax for April and May 1812 included the arrival of 11 grain ships from
St Andrews, New Brunswick, laden with a total of 2,307 barrels of flour, 60 bushels of corn, and
51 barrels, 88 hundredweight, and 1,234 bags of bread. 166 These two months are not an outlier,
as the records for June record entrances for five ships laden with 424 barrels of flour, 20 bushels
of corn, and 71 hundredweight of bread along with an additional ship with 130 barrels of flour
from “N. Brunswick.” 167 This pattern of trade makes little sense on the surface. According to
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historical geographer Cole Harris, “New Brunswick imported wheat and flour, and exported
almost no agricultural produce.” 168 Historian Joshua Smith notes that flour and grain products
were commonly smuggled through the US ports on Passamaquoddy Bay into New Brunswick
during the embargo. 169 In light of the April 8 Order in Council opening St. Andrews to US
imports, the long history of smuggling flour into St. Andrews, and the weakness of local New
Brunswick wheat agriculture, the circumstantial evidence for a persistent trade with the US is
persuasive.
The War of 1812- Trade during the War Years
As the war started in June 1812, American plans for war consisted of a four-part
American scheme against British North America. British naval superiority over the United
States was somewhat limited due to the demands of the Napoleonic war in Europe. An effective
blockade of the entire US coastline could not be sustained assuming it was desired. An
ineffective blockade allowed the handful of US warships to inflict several well publicized but
strategically indecisive victories over the Royal Navy. According to Lance Davis and Stanley
Engeramn, “throughout 1812, the British blockade was neither extensive, tight, nor particularly
effective.” Part of this was by design. Only the coastline between Charleston, South Carolina
and Florida was declared blockaded in 1812. It was not until spring 1813 that the blockade was
extended north to New York and south to Louisiana. Notably, the ports of New England were
not included in these measures. 170 It is easy but misleading to remove New England and the
Maritimes from the wartime story. Although losses due to privateers on both sides caused
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hardship for civilians, the scope and scale of conflict falls far short of the level of violence seen
during the land campaigns in the Canadas. In relation to grain and provisioning, this division is a
serious mistake. The need for supplies, and the efforts to secure supplies for the war effort was
an integrated problem spread over a broad geographic scope. The integrated problem produced
an array of solutions by British authorities as the army commissariat, naval authorities, and
political leaders coordinated efforts across British North America to resolve the common
problem.
Along the border, the US planned a three-pronged assault on the Canadas. The first
prong would be General William Hull’s advance from Detroit into southwestern Upper Canada.
Confronted by General Isaac Brock and the First Nations leader Tecumseh’s unexpectedly active
defense, Hull retreated to Detroit. Closely pursued and besieged by inferior forces, Hull
surrendered his entire command on August 16. Combined with the fall of Fort Michilimackinac
(July 17) and the abandonment of Fort Dearborn (August 17), American forces in the Old
Northwest suffered a crushing defeat. Far from invading Upper Canada, the northwestern most
post remaining under American control after two months of war was Fort Wayne, Indiana. 171
The second prong focused on the Niagara frontier. The Niagara campaign illustrated the
logistical and political weakness of the American army. An ill-advised assault across the
Niagara River on October 13 resulted in a bloody repulse at Queenston Heights. 172 Crippled by
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logistical challenges, poor morale, and uncertain leadership, the army was effectively out of the
war for the remainder of the 1812 campaign.
The third prong followed the traditional invasion route of Canada utilizing Lake
Champlain and the Richelieu River. General Henry Dearborn, the lethargic American
commander in this region, proved a better negotiator than combat commander. After negotiating
a truce with Prevost upon receiving news of the repeal of the Orders-in-Council, Dearborn
waited for orders from Washington prior to proceeding with the campaign. Hostilities did not
official resume in this theater until September 4, and Dearborn’s forces made no effort to
advance. 173 The third offensive thrust into Canada did not break camp. The grandiose plans
concocted by Madison and his advisors resulted in two decisive defeats and little else.
Despite declaring war and constructing grandiose plans for pursuing the conflict, the
materials needed for a successful campaign were in short supply in the US. Both sides also had a
vested stake in retaining peaceful (if managed) seaborne trade while pursuing military operations
in the continental interior. A June 10, 1812 letter from Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin to
Congressman Langdon Cheves, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee on import
duties hints at the ongoing debate between enforcing the embargo and non-importation acts,
government revenues, and a war that could not help but impact both calculations. The letter
noted that if the trade restriction laws were repealed, US exports would be consumed by Britain
directly as well as by Spain, Portugal, and the British West Indies. 174 Upon further study,
Gallatin estimated that repeal would double government revenue from customs duties, thereby
reducing the need for unpopular internal taxes and governmental borrowing. 175 Gallatin was
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fully aware of the progression of the declaration of war through Congress, and the likelihood of
approval by President Madison. He must have also been aware of the superiority of the Royal
Navy and the potential devastation of US trade through blockade or seizure of American ships on
the high seas as the United States Navy lacked the ability to protect its merchants. Essentially,
funding the war against Britain required customs revenue obtained by trading with Britain or a
fundamental revolution in Jeffersonian political economy. The second premise would prove
politically difficult for the administration, while the first depended on a pious hope that demand
for US exports would be so vital to the British economy that some sort of accommodation could
be reached that would protect American ships in spite of their nation’s belligerent status.
Legally, the declaration of war had little impact on trade. Exports to Napoleonic France
were legal, but due to the impact of the British Royal Navy, this trade already had been severely
curtailed. Direct commerce with Great Britain was still technically illegal under the Nonimportation Act of 1811, although there was an effort to repeal this ban in order to increase tax
revenues and violations of the law were routine. The grain trade with British allies Spain and
Portugal remained legal and encouraged by both US and British officials through the
establishment of a licensed trading scheme that protected some American shipping from capture
by British cruisers In this light, there was nothing in the declaration of war or any subsequent
legislation that made trading with a British license to neutral ports throughout the world illegal
through 1813, while Gallatin’s hope of an accommodation allowing trade was answered for the
first 18 months of war. Although the intent was to support Iberian trade, the principles of the
license trade also applied to seaborne commerce between Nova Scotia and the United States. It
was only after 18 months of war that seaborne commerce became more closely regulated.
Inland, boundaries between the Canadas and the US represented a different form of trade,
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however, support also existed for the continuance and expansion of commodity trade by land.
According to historian Donald Hickey’s “American Trade Restrictions During the War of 1812,”
the British blockade and trade restrictions were not designed to stop American trade with Canada
nor could American laws designed to end trade with the enemy be enforced. 176
The uncertain nature of the American war effort opened opportunities for British North
America. The best solution to the supply difficulties caused by war with the US was, perversely,
the US. July 1812 saw a number of letters from Sir John Sherbrooke, Lieutenant Governor of
Nova Scotia, and Sir George Prevost, Commander in Chief and governor of British North
America as to how the war would be conducted by British forces. General Prevost’s orders
allowed for continued cross-border provisions trade provided that the merchant applied for and
received a permit. 177 A continuous supply of provisions and specie from the United States was
vital for the defense of the Canadas, as Commissary General Robinson in Quebec tersely noted
to J.C. Herries of the Commissariat Department. Robinson wrote in July 1812 “of flour a
sufficiency may be had in the country tho’ the price has much augmented particularly as I have
no cash.” Further, immediate shipments of salted meat were required as “these provinces cannot
furnish meat for its’ inhabitants. It has always been imported from the states in large quantities.”
Further adding to his burdens were the demands for provisions in Halifax, which were fulfilled in
part by shipments from Quebec. 178 According to the Halifax Naval Office records, eight ships
laden with wheat and bread arrived from Quebec between July 6 and July 15, however is was not
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sustainable. 179 July also finds the entry of four additional flour ships from St. Andrews and three
ships from New Brunswick laden with corn and bread amounting to 622 barrels of flour and
326.5 bushels of corn. 180
1812-13: Halifax and the Maritime Trade
For Sherbrooke, the prospect of war with the United States required careful management
as Nova Scotia was ill-prepared for conflict. Fortunately, the US war plan did not include an
attack on the Maritimes. One means of maintaining the peace was through cultivating trade
relations across the border both for economic benefit but also to maintain peace on the
international boundary between the Maritime Provinces and Massachusetts. Sherbrooke’s July 3
proclamation declared to borderland inhabitants his desire that residents would “pursue in peace
their usual and accustomed trades without molestation.” 181 Further, the proclamation protected
American goods and unarmed vessels in the region provided no hostile acts occurred.
This action met with approval from disparate audiences. His Royal Highness the Prince
Regent “entirely approves the substance” of the de facto truce, while recommending “an
amicable and liberal communication and intercourse between the inhabitants of the respective
borders whatever may be the actual state of relations between the two governments.” 182 Further,
authorization permitting trade relations between Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and the United
States under the authority of an Act of Parliament issued prior to the war would remain in effect
until its scheduled expiration in April 1815. Sherbrooke suspected that the war would “prevent
the inhabitants of Nova Scotia from deriving the intended benefit from His Royal Highnesses
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order as the regulation therein contained cannot now be carried into effect.” 183 This pessimistic
observation did not entirely happen, although some modifications of trade were inevitable under
the circumstances.
British consul Andrew Allen in Boston reported on July 23 that the proclamations
preserving the peace “has been received here [Boston] with the most markd [sic] satisfaction.”
Popular opinion in the Eastern States opposed war with Great Britain; in Boston fears of “the
exhaustion of the treasury, the imposition of taxes, the depreciation of real property, and the want
of a vent for their produce” combined with fear of the result of a war with Britain dominated
public perceptions of the war effort. 184 This mirrored Sherbrooke’s fears on the indefensibility
of the province due to the lack of soldiers and weapons. More importantly, perhaps, was the lack
of provisions and specie to sustain Nova Scotia; this fear and the American need for trading
partners combined with public sentiment to create an environment more conducive to peace and
trade than the official state of war would suggest. 185
Driven by multiple reinforcing goals, Sherbrooke issued trading licenses similar to that
issued to the merchant Edward Perkins in July 1812. The license allowed Perkins to “import and
bring into the port of Halifax from any port of the United States of America in any ship or vessel
a cargo of flour, meal corn, or provisions of any kind.” 186 This included US ports that were
theoretically under British blockade. Perkins was one of many traders who took advantage of the
opportunities provided by the licensing system as the commercial connections between Nova
Scotia and New England remained remarkably intact. In a lengthy letter from Sherbrooke to
Lord Liverpool in August 1812, Sherbrooke noted that a number of American traders continued
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to trade with the province due to the demand for British manufactures, “the consequence of such
a commercial intercourse between this colony and the states of America would doubtless be a
supply of both specie and provisions to the former, articles much wanted and likely to be
increasingly demanded” within the province. If this trade was officially sanctioned, and
protections for American merchant vessels trading with Halifax enacted “very considerable
supplies might be expected” from this quarter, however, authorization from the home
government was required. 187
In reply Liverpool authorized and encouraged Sherbrooke to cultivate “an amicable and
liberal communication with the neighboring states, and of promoting any friendly disposition
which may manifest itself in the manner which may appear to you best calculated to ensure its
continuance.” 188 Licensed trade also enjoyed the support of Sir John Borlase Warren, the
Commander in Chief of the Royal Navy’s North American Station, who promised his
cooperation “as the import of provisions into this province is desirable.” 189 Support from these
three sources is significant as it represented the assent of the imperial government in the persons
of Liverpool and the Prince Regent and the assurance of an available and legal market for US
produce through the consent of Sherbrooke. The role of Warren is especially significant. His
ships conducted the blockade of US ports and patrolled the sea-lanes leading to Nova Scotia.
His consent to the license system provided the essential practical security for trade to continue.
Although this would change over the course of the war, the pertinent British authorities were
united in their support for continued seaborne trade at the start of the war in North America.
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Sherbrooke’s efforts to encourage trade with the United States bore fruit in the fall of
1812. In October he reported to Lord Liverpool that “this province has of late been supplied
with flour and other articles of provisions imported from the United States under licenses signed
by me and ordered by the admiral [Sir John Warren] to be respected by the cruisers on this
station.” 190 The license system established by Warren and Sherbrooke was approved; despite the
outbreak of hostilities the provisions of the Orders-in-Council of April 8, 1812 allowing for trade
in certain enumerated products remained in effect. 191
However, these happy circumstances may be temporary depending on the next session of
Congress; Sherbrooke expressed the real fear that the trade between enemies would be formally
banned by the US government. If this should come to pass, “the want of sufficient supply of
provisions” would cause “a situation of very great embarrassment.” Later in the same letter,
Sherbrooke linked the fate of Halifax and the trade in American provisions to other portions of
the British Empire and the war in Spain as “large quantities [of provisions] have again been
exported from hence, for our West India Islands, and for Spain and Portugal.” 192
This hints at the same combination of supply and demand factors as Robinson’s July
1812 letter but with an additional and significant addition to the calculations. Sherbooke’s
inclusion of the US as part of the calculous further reinforces the interlocking nature of
provisions trade and adds a layer of political complexity as one of the proposed suppliers was
firmly outside British political control. Only market pressures and political acquiescence of both
belligerents allowed this commerce to continue. The supply and demand dynamics of grain were
not restricted to a single colony or even a single side of the Atlantic; rather the grain trade was an
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integrated system connecting Europe, the West Indies, British North America, and the United
States. The letter also hints at the fragility of this trade; just as both nations could rationalize
allowing commerce, both sides might also rationalize ending trade. Much as the wheat harvest
fluctuates from year-to-year, dynamic political and economic factors regulating commerce joined
a host of factors encompassing the progress of two separate wars, harvests throughout the
Atlantic basin, and the political machinations of varied individuals and states. How, when, or if
any of those factors would shift, and thereby create a new cost-benefit analysis, remained
unknown.
Quantifying the extent of trade from the US to Halifax is difficult for the last half of
1812. This is especially true for commodities such as grain and flour, which were not subject to
customs duties. Fortunately, the Naval Office recorded incoming and outgoing shipping based
on the physical entry or exit of individual ships rather than by cargo. Despite the importance of
US grain and of Sherboorke’s licensing scheme, there is no record of any American vessels
entering into Halifax between the quarterly report ending with May 16 and the quarterly report
ending in December, which records the entry of 14 American ships laden with flour and salted
meat. 193 For the quarter, the 14 American ships recorded in aggregate were responsible for a
significant portion of all provisions imports- 30% of all flour and 96% of salt meats, however
with the exception of three ships all imports from Quebec and St. Andrews occurred by the end
of October. 194
The quantitative data is much more ambiguous as to the volume and importance of trade
between Halifax, the West Indies, and Iberia. The fourth quarter of 1811 suggests that Halifax is
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the hub of a thriving grain trade based on exports to Newfoundland, New Providence, Bermuda,
and, intriguingly, Miramichi. 195 1812 saw a dramatic decline in volume; the first quarter only
saw two clearances for grain cargoes for Newfoundland and none for the West Indies or Iberia.
The second quarter record of clearances amounts to two ships for Newfoundland, one for
Liverpool, one for Bermuda, and one for Miramichi; bread and flour exports amount to these five
ships and total cargoes of 500 barrels of flour and 265 hundredweight of bread. 196 Third quarter
returns are also relatively small; amounting to a total of six vessels and cargoes of 3,076 barrels
of flour and 119 hundredweight of bread distributed between the British West Indies, New
Brunswick, Barbados, Falmouth, and Miramichi. 197
Accepting Sherbrooke’s letter of October 7 emphasizing the American trade as an
important source of supply for the West Indies and Iberia as fact, this raises a potential problem
as there is no indication in the records of any exports to Spain or Portugal in the Naval Office
records and, unlike Robinson’s reports, Sherbrooke’s writings do not provide any particular
shipment or set of clearances for Iberia during this time. Likewise, clearances for the West
Indies amount to a small handful of vessels through the end of 1811 and the first three quarters of
1812. Unfortunately, the records for the fourth quarter are faded in spots rendering it impossible
to discern portions of the ledgers. Fortunately, the column reporting the total exports for the
quarter are intact; according to the records a total of 887 barrels of flour were exported from
Halifax during this quarter. 198 Although the destinations are unclear, the pattern for the previous
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four quarters may provide some clues and regardless of destination, the quantity of exports are
minor for this quarter and for this entire 15-month period.
By November, a second and perhaps more serious problem arose for the licensed trade.
Demand for provisions within Nova Scotia was such that even the existing interruptions of
commerce resulted in provisions becoming “scare and dear as to excite considerable alarm”
within the province. The political solution of licenses did not solve the problem of creating a
profitable or sustainable trading relationship given the restrictions place on exports from Nova
Scotia resulted in American trading vessels leaving without a return cargo, as Sherbrooke did not
believe that his authority permitted him to authorize US ships to export fish and lumber from
Nova Scotia to the West Indies. In his view, American ships required “the privilege of trading to
any port whatever any articles being the growth produce or manufacture of the United
Kingdom….or of any of His Majesty’s colonies or settlements for economically sustainable
trade.” Therefore, he requested imperial approval to authorize such trade if favored by the
Lieutenant Governor with the advice and consent of the council. 199
Two weeks later, dire need compelled Sherbrooke to acquaint Liverpool that “I have felt
myself under the necessity of encouraging the importation of provisions so far as to allow neutral
vessels bringing such cargoes licenses to export lumber to our West India islands. I hope your
lordship will be of the opinion that our necessities will justify the measure.” 200 This somewhat
benign request concealed two potentially more controversial elements. First, did the Lieutenant
Governor hold such powers over trade policy, and, second, the practice of American ships
entering into Halifax under neutral flags was already an established fact. Whether this
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permission extended to American ships sailing under a neutral flag or only truly neutral vessels
is unclear. 201
After six months of war, the economic patterns linking the colony to US agriculture were
clear and familiar. The custom of permitting American provisions into the colony due to need
and a lack of local production on an “emergency” basis was an established pattern since the
loyalist influx during the 1780s. Naval Office returns for the first quarter of 1813 record 17
American vessels clearing Halifax harbor. Although records of each cargo are illegible, the prewar and wartime patterns provide a persuasive contextual argument that the cargoes were
agricultural products.
Whatever the problems faced by Sherbrooke in Halifax, there would be no help
forthcoming from the commissariat department in the Canadas. Robinson’s cheerful optimism
from July did not persist as the demands of the war outstripped his capacity to provide food and
material for the war. By December 1812 the tone of his correspondence with Herries was
despondent: “in the event of a continuance of the war it will I am confident be impossible to
furnish a sufficient quantity either of salt pork or flour which a former letter of mine….will have
prepared you for.” Further, it was his unfortunate duty to report that he had already informed
Deputy Commissary General Manby in Halifax “that he must not look to me for the usual annual
supply for Halifax and its dependencies.” 202 As it came to pass, only three grain vessels from
Quebec entering the port of Halifax from October to the end of the year. 203
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According to economic historian Fernand Ouellet, the 1812 Canadian harvest suffered
from a late snow melt and early frosts, which may explain Robinson’s changed outlook. 204 The
vastly different tone found within Robinson’s letters is suggestive of the state of Canadian
agriculture, and of the marginal nature of Canadian surpluses as the commissariat department’s
outlook on the state of provisions transitions from having an exportable surplus at the end of
September to a dangerous shortage by the beginning of December based on a single subpar
harvest. Robinson’s correspondence also hints at a number of significant features of the 1812
provisions trade. The inability of the Maritime Provinces to reach even self-sufficiency in
agricultural production required the diversion of scarce and uncertain resources from the
Canadas to sustain the Maritimes. Failing this support, finding alternative sources of supply was
crucial. Little help could be expected from Great Britain as a result of disastrous harvests there
in 1811 and 1812, which had made Britain dependent on grain imported under license from
Napoleonic Europe in 1811 and the upcoming 1812 campaign destroyed this source of
imports. 205
Under these circumstances, non-British sources of supply were essential. The only
plausible and reliable source of grain for the foreseeable future was the United States. The
Halifax port records for the first quarter of 1813 record the entry of 13 American ships laden
with 2,481 barrels of flour and 543 hundredweight of bread. 206 The volume of trade suggests a
vibrant marketplace, although other documents suggest some level of confusion as the mechanics
of licensed trade uncomfortably meshed with larger political forces. The saga of the American
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brig Dispatch in January 1813 provides an interesting case study in the difficulties of conducting
trade between two warring powers. Two American merchants named Plasket and Clarke sailed
the Dispatch into Halifax with a license to carry provisions and naval stores from the United
States. However, part of the cargo was “a few casks of cyder [sic] and about one hundred boxes
of spermaceti candles, which was done by them solely with a view of concealing from the
custom house officers in Massachusetts the real place of the brig’s destination.” The candles
were seized by the Halifax port collector as contraband, however Plasket and Clarke applied to
Sherbrooke for the restoration of the seized goods, as there was no intent of selling the candles in
the Halifax markets. After making “a very minute inquiry into the particulars of this case”
Sherbrooke found that “the candles were embarked by the adventurers solely with a view to
deceive their own government” and therefore should be returned to the merchants. In his report
to Lord Liverpool on the incident, Sherbrooke requested that special instructions be sent to port
collectors about the management of American trade, for “if the revenue laws were to be rigidly
enforced there, an immediate stop would be put to our communication with the states, upon
which we must now so much depend for our supplies of flour and other necessities of life.” 207
1812-13: The Canadas and Cross-Border Trade
Commissary General Robinson’s dire warning on the state of provisioning in the Canadas
found relief via American trade. Unlike the seaborne trading system, no formal system of
mutually recognized licenses existed for this land trade. A series of personal truces between
individuals combined with a weak or corrupt American customs service allowed for an informal
licensing system to operate. 208 The Lake Champlain-Richelieu corridor illustrates this difficulty.
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Initially, the state of Vermont expressed support for the war through legislation designed to end
trade with British North America. A November 1812 act of the Democratic-Republican
dominated Vermont Legislature made it illegal to enter into Lower Canada under any pretext
whatsoever without a pass from the governor or his agent. The act also made it illegal to trade
any cattle or horses with Canada under the penalty of seizure. Half of the property seized would
be sold for the benefit of the state, while the other half would be given to whoever reported the
crime. 209
This level of commitment to the national cause would not be sustained. The November
act was subsequently repealed by the Federalist-leaning 1813 legislature. 210 In April 1813,
smuggling in upstate New York reached such epidemic proportions that 50 soldiers under the
command of US army Lieutenant Lorin Austin were detailed to reinforce customs officials.
During a raid on Americus, New York, thirteen alleged smugglers were arrested. The smugglers
received bail from a sympathetic local judge; upon their release, they filed charges against
Lieutenant Austin. Austin was arrested and remained in jail until bailed out by his commanding
officer, Colonel Zebulon Pike. In Vermont, a brawl broke out in September 1813 between a prowar mob acting in support of customs officials and a pro-smuggler mob over a collection of
illicit goods. The brawl ended “in the complete discomfiture of Uncle Sam’s party, who retired
from the conflict with many a broken head and bruised limb.” 211
Other smugglers used more peaceful, if brazenly corrupt, methods to trade between the
United States and British North America. In his article “A Traitorous and Diabolical Traffic,”
historian H.N. Muller outlined the experiences of customs collector Cornelius Van Ness.
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According to Van Ness, trade across the boundary could be arranged through the good offices of
the customs collector. An importer would give notice that a shipment of smuggled goods was
located near the border. The goods would be seized, a bond was collected from the smuggler,
and the goods were left in his hands. The smuggler then filed an application with the courts for
the remission of the forfeiture, which was usually granted. According to Mueller, this system
amounted to a legalization of enemy trade by means of legal chicanery implicating the court
system and the customs service. This was officially tolerated because “stopping the commerce
along the Champlain-Richelieu path flirted with the possibility of open rebellion in Vermont.” 212
Planning for the 1813 campaign presented Madison and his adviser with a number of
difficulties. At sea, American warships faced increasingly effective Royal Navy efforts to
blockade the United States Navy in port. More bad news arrived from the far west as efforts to
recapture Detroit failed. Losses suffered at Frenchtown (January 1813) preempted the advance
of William Henry Harrison’s army for the remainder of the winter. The army would not advance
again until Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory at the battle of Lake Erie (September 1813) improved
Harrison’s supply lines. Victory at the Battle of the Thames in Upper Canada (October 5, 1813)
liberated Michigan for the US, although controlling southwestern Upper Canada was beyond his
means. A more important outcome of the battle was the death of Tecumseh, and the subsequent
collapse of the First Nations’ war effort. 213
Further east, American planners called for the capture of Kingston, an advance on the
Niagara frontier and the capture of York (present day Toronto). The raid on York proved the
easiest objective to reach. The lightly defended town fell to a raid in April 1813. The sack of
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York embittered the struggle and provided a rallying cry against the Americans, however the
most important short term effect of York was the destruction of supplies stored there. Operations
on the Niagara frontier remained indecisive. American victories at Fort George (May 1813)
were counterbalanced by British victories at Stoney Creek (June 1813), Beaver Dams (June
1813) and Fort Niagara (December 1813). Despite great efforts and great suffering, the net
result was a stalemate. 214
The proposed offensive against Kingston was not launched. A smaller expedition
launched in the fall descended the St. Lawrence. However, this expedition was repelled at
Chateauguay (October 1813). An informal truce controlled trade along the St. Lawrence River
between upstate New York and Upper Canada to the west. The examples of David Parrish and
John Jacob Astor illustrate the possibilities for sustained cross-border business during wartime.
David Parish was a wealthy land owner with influence on both sides of the St. Lawrence. He
was closely connected to the Madison administration due to his wealth and even made
substantial loans to fund the war. 215 Historian Alan Taylor speculates that Parish had an
informal understanding with the US government: in exchange for lending money to the
government, the administration would ensure that US troops stayed away from the St. Lawrence
Valley. Parish also had an understanding with the British government that both sides would
uphold the peace. The informal truce in upstate New York was threatened by the introduction of
forces from outside the borderlands. From July 1812 to February 1813, US troops under
command of Benjamin Forsyth of North Carolina conducted a series of raids along the Canadian
side of the border despite the truce. A counter raid by British forces threatened to embroil the
border in war. In order to preserve the peace, Parish lobbied the US government to remove all its
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troops from the St. Lawrence Valley. Forsyth was transferred elsewhere, and the American
troops were removed. Parish subsequently subscribed $7.5 million in federal war loans. By
March 1813, peace was restored to such an extent that British officers and respectable American
citizens openly socialized in the city streets of Ogdensburg, New York. 216
John Jacob Astor was a well-connected US businessman with ties to the Madison
administration as well as significant interests in trans-border trade. Astor was heavily involved
in the fur trade, both through ownership of The American Fur Company and the AmericanCanadian Southwest Fur Company. The Southwest Company was designed as a partnership
between Astor and Canadian fur traders to facilitate cross-border exchange of furs and Indian
trade goods. 217 Astor’s trade with Canada was not dramatically impacted by the start of the war.
In late June 1812, Astor approached Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin to secure
permission to import goods from Montreal that he owned prior to the declaration of war.
Permission was subsequently granted. Astor then used his connections to Montreal merchants to
secure a passport from British officials in order to tend to his business affairs there. By spring
1813, Astor imported approximately $250,000 worth of furs into the United States from British
North America. Much like David Parish, Astor also happened to be one of the primary investors
in government securities during the war. In April 1813, Astor invested over $2 million into
government securities. 218 The stories of Parrish and Astor combined with the activities of less
well known smugglers around Lake Champlain suggest another interesting facet of the War of
1812; commerce between the belligerent powers was not just a regulated seaborne trade under
licenses but also a matter of illicit (though often tolerated) smuggling and potentially outright
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corruption enmeshing the highest levels of US government and influential businessmen with
access to power.
The influence of Parish in particular has provoked a great deal of historical debate.
During the bicentennial celebration of the war, Alan Taylor presented a controversial theory in
Maclean’s Magazine. Outside of a short lived raid late in 1813, the decisive St. Lawrence
Valley remained undisturbed by American forces. Although he admits that “there is no smoking
gun” and that it is a “circumstantial case” Taylor posits that Parish’s influence, wealth, and
connections to the US Treasury extended so far that military operations in the St. Lawrence were
abandoned as a quid pro quo for Parish’s purchases of government securities. 219 Although the
case is not proven, it reflects the desperation of the US government as the war continued with no
victory in sight.
Taylor’s supposition represents the most obvious connection between American business
interests and the war effort on both sides. Less noticeably, ongoing grain imports from the US
helped Commissary Robinson in Quebec during the winter crisis, and offered the potential of
further help in the future. However, American goods failed to entirely solve the provisions
problem. Dire need resulted in an incredible transformation in the traditional patterns of the
peacetime grain trade. The demand for flour in British North America during the war caused the
flow of the trans-Atlantic grain trade to start reversing itself—flour and grain no longer flowed
from North America to the West Indies or Europe, but rather from Great Britain and the West
Indies to the Canadas.
This process was in part a product of changing conditions in Europe which slowly
redirected trading patterns from 1812 to 1813. The complete failure of Napoleon’s Russian
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campaign also caused the collapse of his continental economic system, which re-opened a
number of markets in central and Eastern Europe for British trade leading to a more consistent
source of grain for Great Britain. Improved harvests in Ireland and Great Britain itself further
increased the availability of grain in Great Britain; the increased supply and the forthcoming end
of the peninsular campaign provided a degree of flexibility in the wartime grain markets that had
not existed since 1809. This trend is a process rather than an immediate shift; how quickly this
new found flexibility could transition from theory to practical effect remained to be seen as even
these momentous events lacked the capacity to create immediate change at the front in Upper
Canada. Improving conditions in Europe held the promise of aiding the Canadas, but whether or
not help from Europe would arrive in time was an unanswered question.
For the commissariat in Quebec, immediate help was required. In November 1812
Robinson wrote to Herries apprising him of the need for the immediate shipment of provisions to
the Canadas. Herries responded in April 1813 by shipping 980,112 pounds of flour from Britain
as well as over 600,000 pounds of pork. A second dispatch cheerfully noted, “I hope that the
pork and flour which I . . . shipped for your station . . . will reach you in time.” 220 This
exchange reveals two interesting features of the new path of the grain trade. The time lag
between requests and delivery is significant. The exchange of requests spanned five months
across winter and early spring, receiving the promised goods required still more time:
Robinson’s November 1812 request resulted in action by the Commissioners of Victualling in
April 1813. However, it was not until mid-June 1813 that two ships were laden with the
promised supplies and Herries only notified Robinson that they were en route in September. 221
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Thus, from first request for supplies to notification they were en route covered 11 months.
Second, the difficulties in providing the needed supplies were significant but not for the obvious
reason. It is the problems of time and distance that Herries is hinting at; the question of expense
for these provisions is not mentioned. This is a significant departure from the content of the prewar letters in which the specie problem played a prominent role.
Although this could not have been clear in April 1813, these letters represent the
beginning of a consistent pattern rather than an aberration. A June 10 letter from Robinson
asking for additional support was met by an August 12 response promising the shipment of 3,000
sacks of flour to Quebec from Cork, an additional one million pounds from the Commissioners
of Victualling in Britain, and (perhaps the most interesting of these promises) the shipment of
one million pounds of flour from the British army commissariat in the West Indies. 222 Halifax
port records show two entries of flour and bread cargoes from Bermuda in mid-May 1813 and
two additional cargoes from Bermuda and Jamaica in June. Although the quantities only
amounted to 2,432 barrels of flour and 3,980 hundredweight of bread, this is an interesting
aberration in the traditional patterns of commerce. 223
Herries conceived that the above quantities would be “sufficient to meet your
consumption of flour until the arrival at Quebec of the first spring fleet, by which the remainder
of your requisition will be forwarded.” 224 This promise was later augmented by the Lords of the
Treasury. At meetings held in June and July 1813 they sent four million pounds of flour, the
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same of pork, and over a half million pounds of rice “by the first convoy to Canada.” 225 A
September 9 letter from Jason Drummond of the Commissariat Department to Robinson
informed him of the immediate shipment of two shiploads of flour to Quebec amounting to
slightly more than 330,000 pounds of flour from Cork, Ireland. 226 The element of time is again
critical due to the time lag between shipment and receipt in Quebec as well as an additional delay
between receipt in Quebec and arrival at the front.
The difficulty of transporting supplies to the front in Upper Canada challenged the
commissariat and placed a premium on locally produced foodstuffs. The distance between
Quebec City and troops in Upper Canada amounted to 800 miles, which according to General
George Prevost “presents great obstacles to the transport service, some of them almost
insurmountable, until the superiority on the lake [Ontario] is obtained by us.” 227 The physical
distance between the port of Quebec and the warfront complicated meaningful provisioning. The
long supply lines were also subject to disruption by Americans. The adventures of Thomas
Rideout, a commissariat officer in Upper Canada, illustrate the difficulty of supporting the war
effort so distant from imported provisions. Writing to his father in August 1813, Rideout
complained that the disaster at York in April 1813 also had the effect of destroying the flour and
other provisions required by the British forces in western Upper Canada. 228
This provisioning crisis contributed to the most famous US victory of the war on Lake
Erie in September 1813. Control of the lake was crucial to deliver supplies, an especially dire
issue for the British. In his dispatch to Sir James Yeo announcing the unfortunate result of the
Battle of Lake Erie, Robert Barclay prefaced his report by noting that “so perfectly destitute of
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provisions was the port [of Amherstburg, Upper Canada] that there was not a day’s flour in store,
and the crews of the squadron under my command were on half allowance of many things, and
when that was done there was no more.” 229 The army was in little better condition according to
Rideout’s later letter to his brother George. By the beginning of September, the army in Upper
Canada was reduced to “an extensive robbery of pears, apples, onions, corn….bread or butter is
out of the question.” 230 This startling breakdown in discipline represents both the inability of the
local countryside to supply adequate flour for its defending army as well as the inability of the
army to provision the troops from external sources. Local supplies of grain, even if they could
be purchased or purloined, proved scanty as the 1813 harvest “lacked abundance.” 231
1813: Halifax and the Maritime Trade
The problems of simultaneously having protected licensed trade with the enemy and a
state of war created a crisis for Sherbrooke in Halifax. The second quarter 1813 records do not
record the arrival of any US ships by name or in aggregate. There is, however, the arrival of
slightly over 4,000 barrels of flour and nearly 3,000 bushels of corn delivered by “11 foreign
vessels.” 232 The volume and cargo is consistent with the flow of American commerce, and the
absence of a separate line item for American ships is suggestive that “foreign” and “US” is the
same trade. This obfuscation probably arose from the lack of direction from London as to the
official conduct of the war in North America even over a year past its declaration. As late as
August 1813, customs officers in Nova Scotia did not have official instructions for regulating
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trade between the province and the US. The collector in Halifax reported to Sherbrooke that he
received no instructions, and “the probability is that they were lost in the May or June mails.” 233
Sherbrooke pleaded for a lenient policy towards American traders, for, in his mind, the
continuation of trade better protected the colony from attack than the addition of thousands of
soldiers to the garrison. Sustaining essential commerce required a flexible interpretation of trade
laws and protection from prosecution for minor deviations that would give American merchants
the security to continue trade in foodstuffs. 234 As a result the British Lieutenant Governor of
Nova Scotia beseeched the British imperial government for leniency towards Americans trading
in Halifax, a fascinating scene symptomatic of the counter-intuitive conglomeration of factors
that shaped wartime political economy in the region.
Having a consistent and merciful policy toward American merchants and their
agricultural imports was especially significant as the province’s agricultural production remained
limited. Supporting regular troops with local resources proved impossible and embodying the
provincial militia to defend the colony was impossible given “the situation of the province, in
respect to its agriculture and fisheries,” which rendered long-term mobilization of a substantial
militia “inexpedient.” 235
In a lengthy letter to Vice Admiral R.G. Keats in Newfoundland in July 1813,
Sherbrooke provided a general synopsis of the state of the Halifax grain economy. Begging
leave to report that “the exportation of provisions has not been prohibited during my
administration of this government….being fully sensible that His Majesty’s islands in the West
Indies and Newfoundland have to a considerable extent depended on this market for supplies.”
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Prices in Halifax remained high due to “the great quantities purchased for His Majesty’s service
in Canada and various exportations to other places on private account” but “great quantities of
flour grain etc. are now in Halifax ready for sale or exportation.” There were shortages of salted
pork and beef, which could be solved by increased trade with the US on reasonable terms,
however these articles were not among the enumerated goods allowed by licensed trade, as it
“should interfere with the Irish trade in those articles.” If there was a fear of famine in
Newfoundland and private importations to the island from Halifax were not adequate,
Sherbrooke suggested the Keats establish an agent in the port in order to procure better terms and
more certainty of an adequate supply. 236 Despite the notice given by Sherbrooke to the
importance of Halifax as a source of grain for Newfoundland and the West Indies, the quarterly
report only records the export of 245 barrels of flour and 287 hundredweight of bread, overall,
divided between six clearances for Newfoundland, the West Indies, Quebec, and Miramichi. 237
This correspondence raises two important points. First, one of the difficulties within this
project is determining what, if any, divisions there are between the grain trade operating under
the authority of the British government on behalf of its armed forces and the operation of civilian
markets distinct from the military. The first would indicate an economic plan driven by a
centralized effort, while the second would be more indicative of a trading system influenced by
the war and wartime regulation but not necessarily controlled by the government. Sherbrooke’s
letter suggests that the British state was an actor in the Halifax provisions market. However, the
letter also indicates that the market was not restricted to government officials to the exclusion of
private actors. This clarifies an important element of the naval office import records which do
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not include any information as to who the imported grain is sold to; this indicates that imported
grain brought into Halifax under license entered into the general economy.
It is also intriguing to note the persistent element of mercantilism related to imports of
salt beef and pork in favor of Irish producers. Agricultural produce within the empire, and
especially the home islands received legal protection whenever possible. The stark contrast
between this example in salted meat and American grain imports over the course of three
decades illustrates an important feature of this exchange. The British Empire simply had no
internal grain surpluses. The relationship between American supply and imperial demand
required a series of accommodations that defied the mandates of a mercantile economic system.
In July 1813, Lord Bathurst relayed an order from the Prince Regent to Sherbrooke
requiring him to submit a monthly report on the imports and exports between the US and
Halifax. 238 This request for information from the highest levels of the British government
reflects the importance attached to this trade. The new reporting procedures also provide a clear
and concise record of the extent of this trade through the remainder of 1813. Sherbrooke’s first
report for September 1813 listed a total of six vessels clearing Halifax for destinations in the US.
The commodities carried on these ships provides an intriguing insight into the nature of trade
with the US. Exports from Nova Scotia to the US included brown sugar from the British West
Indies, muslin fabrics, printed cottons, velvet, and buttons. In exchange, Nova Scotia received
grain products in enormous quantities, as well as supplies of onions, apples, pease, and cheese.
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Table 7.1: Halifax Imports from the US, September-December 1813 239

Month

Vessels

September
October
November
December
Totals

11
18
12
16
57

Flour
(Barrels)
6,456
9,723
5,734
9,634
31,547

Bread
(Barrels/Bags)
70/0
772/339
197/40
190/0
1229/339

Corn
(Bushels)
1,308
1,800
930
2,275
6,313

Barley
(Bushels)
0
100
1,200
230
1,530

Sherbrooke’s report illustrates the nature of trade between the US and the British Empire and
that basic colonial era contours persisted. Despite war, the essential flow of goods remained the
same: British manufactures in exchange for American foodstuffs. Although the context is
different, the commerce is the same and actually expanded when compared to the volume of prewar trade or the statistics from the first quarter of 1813.
It is unclear what percentage of imports went civilian markets or for military use within
the colony or elsewhere. However, evidence exists that Halifax was exporting grain to Quebec
by the end of 1813. Thomas G. Rideout, a commissariat officer in Canada, discovered to his joy
that transports in the harbor of Quebec City were laden with 20,000 barrels of flour from Halifax
and an additional 10,000 barrels from England in December 1813. These arrivals were fortunate,
due to the country being “miserably poor and unable to maintain its own inhabitants the crops
being so scanty.” 240 Unfortunately, consistent quantitative data to assess this trade does not
exist. According to the Halifax port records, flour exports from Halifax through the end of June
1813 amounts to only 671 barrels overall, of which only one shipment cleared for Quebec. 241
The third quarter finds an increase in the volume of flour exports overall to 3,607 barrels to a
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more diverse set of ports, including St. Johns, Newfoundland, Arichat in Cape Breton, Labrador,
the British West Indies, and Jamaica. Conspicuous by its absence is Quebec as a port of
destination for flour exports with one single exception. 242
1814: Halifax and the Maritime Trade
Continuing trade was lucrative for everyone involved, but as 1814 dawned a new set of
political and economic calculations arose. In the US, a new embargo on shipping legally
prohibited American ships from all seaborne commerce (see chapter 5). Much like the embargo
of 1807-09, this proved to be much easier to enforce at port cities rather than along the border
with the Canadas, as a result the grain economy diverged between the land-based trade across the
border and that by sea. Later, a stricter blockade by the Royal Navy combined to sever the
connection between Nova Scotia and the United States grain markets. This new policy towards
American trade was a result of the importance of maritime trade to Federal revenue and a new
dedication by Great Britain to deny this source of income to the US government, while
recognizing the necessity of encouraging direct trade between Vermont and New York with the
Canadas because of desperate need to provision distant regions in the continent’s interior.
The results of this changing regulatory environment on both sides were immediately
reflected on Sherbrooke’s monthly returns. In January 1814, only a single American ship laden
with barley and bread entered harbor. The February returns were “nil,” although three “foreign”
ships entered laden with flour and bread. 243 “Foreign” is undefined. To Sherbrooke, the
American embargo posed numerous problems. In his report to Liverpool, he wrote that
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It is impossible to calculate at present how far this embargo may operate to the
determent of our West India Islands and of his Majesty’s North American
possessions, but the sooner your Lordship is made acquainted with the
circumstances the sooner we may expect that measures will be adopted to
counteract its baneful effects. 244
The January 26, 1814 edition of The Nova Scotia Royal Gazette provided a somewhere different
commentary on the embargo and the possible effects, or lack thereof, of the new American
policy on Great Britain. Citing the bounty of European crops, the decline in price for imported
English flour to only £3 per barrel in the Halifax markets, and the opening of trade connections
between Great Britain and the rest of Europe, the editor speculated that “the bitterest enemy of
the United States could not have wished a greater evil to befall them than the Act is calculated to
produce.” 245
Although Congress enacted a full embargo on American shipping, it proved short-lived.
Although small in numbers, US ships still came to Halifax, the embargo did not preclude the use
of licenses in the eye of British authorities. The threat to potential grain supplies, however,
caused panic for British officials. Writing to Henry Gouldburn in April 1814, Sherbrooke
expressed joy at the embargo’s its repeal as “if the act continued in force, I fear we should have
found great difficulty in supplying our troops in the Canadas with flour during the ensuing
campaign.” 246 The letter confirms the essential place of US provisions for British forces in the
Canadas.
In a case very similar to that of Plasket and Clarke in January 1813, February 1814 finds
another legal case involving an American merchant and the customs service. In this case,
Frederick Starling of New Haven entered Halifax with a cargo of 1,100 barrels flour, 25 barrels
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each of pork and beef, and 6,000 staves cosigned to Halifax merchant Richard Tremain; a few
prohibited articles intended for St. Bartholomews were also included in the cargo as that was the
next trading destination for Starling after clearing Halifax. Unfortunately, the ship was wreaked;
upon salvage the surviving cargo of beef, pork, and staves was seized by the customs service
upon entry into Shelbourne. Starling begged for the restoration of the property, which would be
expected, however, this petition was accompanied by a declaration from Tremain noting that
Starling had long delivered to him cargoes of flour under license since the start of the war. 247
Sherbrooke’s response to this petition is interesting. Finding that the contraband portion of the
cargo was onboard due to Starling’s goal to “conceal from the American government the next
destination of the said vessel,” all property seized by the customs service should be restored to
Starling. 248 The intervention of the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia on the behalf of an
American merchant in conflict with British customs authorities speaks to the importance of
maintaining these trading relationships even at this later stage of the war.
1814: The Canadas and Cross-border Trade
The separation between supplies arrived in Quebec City and supplies available to the
commissariat outside of Quebec remains stark. Despite Rideout’s observation of 30,000 barrels
of flour arriving in Quebec, the prospects for more distant Upper Canada were bleak. Writing to
his brother George in January 1814, Thomas G. Rideout lamented that supplying the 1,600 men
garrisoned at Prescott, Upper Canada, “will be very hard, for the country is so excessively poor.”
The only salvation for the garrison was trade with New York; Rideout noted that “our supplies
are all drawn from the American side of the river,” and, in particular, he would be “under the
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necessity of getting most of my flour from their side.” 249 Sustaining this cross-border land trade
required a flexible sense of propriety as well as a good supply of specie. Two weeks later
Rideout wrote to his father that he had “paid very large sums in specie for secret service, which
is the fountainhead of all correspondence with the enemy,” and that he had “2 months supply of
everything for 1,000” in stock. 250 John Rideout, writing from Cornwall, Upper Canada, was
even more explicit about the link between US suppliers and provisions for the army. The arrival
of 60 sleighs loaded with supplies from Vermont caused rejoicing. 251
Militarily, 1814 provided a new geo-political landscape for the war. The collapse and fall
of Napoleon freed waves of British ships and soldiers for service in North America. A stricter
blockade was complimented by growing raiding parties of British soldiers, particularly in the
Chesapeake Bay region and on Lake Champlain. Raiding in the Chesapeake disbursed American
strength in the region. The British victory at Bladensburg (August 24) and the successful
defense of Baltimore (September 1814) provided the most memorable events of the war for both
sides. On Lake Champlain, the United States Navy’s defeat of the Royal Navy at Plattsburg
(September 11) repelled a British assault down the lake. However, a decisive victory eluded
both sides.
Even an indecisive war requires logistical support. For the British, the resource base of
British North America remained inadequate. The British government promised more aid to both
the Canadas and the garrison at Halifax once peace in Europe in May 1814 allowed a surplus of
grain for export to North America. As more troops from Europe arrived, the supply of
provisions (as well as demand for them) from the Quebec magazines increased. Commissariat
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chief W. H. Robinson’s estimated requirements for April 1814 to September 1815 anticipated a
total demand for over 10 million pounds of flour, 8.5 million pounds of salt pork, and lesser
amounts of rice, cocoa, pease, and rum. Jason Drummond, Robinson’s Commissariat
Department correspondent in Britain, informed him that the estimate was faulty because “you
had not received my dispatch of the 12th April no. 180 by which you were appraised of the
intention of His Majesty’s government to supply from the United Kingdom the whole of your
wants in the article of flour.” Of the ten million pounds demanded, Drummond wrote that over
seven million pounds had already been dispatched by a combination of the Victualling Board,
the Commissariat in Chief, deliveries from Bermuda, and other supplies already in route. 252 This
supply pattern regularly appears in other correspondence from Drummond to Robinson through
September 1814 with frequent reports of grain and grain products dispatched from Ireland and
Great Britain. 253
If fully implemented, this scheme of provision represents the complete reversal of the
typical trading patterns for wheat and wheat products. Rather than British North America
supplying the West Indies or replacing the US as a granary for the southern European markets,
the poor condition of agriculture in the Canadas required the entire supply of the army to be
imported from Britain and Europe. This is perhaps fortunate as the 1814 harvest in the Canadas
was stricken by severe drought. 254 Structurally, this temporary aberration from the accustomed
patterns of trade illustrate the durability of US grain trade with the empire. Only the intersection
of a host of circumstances- the fall of Napoleonic Europe, massive wartime military expenditures
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by Britain, the unprecedented mobilization of military transport for bulk commodities, and an
ongoing war with the US could break the pattern. Thus, removing American agriculture from
the empire on a regular basis would be prohibitively expensive and disruptive to the domestic
British economy. Mercantilism (of the pre-1775 vintage) worked for the grain trade.
Mercantilism (post-1783 vintage) did not and could not function over a long term. An
accommodation with the independent US was necessary. In this light, the actions of Prevost and
Sherbrooke in both their civil and military capacities are understandable reactions to an
economic reality.
Although help was promised, how quickly, or if, the mass wave of pledged imported
provisions would make it to the front was unclear. Until the promise and reality coincided, other
measures were required to sustain the army. The summer of 1814 sees a persistence of a number
of trends in Upper Canada’s provisions crisis. The arrival of supplies in Quebec still meant little
to the commissariat in places distant from Quebec where the reliance on US supplies continued.
Writing from Cornwall in June 1814, Thomas G. Rideout recounted one particularly memorable
cross-border negotiation: Rideout had contracted with
a Yankee magistrate to furnish this fort with Irish beef. A major came with him
to make the agreement but as he was foreman to the grand jury at the court in
which the government prosecutes the magistrate for high treason and smuggling,
he turned his back and would not see the paper signed. 255

A later negotiation in July brought 200 oxen from the US with the promise that “several
thousand more head can be driven in by St. Regis if wanted.” Clearly cross-border trade
persisted and was prevalent; however, the same letter suggests that efforts to import flour from
Europe impacted cross-border exchanges. Rideout wrote that “flour is here $14 per barrel, but
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large supplies have arrived at Quebec from France and England so that there will be no want.” 256
He hoped that transportation of these provisions would be possible to alleviate some of the
burden he faced to procure local supplies. The inclusion of France as a source of flour was
possible given the restoration of peace and the abdication of Napoleon earlier in the year, and if
substantial and sustained would be a novel addition to the trans-Atlantic grain trade. At the same
time Sir George Prevost in Quebec City wrote that “two thirds of the army in Canada are, at this
moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the states of
Vermont and New York.” 257
The scale and importance of the cross-border land exchange also drew the attention of US
authorities. George Izard, the American general commanding in the Lake Champlain region,
wrote to the Secretary of War that “many deserters come in, who state that the enemy’s supply is
exhausted, but that they expect to be resupplied within a short time.” 258 In another more strident
and voluminous letter Izard wrote that:
From the St. Lawrence to the ocean an open disregard prevails for the laws
prohibiting intercourse with the enemy. The road to St. Regis is covered with
droves of cattle, and the river with rafts, destined for the enemy. The revenue
officers see these things, but acknowledge their inability to put a stop to such
outrageous proceedings. On the eastern side of lake Champlain, the high roads
are found insufficient for the supplies of cattle which are pouring into Canada.
Like herds of buffaloes, they press through the forest, making paths for
themselves…. Were it not for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would
soon be suffering from famine, or their government be subjected to enormous
expense for their maintenance. 259
This correlates with the observations of Rideout and Prevost both on the source of supplies for
the British army and their importance. Significantly, references to expense had disappeared from
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the correspondence between the commissariat department in Quebec and British authorities in
London. Although it may have been expensive, the coming of peace in Europe meant that Great
Britain could afford the maintenance costs at least for the present time. If cost was no object, the
weather was. By the end of September London commissariat J.C. Herries informed Robinson
that all shipments for the year were suspended due to the oncoming winter. 260
1814: Halifax and the Maritime Trade (Part 2)
Whether or not the Royal Navy would permit trade with the US, and on what terms, was
unclear as the calculous of power changed following the abdication of Napoleon in April 1814.
With the gradual transfer of troops and warships to North America that spring and summer, the
nature of the war fundamentally changed. May and June 1814 marked a turning point for the
Halifax grain imports from Great Britain. The Naval Office recorded 10 entries from London,
Cork, Liverpool, and Bristol laden with bread and corn for Halifax; these entries totaled 5,290
barrels of flour and 9,398 hundredweight of bread. Eight entries from the US totaled 1,713
barrels of flour (24% of imports) and just 372 hundredweight (4%) of bread. 261 The existence of
these eight entries is slightly odd as the enumerated goods permitted by license to pass through
Britain’s more vigorous blockade was in theory limited to specie, however this regulation does
not seem to have been rigorously enforced. 262 This transition is notable for two important
reasons. First, this is the first time since the beginning of the war that the majority of grain
imports to Halifax originated in Great Britain rather than the US. Second, the shift from
American flour to British bread is intriguing. One possible explanation is that military
regulations specified “biscuit or good wheaten bread” for rations. Whether raw flour would have

260

J.C. Herries to Robinson, 26 September 1814. LAC, roll C-12849.
Halifax Naval Office Records, May-June 1814. PANS, roll 13875.
262
Bathurst to Sherbrooke, 12 April 1814. PANS, roll 15241.
261

262

been an adequate substitute, if hardtack biscuit was more durable, or if the military establishment
in Halifax had the capacity to produce bread or biscuit on the scale required is unknown. 263
An advertisement in the July 11, 1814 edition of the Halifax Journal noted the arrival of
a “Swedish schooner, with 700 barrels of flour and 200 barrels of tar, detained by the Endymion”
in Halifax harbor. It is exceptionally unlikely that the blockading squadron off an American port
would have detained an actual Swedish ship given that in the same article a Portuguese ship
bound for Boston was only “ordered off” as a result of the blockade rather than “detained.” 264 It
is even more unlikely that a Swedish ship would have carried flour as a cargo to the US. This
circumstantial evidence suggests that the ship was actually an American vessel operating under
false colors ensnared by the blockade. The tightening of the blockade also brought licensed trade
to a close, much to the lament of Halifax merchants. The rigid embargoes did not immediately
stop trade; it was not until July 1814 that Sherbrooke reported that “vessels under my license can
no longer be permitted to enter the ports of the United States, as they are placed by him [Admiral
Sir Alexander Cochrane, Warren’s replacement as head of the Royal Navy’s North American
station] in a state of strict and vigorous blockade,” therefore he would desist from issuing more
trading licenses. 265 However, unlike the case earlier in the war, the British government was now
less than sympathetic to the merchants, noting that although the imperial government regrets any
ill-effects on loyal merchants, there was no justification for “any relaxation of the
measures….which could have the effect of debarring neutral nations from a trade which was at
the same time carried on by one of the belligerents.” 266
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Entrances into Halifax for the second and third quarters of 1814 reflect this changing
economy. From July 1 through September 30, only four intrepid American merchant vessels
carrying 144 barrels of flour and 10 hundredweight of bread entered into Halifax harbor. 267
There is another peculiarity within the records however. Despite the increase in the number of
troops and naval vessels stationed in or around the colony, the importation of flour actually
declines. For the quarter, total entrances for flour only amount to 1,470 barrels, although imports
of bread rise dramatically to 33,892 hundredweight. These shipments may correlate with the
London commissariat’s July letter to Robinson in Quebec reporting the shipment of 7,576 bags
of biscuit and 2,200 casks of flour to Halifax as part of the flow of provisions to British North
America during the summer of 1814. 268 Outside of the minor US contribution, these imports
were from Great Britain. 269
Fourth quarter entrances suggest that this may have just been a brief anomaly. Although
the records for ports of origin are badly faded, the quarterly totals amount to 5,235 barrels of
flour and 15,700 hundredweight of bread. 270 Very little flour or bread was exported out of
Halifax; third quarter totals amount to 979 barrels of flour and 472 hundredweight of bread
distributed to varied destinations with no clearances for Quebec. 271 The fourth quarter is even
more limited, totaling just 101 barrels of flour and 1,126 hundredweight of bread with Bermuda
as the primary recipient. 272 The discrepancy between entrances and exits is interesting as it
suggests that most of the imported grain was consumed locally, which would be in keeping with
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the presence of an increased garrison and naval presence. However, it also means that the
entrepot function of Halifax as a distribution center for supplies to the West Indies was limited.
Although the Halifax port records do not record direct trade with the US, trade continued
through the port of Castine in the District of Maine after its military occupation by the British in
September 1814. Castine served as a lucrative hub between the British economy and the US,
since Castine was now British territory it could trade throughout the empire without fear of the
British naval blockade. In a September proclamation, Sherbrooke pronounced that the port was
open to all British subjects and all British goods; with the annexation of the lands east of the
Penobscot River and the creation of the British customs house at Castine, the proclamation
created a new land boundary between the US and British North America through which trade
could be conducted.
The volume of trade there was so substantial it threatened the stability of the US banking
system. The Niles Register reported at the end of December that “a number of banks to the
eastward have recently stopped payment in specie; and if the trade with ‘his majesty’s’ port of
Castine, with the usual smuggling is continued, we venture to say without pretending to a spirit
of prophecy, that all the rest will soon follow the example.” 273 In return, the value of British
products entering the US also increased. By January 1815, Sherbrooke estimated the value of
imports destined for the US stored at Halifax to be worth over £1 million, most of which was
destined for Castine. Since the implementation of the general embargo of the US, much British
trade had been redirected there. 274 The end of the war provided another variable for merchants to
consider. The Treaty of Ghent did not address issues of trade, and Sherbrooke proved reluctant
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to reopen unlimited trade without instructions from Britain in spite of demands by local
merchants. 275
1815: Peace, and a Return to Normalcy
The end of the war corrected the trading patterns distorted by the war. By February 1815,
Drummond informed Robinson that the quantities of provisions provided from Britain to the
commissariat in Canada would be strictly limited due to the changed political and martial
situation. In March this was modified as Drummond waited on “taking any steps for forwarding
the supplies required by your present estimate until I hear further from you on the subject.” The
next month the provisions shipments previously promised to Robinson were diverted to the
Netherlands due to the needs of British forces there. 276 The rapid redirection of supplies
elsewhere indicates the fragile and very unusual nature of British grain exports to North
America. As soon as the geopolitical situation shifted, the trade was quickly limited, halted, and
then recalled in the span of less than three months.
A proclamation Sherbrooke signed March 4, 1815 perfectly illustrates the enduring
continuity of the political economy of the overseas Anglo-American grain trade. After over two
years of war, and numerous political machinations regarding trade, the end of the war left Nova
Scotian trade almost exactly where it had started. The proclamation permitted the importation of
a number of goods including bread, flour, wheat, biscuit, and livestock into the colony from the
United States for a period of three months. 277 A letter from Lord Bathurst approving this
measure arrived in May. 278 More broadly, this proclamation parallels the one by Governor John
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Parr permitting grain imports into the colony on an “emergency” basis over thirty years prior.
Nova Scotian production of foodstuffs had not substantially advanced since the Loyalist
migration overwhelmed it in the 1780s. The province remained marginally self-sufficient in the
best of times and dependent on the United States for food security.
The North American grain trade leading up to and through the War of 1812 reveals the
persistence of long established trading patterns and the fragile and limited alternatives to the
essential connection between US agricultural production and British imperial consumption. The
flow of grain connected various parts of the Atlantic and shows an especially strong tie between
the Canadas and the Maritimes that has been understated by the traditional historiography that
privileges provincial specialization. For the Maritime Provinces, US grain remained important
until the summer of 1814 when the British blockade of US ports temporarily severed the
connection. In the Canadas, a shortage of grain and specie loomed at the start of the war and
worsened over time. Although there were schemes to import grain into the Canadas from
Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies early in 1813, enacting a practical change in trading patterns
was not fruitful until the end of 1813, and then only for Quebec City. The challenges of distance
and increased demand by the army in Upper Canada rendered efforts to supply the troops from
across the Atlantic ineffective as most of the provisions consumed by the British army were
attained from the US.
The effort to try to reverse the traditional trade pattern required an enormous investment
of time and money only made possible due to a very particular set of historical circumstances in
late 1813 and through 1814. This short span of time saw the collapse of Napoleon’s empire, the
end of a war that had raged for over 20 years, and an exceptional harvest in Ireland and England
combined with bountiful crops in Eastern Europe that complemented pent-up demand for British
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products in Europe. The war also created agricultural labor shortages and an exceptional
demand for provisions in British North America, which coincided with weather related shortages
that unbalanced the supply and demand of food within the colonies. Essentially, this was a
fleeting moment where British and European supply of British North America could have been
attempted, and the swift collapse of this effort in spring 1815 highlights its fragility. By contrast,
the traditional trade pattern dating back to at least the mid-eighteenth century (and probably
earlier) remained intact through two years of open warfare between the US and the British
Empire.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

Using grain as a lens to examine the late colonial and early republican era political
economy reveals a number of significant but overlooked elements that provide a fuller
understanding of this critical time. Rather than focusing on the traditional story of political
division, this dissertation demonstrates that economic continuities are also foundational to the
Anglo-American Atlantic World from the 1760s to the 1810s. By crossing the traditional
historiographical division in the field as well as geographic boundaries, we find a surprisingly
integrated and resilient economy centered on grain. Grain was the essential commodity that
underwrote colonial development and social stability in the early modern Atlantic World.
Without access to timely and reliable deliveries of American colonial grain products, the
societies of the era would have ceased to function as they did. Without basic subsistence, other
economic, political, and social developments would have to have been profoundly altered.
Tracing the patterns of exchange from the 1760s CO 16 records provides a baseline for
late colonial American grain trade patterns. The important links to the West Indies, Iberia, and
the coastal trade in British North America formed the primary external markets for American
surpluses. This exposes a unique trait of the grain economy. Traditional examinations of the
colonial economic trading networks focus on imperial regulations and the effect of trade
restrictions on the development of the colonial economy within a mercantilist framework. By
using grain as a point of entry, it is clear that the mercantile framework was more flexible than
studies of tobacco, sugar, or other enumerated commodities suggest. Trading grain across
imperial boundaries was an open practice in the late colonial era. Reconciling this with
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mercantilism is possible. Customers external to the British Empire required grain imports, and
there were no substitutes. Thus, a freer trade in grain was complimentary to mercantilism as it
drew needed resources into the British Empire at the price of an unabsorbable agricultural
surplus.
As political and social pressures combined to sunder the empire in 1775, economic ties
between the independent US, the British Empire, and the empires of other European nations
would logically become more complex. At the end of the American Revolution, debates on how
to (or if) to re-integrate the US back into the British Atlantic economy sparked a voluminous
public debate through newspapers and pamphlets. The theoretical conceptions of both American
and British commentators rested on an underlying reality: the empire required access to surplus
grain. This need refocused attention on British North America. Could the remaining North
American colonies replace the US as a source of grain for the empire?
The resettlement of loyalist refugees in Canada and the Maritime Provinces in the years
following 1783 provided some hope. A willing population combined with the availability of
land seemed to promise agricultural growth. The reality was far different. Immigrants to British
North America faced a formidable environment, a lack of infrastructure, and a complicated
process of settlement in a new land. The result of this was unexpected from a political
perspective. In immediate need of provisions, British colonial officials turned to the US as a
source of sustenance. In a perverse outcome of the loyalist migration, the need for foodstuffs
bound British North America even closer to the US than prior to the revolution. Far from being
a solution for the food needs of the British West Indies, British North America added to the
imperial difficulties of building a closed British Atlantic economy shorn of the thirteen rebellious
colonies.
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Grain exports led the post-war economic recovery in the United States. The trading links
to the West Indian colonies of each imperial power and to Iberia were already established. The
lack of an alternative supply from British North America also reopened British colonial markets
to US grain producers. By the signing of Jay’s Treaty in 1794 that formally re-established
Anglo-American commercial ties, the grain economy was fundamentally a story of continuity
rather than one of Revolutionary rupture. In turn, this raises significant questions as to the true
nature of the American Revolution. While the political outcome was new, the underlying
economic foundation and commercial connections of the new nation remained strikingly
familiar.
The outbreak of the French Revolutionary and subsequent Napoleonic Wars created
tremendous opportunities for neutral US trade. The upheaval opened a new stream of trade for
the US in the carrying trade. This was initially a relatively benign undertaking. As the new
Democratic-Republican administration of Thomas Jefferson entered office in 1801, the carrying
trade was a significant part of both economic and political policy for the nation. Yet, by 1805,
the international situation had changed. The increasingly bitter war between Napoleonic France
and Great Britain inevitably ensnared the US economic regulations and trade restrictions by one
power were met by equally stringent responses from the other in an ever-widening vortex. By
1807, Jefferson proposed a radical solution to the problem: an embargo of all US trade with all
nations.
Superficially, this was an application of a Revolutionary-era lesson to a present-day
problem. Protests and boycotts against British taxation policies had seemed to have succeeded in
the 1760s. The idea was undone by the fundamental continuity of the grain trade, it was too
central an item of trade to be curtailed. The national political economy of the US was
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fundamentally export based, and trade disruptions effected the US more thoroughly than any of
the European powers that the embargo sought to punish. British North America provided a ready
market for US producers, and enforcing the embargo on an unwilling American citizenry created
serious domestic consequences for the Jefferson administration.
With the end of Jefferson’s presidency in 1809, another change in international geopolitics provided opportunity for US grain farmers and merchants. The uprising in Spain against
Joseph Bonaparte, combined with the continued resistance of Portugal and the introduction of
British forces into Iberia provided a perfect market for US produce. In traditional
historiography, the Peninsular War has little connection to the US. An examination of the grain
economy, however, reveals a different story. Although not a belligerent power, a combination of
long-standing ties to Iberia, the influx of British capital into the region, and wartime economic
dislocations deeply involved US interests in the war effort. The importance of American grain
could have provided the Madison administration with a means to garner concessions from Great
Britain, however, the US followed another path in 1812.
For the first time since the American Revolution, a war between Great Britain and the US
threatened the continuity of the grain trade. Yet, this is not what actually happened. Through a
scheme of licensed trade, US grain exports to British-supported Spain and Portugal continued
despite the outbreak of war between the US and Great Britain. It was not until the war in Iberia
concluded in early 1814 that the US and British governments took steps to abolish the licensed
trade.
The US grain trade also continued with British North America despite the region being an
active theater of war. Provisions shortages in the Canadas and the Maritime Provinces both
effected combat operations as British colonial officials sought to encourage continued trade with
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US civilians willing to trade during the course of the deeply unpopular war. It was not until the
end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814 that this pattern changed, as surplus provisions from Europe
briefly replaced the US as the source of these vital supplies. The change in trade patterns was
temporary, as 1815 witnessed the resumption of trade.
The grain trade patterns of 1765 and 1815 are very similar to one another. The American
Revolutionary War, of course, disrupted trade for a period of time, however, other efforts to
block the accustomed grain trade through embargo and (eventually) war were ultimately
unsuccessful. The trade was too deeply ingrained in the private business interests of the people
and in the interests of colonial, national, and imperial governments for long-term restriction.
This examination of the grain trade deepens our understanding of the late colonial and early
republican US. Grain was also vital to the British Atlantic and British North American economy
of this era. The inherent difficulties of overcoming national, imperial, and war-divided
historiographies conceals grain from our easy gaze. Mistaken ideas of periodization and
politically inspired limitations to historical assessments ultimately hide connections that were
fundamental at the time and should be exposed. The availability of surplus grain, particularly
from the mid-Atlantic colonies in what would become the United States, were essential to the
viability of societies around the British Atlantic. Simply stated, without food society ceases to
function. Ideology falls to the wayside, plantations cease production, populations collapse, and
long-distance warfare becomes impossible. Examining the availability of food products, the
laws enabling or limiting access, and the extraordinary (and sometimes illegal) steps taken to
ensure that the staff of life was available to fuel social development was crucial to the rise of
Anglo-American power in a tumultuous Age of Atlantic Revolutions whose political drama
should not completely eclipse its economic foundations and the vital lens of political economy.
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